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Although they share a number of clinical features, autism and schizophrenia are usually 
distinguished by their different ages of onset and certain discriminating features such as 
major impairments to communication in the former and positive psychotic symptoms in 
the latter.  However, the recognition that these conditions are part of broader spectrums of 
impairment has led to the definition of disorders which do not show such marked and 
discriminating features, such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and schizotypal 
personality disorder (SPD).  Reviewing the historical development of these concepts and 
areas of potential overlap or difference between them revealed that they have both shared 
and discriminating features, but no study to date has directly compared them.  Three 
experiments were therefore conducted to compare ASD and SPD using clinical, 
neuropsychological and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques.   
 
In the clinical experiment, standardised measures were used to determine if it was 
possible to distinguish between the groups, and to allow their quantitative comparison.  It 
was possible to distinguish between ASD and SPD in most cases, although 17% of the 
population tested met criteria for both conditions.  This ‘comorbid’ (CM) group were 
therefore considered separately.  When a single diagnosis could be allocated, there were 
clear overlaps of clinical features between the conditions and each condition showed 
more traits of the other than were seen in controls.  The overlaps were most prominent for 
negative schizotypal traits which did not differ between the groups.  The CM group were 
more affected than either the ASD or SPD groups across multiple domains.  All groups 





In the neuropsychological experiment, tests of social cognition, executive function and 
central coherence / local-global processing bias were employed.  The similarities between 
the ASD and SPD groups were striking.  Both showed similar evidence of impairment in 
social cognition and executive function, although there was some evidence of greater 
impairment in working memory in the ASD group.    Differences were seen using a test 
of local-global processing bias, although these were potentially confounded by 
differences in general intellectual ability.     
 
Two fMRI tasks were conducted: a working memory task (a letter based n-back task) and 
a social judgment task (where individuals made judgements of either gender or 
approachability from a picture of a face).  The former did not distinguish between the 
ASD and SPD groups.  In the latter, individuals with SPD showed significantly greater 
activation than the ASD group in several brain regions known to be associated with social 
cognition, with the controls scoring in-between the two.   
 
Although they show marked clinical and brain functional overlaps, the results of the 
fMRI task of social judgement suggest that it is correct to consider ASD and SPD as 
separate diagnostic entities.  The findings are consistent with the idea that, although both 
conditions are associated with impairments in understanding the mental states of others 
(mentalising), the mechanism which underlies these differs between the groups, with 




STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 
The following thesis concerns the relationship between the broader spectrum forms of 
autism and schizophrenia, commonly referred to as autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and 
schizotypal personality disorder (SPD).  It is divided into two introductory chapters, three 
experimental chapters and a conclusion.   
 
Chapter 1 contains a historical perspective on the development of the current concepts of 
ASD and SPD.   
 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature with regard to the potential shared and 
discriminating features of ASD and SPD.   
 
Chapter 3 contains the first experiment of the thesis: a comparative study of the clinical 
features displayed by groups of people with ASD and / or SPD.   
 
Chapter 4 is the second experiment of the thesis: a comparison of the neuropsychological 
characteristics displayed by the same groups.     
 
Chapter 5 is the third experimental section: a comparison of the same groups using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
 


































Psychiatry is unusual in modern medicine as being the only speciality where almost all of 
the conditions treated are classified on the basis of their observed symptoms and signs, as 
opposed to the biologically oriented classificatory systems which characterise other 
branches of medical practice.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, diagnostic certainty and 
consistency are difficult to achieve with such a state of affairs, a problem most clearly 
illustrated by the USA-UK prevalence studies of schizophrenia in the 1970s (Wing 
1971).   
 
The relationship between autism and schizophrenia is one area of psychiatry in which the 
difficulties of clinically based classificatory systems quickly become apparent.  As will 
be expanded later in this chapter, the term autism was originally developed for a 
symptom of schizophrenia; it became a diagnosis in its own right in the 1940s but was 
quickly encompassed in the following years by an ever broadening concept of 
schizophrenia; in the 1970s autism was reclassified as an independent disorder, which it 
has essentially remained until the modern day when questions about the relationship 
between autism and schizophrenia have started to re-emerge (Crespi and Badcock 2008; 
Nylander, Lugnegård et al. 2008; Carroll and Owen 2009; Craddock and Owen 2010), 
with some even proposing the reverse of the historical position, i.e. that schizophrenia is 
a form of autism (King and Lord 2011).   
 
This relationship becomes particularly confusing when one considers that there are 




features are less prominent, making their distinction more difficult.   Of course, 
classificatory systems do exist for these ‘spectrum’ disorders - schizophrenia related 
personality disorders and autism spectrum disorders (such as Asperger syndrome) are not 
infrequent diagnoses in modern psychiatry.  In general these diagnostic categories are 
regarded as being mutually exclusive (American Psychiatric Association 2000).  
However, whether these spectrum disorders are truly independent of each other is unclear 
(Wolff 1995) and there is little research available to guide either the practitioner or the 
academic working in this field.   
 
The initial step in determining the relationship between the autism and schizophrenia 
spectrums is to consider the historical background against which these diagnostic 
categories arose and how they have developed since the original descriptions of their 
more marked forms.  In doing so, it may be possible to discern differences in the 
evolution of these diagnoses which may enlighten the nature of their relationship. 
 
 
1.2: SCHIZOPHRENIA SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
 
1.2.1: A brief history of schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia, as currently defined, has resulted from the amalgamation of a number of 
different conceptualisations of the condition.  Although commonly taught that the 
development of these concepts occurred as a linear progression until such time as the true 




actually represents the (con)fusion of ideologically distinct concepts (Berrios, Rogelio et 
al. 2003).  Regardless of which of these perspectives is taken it remains true that the most 
influential of these on our modern day ideas of the disorder are Emil Kraepelin’s 
dementia praecox  (Kraepelin 1899) and Kurt Schneider’s “symptoms of the first rank” 
(Schneider 1959) but the name by which the condition is known remains that coined by 
Eugen Bleuler in 1908 (Bleuler 1987).   
 
Kraepelin 
Emil Kraepelin first used the term dementia praecox in the 4th edition of his textbook 
Psychiatrie - ein Lehrbuch für Studierende und Ärzte (Psychiatry - a Textbook for 
Students and Physicians) (Kraepelin 1893) .  Here he includes it under the section 
heading of Die Psychischen Entartungsprocesse (the Degenerative Psychoses) and 
equates it with the concept of hepehrenie, previously described by Ewald Hecker (Hecker 
1871).  In this section he also includes the condition katatonie, based upon Karl 
Kahlbaum’s katatonie (Kahlbaum 1874) and his own dementia paranoides (which was in 
turn based upon Kahlbaum’s paranoia (Kahlbaum 1863), all as separate disorders.  In the 
5th edition of his textbook (Kraepelin 1896), this classification persists under the heading 
Verblödungsprocesse (Processes of Mental Deterioration) and it is not until the 6th edition 
in 1899 that he subsumes hebephrenie, katatonie and dementia paranoides under the 
heading dementia praecox (Kraepelin 1899).  The characteristic feature of dementia 
praecox, according to Kraepelin, was the “development of a peculiar kind of 
psychological enfeeblement” and he used this to separate these conditions from manic-




rapid development of “psychological enfeeblement”, Kraepelin also emphasised the 
importance of delusions, hallucinations, impaired attention, thought incoherence, 
stereotyped movements and expressions, deterioration of emotional life and a loss of 
drive as key symptoms of the condition – features which are still accorded importance 
today in modern descriptions of the condition (see Figure 1.1).   
 
It is worth noting that, Kraepelin was guided by the principle that dementia praecox was a 
condition which was entirely biological in nature and which, when enough was known 
about it, would eventually be shown to have a clear biological cause.  However, although 
suggesting that hebephrenie, katatonie and dementia paranoides ought to be classified 
together, Kraepelin also recognised the clinical value in maintaining the different 
subtypes of dementia praecox:  
 
“From a clinical standpoint it is perhaps better for the sake of clarity to keep the three 




The first recorded use of the term schizophrenia occurred in a monograph by Eugen 
Bleuler in 1908 (Bleuler 1987).  Bleuler felt that dementia praecox was a misnomer and 
that his new term, schizophrenia, highlighted the key feature of the disorder – a splitting 





“I would like to emphasize that Kraepelin’s dementia praecox is not necessarily either a 
form of dementia or a disorder of early onset.  For this reason, and because there is no 
adjective or noun which can be derived from the term dementia praecox, I am taking the 
liberty of using the word schizophrenia to denote Kraepelin’s concept.  I believe that the 
tearing apart or splitting of psychic functions is a prominent symptom of the whole 
group.”  (Bleuler 1987) 
 
From the above it is clear that, similar to Kraepelin, Bleuler did not view schizophrenia 
as single disease entity; indeed his seminal text on the subject was called “Dementia 
Praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien” – “Dementia Praecox or the Group of 
Schizophrenias.”  (Bleuler 1950) 
 
Although he stated that the group of schizophrenias and dementia praecox were the same 
conditions, Bleuler placed much less emphasis than Kraepelin on what we would now see 
as positive psychotic symptoms.  Although Bleuler was convinced of the physical nature 
of schizophrenia, his attempts to understand the symptomatology of the disorder were 
influenced by psychodynamic concepts prevalent in the early 20th century.   Indeed, in the 
foreword to his 1911 textbook he specifically states that his ideas represent an 
‘application of Freud’s ideas to dementia praecox’ (Bleuler 1950) although others have 
cited the theories of Pierre Janet and his work on dissociation as having greater influence 





Against this background Bleuler developed the idea that “the splitting of the different 
psychic functions is one of its [schizophrenia’s] most important features.”   Splitting of 
the mental functions was a metaphor commonly used in the 19th century as an 
explanation for unusual behaviour in a wide variety of contexts (Berrios, Rogelio et al. 
2003).  Although he awarded it the status of being the most important part of the 
schizophrenic state, the exact nature of Bleuler’s concept of splitting is not clear (Berrios, 
Rogelio et al. 2003; Moskowitz and Heim 2011).  There appear to be two main contexts 
in which Bleuler used the term: firstly to denote what his son, Manfred Bleuler, has 
described as “the dissociation of thoughts, of emotions, of attitudes and of acting” 
(Bleuler and Bleuler 1986); secondly to relate to the inconsistent domination of the 
schizophrenic personality by different ideologically charged affective states (complexes) 
which become split from each other leading to disintegration of the personality (Stotz-
Ingenlath 2000; Berrios, Rogelio et al. 2003; Moskowitz and Heim 2011).   
 
In addition to splitting, Bleuler also developed the idea that the features of schizophrenia 
could be divided into categories using two categorical axes: fundamental-accessory (i.e. 
characteristic of schizophrenia / also present in other disorders) and primary-secondary 
(i.e. core to the disorder / arising from other features).  The fundamental features of 
schizophrenia were: loosening of associations, disturbances of affectivity, ambivalence, 
and autism.  Of these only loosening of associations was also a primary feature which 
could explain the others (Bleuler’s concept of loosening of associations was broader than 
the current use as a form of thought disorder (Moskowitz and Heim 2011)); delusions, 




As will be detailed later, Bleuler therefore introduced the term autism as a description of 
a feature of schizophrenia; he defined it as “detachment from reality, together with the 
relative and absolute predominance of the inner life” (Bleuler 1950).   
 
Although modern authors have emphasised the differences between Kraepelin’s and 
Bleuler’s formulations of schizophrenia (Berrios, Rogelio et al. 2003; Kuhn 2004; 
Moskowitz and Heim 2011), their writings do often appear to be describing the same 
group of conditions.  However, Kraepelin, in the main, restricted himself to the 
observable clinical features with the apparent belief that these related to an underlying 
biological dysfunction; Bleuler’s descriptions went beyond this as he attempted to 
describe the psychological mechanisms by which he believed many of the obvious 
clinical features of the disorder were generated out of the primary biological deficit(s).  
This approach is consistent with the psychodynamic influences on Bleuler’s work (and 
indeed bears comparison to the modern field of cognitive neuroscience).  One would 
think that Bleuler’s approach would result in a more narrow delineation of the disorder 
involving as it does a fusion of clinical observations and mechanistic propositions.  
However, his assertions that the fundamental features could be present without the 
accessory phenomena (‘simple schizophrenia’ and ‘latent schizophrenia (see section 
1.1.2)), and that often the only signs of schizophrenia are symptoms that are not 
necessarily pathological (e.g. “Character anomalies, indifference, lack of energy, 
unsociability, stubbornness, moodiness, the characteristic for which Goethe could only 




to Bleuler’s schizophrenia becoming a much wider category than Kraepelin’s original 
ideas of dementia praecox (Hoenig 1983).   
 
Schneider   
Like Bleuler and Kraepelin, Schneider regarded schizophrenia as a biological disorder.  
However, unlike them, he aimed to define the symptoms of psychosis in a way that did 
not depend upon causal or mechanistic theories, instead relying solely upon clinical 
observation.  Originally writing in 1939, Schneider defined his so-called “symptoms of 
the first rank” which he asserted were always indicative of schizophrenia in the absence 
of an organic cause: 
 
“audible thoughts, voices heard arguing, voices heard commenting on one's actions; the 
experience of influences playing on the body (somatic passivity experiences); thought 
withdrawal and other interferences with thoughts; diffusion of thought, delusional 
perception, and all feelings, impulses (drives) and volitional acts that are experienced by 
the patient as the work or influence of others.” (Mellor 1970) 
 
The presence of first rank symptoms was considered by Schneider to be sufficient to 
diagnose schizophrenia.  However, they were not necessary for the diagnosis to be made; 
a combination of second rank symptoms (those which could also be found in other 
conditions) and behavioural abnormalities would suffice.  Second rank symptoms of 




perplexity, depressive and euphoric mood changes and feelings of emotional 
impoverishment (Schneider 1959).   
 
The modern concept of schizophrenia 
Schneider’s work gained particular traction in British psychiatry where it was used as the 
basis for the Present State Examination (Wing, Birley et al. 1967).  However in the USA 
Bleuler’s work held sway for many years, in particular the idea that schizophrenia could 
be diagnosed by the presence of the fundamental features alone.  This divergence of 
clinical practice meant that individuals presenting with the same clinical picture would be 
more likely to receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia in the USA than the UK, a fact which 
also influenced the conceptual development of the broader schizophrenia spectrum (see 
Section 1.2.2).  The emergence of the neo-Kraeplinian movement in the 1960s led to a re-
alignment of British and American concepts of schizophrenia with a de-emphasis of the 
fundamental features and greater importance being placed upon positive psychotic 
symptoms.  The current DSM-IV diagnostic criteria used to define schizophrenia are 





Figure 1.1: DSM IV-TR diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia  
 
 
A.  Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) for the following, each present for a significant 
portion of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated): 
1. delusions 
2. hallucinations 
3. disorganised speech (for example frequent derailment or incoherence) 
4. grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour 
5. negative symptoms, that is, affective flattening, alogia, or avolition 
Note: Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or 
hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the 
person’s behaviour or thoughts, or two or more voices conversing with each 
other.  
B.  Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since the onset of the 
disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as work, interpersonal relations, or 
self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to the onset (or when the onset is in 
childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve expected level of interpersonal, academic, or 
occupational achievement). 
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6 months. This 6-month 
period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if successfully treated) that meet 
Criterion A (that is, active-phase symptoms) and may include prodromal or residual 
symptoms. During these prodromal or residual periods, the signs of the disturbance may be 
manifested by only negative symptoms or two or more symptoms listed in Criterion A present 
in an attenuated form (for example, odd beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences).  
D. Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective Disorder and Mood 
Disorder With Psychotic Features have been ruled out because either (1) no Major Depressive, 
Manic, or Mixed Episodes have occurred concurrently with the active-phase symptoms; or (2) 
if mood episodes have occurred during active-phase symptoms, their total duration has been 
brief relative to the duration of the active and residual periods.  
E. Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the direct 
physiological effects of a substance (for example, a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general 
medical condition. 
F. Relationship to a Pervasive Developmental Disorder: If there is a history of Autistic 
Disorder or another Pervasive Developmental Disorder, the additional diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations are present for at least a 





1.2.2: Conceptual development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
Modern ideas of the schizophrenia spectrum have been heavily influenced by the re-
analysis of the Copenhagen sample of the Danish Adoption Studies (Kety, Rosenthal et 
al. 1975) led by Robert Spitzer as part of the development process for DSM-III (Spitzer, 
Endicott et al. 1979).  However, the histories that were re-examined by Spitzer et al were 
mainly cases which were in themselves diagnosed in the original studies as either 
borderline schizophrenia or uncertain borderline schizophrenia.  In his seminal review of 
the history of schizotypal personality disorder, Kendler asserts that the criteria used for 
borderline schizophrenia in the Danish Adoption Studies and the derivation of DSM-III 
diagnostic criteria were based upon two major traditions - descriptions of atypical 
personality traits in relatives of people with schizophrenia and clinical reports of people 
who displayed symptoms of schizophrenia but without marked delusions, hallucinations 
or personality deterioration (Kendler 1985).   
 
Familial Tradition 
The beginnings of the familial approach are seen shortly after Kraepelin’s first 
delineation of dementia praecox.  In the 8th edition of his textbook (originally published 
in German in 1909 and presented for an English audience in 1919) he notes: 
 
“Not infrequently one learns further that among the brothers and sisters of the patients 
there are found striking personalities, criminals, queer individuals, prostitutes, suicides, 
vagrants, wrecked and ruined human beings, all being forms in which more or less well-





As demonstrated by his belief in the importance of his fundamental features of 
schizophrenia, Bleuler too was aware of the broader spectrum of schizophrenia, where 
these features could be in evidence but without accessory symptoms such as delusions 
and hallucinations.  Bleuler used the term simple schizophrenia for those individuals who 
showed only the fundamental features of the condition and implied that it was familially 
related to the more severe forms of the condition:   
 
“Thus, there is no doubt that many simple schizophrenics are at large whose symptoms 
are not sufficiently pronounced to permit the recognition of mental disorder.  If one 
observes the relatives of our patients, one often finds in them peculiarities which are 
qualitatively identical with those of the patients themselves, so that the disease appears to 
be only a quantitative increase of the anomalies seen in the parents and siblings” 
(Bleuler 1950) 
 
Although he describes several cases of simple schizophrenia Bleuler does not actually 
define the condition in any specific way.  Some element of deterioration in function is 
present in all the cases he describes but he also comments that “there are many simple 
schizophrenics among eccentric people of every sort who stand out as world saviours and 
world reformers, philosophers, writers and artists, beside the ‘degenerated’ and 




In the same section of his monograph as simple schizophrenia Bleuler proposes the 
concept of ‘latent schizophrenia.’  Unfortunately he felt that was ‘not necessary to give a 
detailed description of…latent schizophrenia’ but does provide the below: 
 
“There is also a latent schizophrenia, and I am convinced that this is the most frequent 
form, although admittedly these people hardly ever come for treatment…..In this form we 
can see in nuce all the symptoms and all the combinations of symptoms which are present 
in the manifest types of the disease.  Irritable, odd, moody, withdrawn or exaggeratedly 
punctual people….Often one discovers a concealed catatonic or paranoid symptom and 
exacerbations occurring in later life demonstrate that every form of this disease may take 
a latent course.” (Bleuler 1950) 
 
Despite these and other (see (Kendler 1985)) isolated and rather imprecise descriptions of 
unusual personality traits in relatives of people with schizophrenia the first detailed 
exploration of these phenomena appears in part II of “Physique and Character” by Ernst 
Kretschmer (Kretschmer 1925).  Kretschmer is probably most famous now for his 
description of the asthenic, pyknic and athletic body types, but a large portion of his work 
was devoted to the consideration of temperament and personality, in particular those 
associated with major mental disorder.   
 
Kretschmer defined two types of normal personality – schizothymic and cyclothymic – 
which when present to a pathological degree he labelled as schizoid and cycloid 




and bipolar disorder (or circular insanity as it was then sometimes called), which he 
judged as ‘nothing other than marked accentuations of normal types of temperament.’  
He was concerned not just with the ‘pre-psychotic personality of the sick individual 
himself’ but also asserted that ‘the typical characteristics of the constitutional type may 
sometimes be more clearly delineated in the nearest relations than in the patient himself’ 
(Kretschmer 1925) (Figure 1.2). 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Family tree of a schizophrenic individual, taken from Kretschmer (1925) 
 
He outlines three main types of schizoid personality,  
1. Unsociable, quiet, reserved, serious (humourless), eccentric. 
2. Timid, shy, with fine feelings, sensitive, nervous, excitable, fond of nature and books. 




and emphasises that the core aspect of the schizoid personality is type 1 or what he earlier 
in the book equates to Bleuler’s autism, by which he means ‘living inside oneself’  or 
giving no sign on the surface of true ideas or feelings.  It appears that Kretschmer felt that 
this was, at least in part, an unconscious process:   
 
 ‘One cannot know how they feel; sometimes they don’t know themselves’  
 
Kretschmer outlines hyperaesthetic (‘emotionally sensitive, abnormally tender, constantly 
wounded, mimosa-like natures who are all nerves’) and anaesthetic (‘insensitive and 
cold’, ‘ lack of affective resonance’) components to the schizoid personality which are 
usually present in varying amounts in a single individual’s ‘psychaesthetic proportion’.  
Both components lead to different forms of autism, either through a protective response 
to an unpleasant hypersensitivity to the environment and others (found in 
hyperaesthetics), or through a lack of emotional response to the world (found in 
anaesthetics):  
 
‘He draws himself back into himself, because he has no reason to do anything else, 
because all that is about him can offer him nothing.” (Kretschmer 1925) 
 
In addition to the core social dysfunction Kretschmer also mentions other traits, not 
discussed by Kendler, including a tendency towards mystical religiosity, an overformal 
way of speaking and particularity about the appearance.  Interestingly, in the context of 




a preference for “office work that goes on mechanically, according to fixed rules and 
regulations” and that this results from an affected person’s desire to protect themselves 
from the effects of their hyperaesthesia; similarly, that shutting oneself away leads, in 
some, to a “building up of their own world out of thoughts and favourite pursuits.”   
 
The first systematic exploration of the schizophrenia spectrum in families of people with 
schizophrenia was conducted by Franz Kallmann and published in his 1938 book “The 
genetics of schizophrenia” (Kallmann 1938).  He identified 1,087 patients with 
schizophrenia admitted to the Herzberge Hospital of Berlin in the first ten years of its 
opening and studied 13,851 of their relatives (12,153 genetically related) using a number 
of different sources of information.  Around 10% of these relatives were found to have 
schizophrenia; however 25% met criteria for the broader category “schizoidia.”  Within 
schizoidia Kallmann defined two categories: borderline cases and schizoid psychopaths.  
Borderline cases were described as “eccentric personalities….masked schizophrenics, 
postpsychotic cases after short attacks, and all the various schizoid personalities with 
peculiar and emotionally defective attributes.”  He considered borderline cases as “latent 
schizophrenics and not as carriers of a schizoid constitution” and that “they form, in the 
scale of the schizophrenic disease complex, the transition from homozygotic trait-carriers 
with definite schizophrenic processes to the schizoid psychopaths.”  Schizoid 
psychopaths were defined as “individuals who showed the fundamental schizoid 
characteristics of autistic introversion, emotional inadequacy, sudden surges of 
temperament and inappropriate motor response to emotional stimuli” and included 




and pietistic religio-maniacs, secretive recluses, sectarian dreamers out of touch with 
reality, and the over-pedantic, avaricious and literal-minded people” (Kallmann 1938). 
 
Following Kallmann and prior to the Danish Adoption Studies, there were several family 
studies which gave detailed descriptions of atypical personality traits found in relatives of 
people with schizophrenia.  Slater lists five traits which he identified as associated with 
having a relative diagnosed with schizophrenia: paranoid traits, eccentricities, lack of feeling, 
reserve (incapacity for warmth) and anergia (Slater 1953).  Stephens described increased 
rates of three personality types in relatives of people with schizophrenia: psychopathic, 
paranoid and schizoid.  These were defined as follows:  
 
“The term psychopathic personality was applied to persons whose lives were 
characterized by lack of restraint, antisocial, aggressive or criminal trends, emotional 
instability, or irresponsibility. Paranoid personality, described those who were 
consistently hostile, not only to the interviewer but also to acquaintances, neighbours and 
hospital staff but expressed no overt delusions. Two rather distinct subgroups were 
included under the term schizoid personality: (i) individuals who were socially 
withdrawn from choice, shy, submissive, lacking initiative, or unable to establish 
emotionally warm or close relationships; (ii) individuals who were rambling, vague, 
unrealistic and often excessively anxious at interview and appeared to be eccentric and 
solitary in their personal lives.” (Stephens, Atkinson et al. 1975) 
 
Thus, within the familial tradition the key traits which separated family members of 




isolation, affective coldness and suspiciousness (Kendler 1985).  Although some authors 
refer to superstitiousness, mysticism and mild positive symptoms these are not given a 
primary role in distinguishing relatives of people with schizophrenia from unaffected 
individuals.     
 
Clinical Tradition 
The clinical tradition, as defined by Kendler, is composed of case reports of individuals 
who presented with traits which the treating clinician felt to be fundamentally related to 
schizophrenia, but which fell short of the full diagnosis.  It is worth noting that these 
clinicians were primarily dynamic psychotherapists practicing in the USA at a time when 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia was more broadly applied in North America than it was in 
Europe (Wing 1971).  Although each of the authors reviewed by Kendler specifically 
linked the condition they described to schizophrenia, their reasoning for doing so must be 
viewed within the psychodynamic construct and broad definition of schizophrenia 
prevalent at that time in the USA.   
 
Zilboorg  described “ambulatory schizophrenias” in 1941 and illustrated his ideas using 
three cases – all men convicted of murder (Zilboorg 1941).  The term crops up commonly 
in the psychiatric literature in the following few decades and is often likened to Bleuler’s 
latent schizophrenia (Hollender 1959).  Zilboorg himself coined the term because the 
condition was such that although the men had a form of schizophrenia they appeared 
superficially typical and could therefore be treated as outpatients; in response to its 




rather than the outpatient nature of their treatment that defines the condition (Zilboorg 
1957).  In such cases, Zilboorg felt that “autistic contemplation, or, as Bleuler preferred 
to term it later, dereistic thinking” was “the outstanding feature of any schizophrenia”.  
This thinking could be manifest as anything from a taciturn nature to active social 
withdrawal accompanied by purposeless wandering between jobs or interests, and an 
increased preoccupation with bodily symptoms to the point that many presented with 
somatic complaints.  Patients were said to show illogical thinking and give vague 
rambling answers to questions but marked thought disorder, delusions or hallucinations 
were absent (Hollender 1959).   
 
Helene Deutsch, who studied for a short time with Kraepelin, but later became a firm 
adherent of Freud, described the “as-if” personality which she felt may represent a 
prodromal phase of schizophrenia.  The term “as-if” was adopted by her as she felt that 
“every attempt to understand the way of feeling or manner of life of this type forces on 
the observer the inescapable impression that the individual’s whole relationship with life 
has something about it which is lacking in genuineness and yet outwardly runs along ‘as 
if’ it were complete” (Deutsch 1986).  Affected individuals were said to have a poor sense 
of sense of self-identity and have no connection with their emotional state but lacked 
awareness of these deficits.  Despite these difficulties they tended to display little sign of 
disorder other than the sense of inauthenticity as they could compensate by mimicking 
others in "a spasmodic, if skilled, repetition of a prototype without the slightest trace of 





In 1949 Hoch and Polatin described a condition which they termed ‘pseudoneurotic 
schizophrenia’ and presented 5 case studies as examples (Hoch and Polatin 1949).  The 
term pseudoneurotic was chosen as such cases often presented initially as neuroses but 
later it would become evident that they were in fact forms of schizophrenia.  Hoch and 
Polatin take the Bleulerian view that schizophrenia is defined by the presence of 
fundamental symptoms and describe how these are present in more subtle forms in 
pseudoneurotic schizophrenia.  From a symptomatic perspective, these individuals 
commonly presented with extreme anxiety and ‘pan-neurosis’, a state which differed 
from that seen in typical neurotic patients due to its all-encompassing nature, pervading 
many aspects of the patients life and including multiple different neurotic symptoms.  
Individuals were said to be unable to describe or give explanations of their anxiety, not 
moving beyond vague, repetitive and stereotyped descriptions of their symptomatology.  
Magical thinking was commonly elicited in relation to phobic symptoms.  Brief psychotic 
episodes, termed by the authors as ‘micropsychosis’ were also relatively common and 
thought to evolve in a gradual fashion.  During these episodes, hypochondriacal ideas, 
ideas of reference and depersonalisation were particularly significant symptoms and 
patients showed a tendency to “zig-zag repeatedly over the reality line”.  Atypical 
psychosexual organisation or ‘polymorphous perverse manifestations’ were held to be an 
important feature of the condition.  None of the patients described had a family history of 
schizophrenia.  Later Hoch formalised the diagnostic criteria as in Figure 1.3 (Hoch and 
Cattell 1959) and presented outcome data showing that 20% of affected people went on 
to develop schizophrenia with half of those showing chronic forms of the disorder (Hoch, 





Figure 1.3: Diagnostic criteria for pseudoneurotic schizophrenia, from Hoch and Cattell 
(1959) 
 
In 1953 Sandor Rado coined the term schizotype, during a lecture given to the American 
Psychiatric Association (Rado 1953).  Although, the lecture was an exposition of 
psychodynamic classification, Rado used the term schizotype as a condensation of 
schizophrenic phenotype.  Rado viewed the schizotype as the inherited disposition 
towards developing schizophrenia and that a number of psychodynamic traits, together 
called the schizotypal organisation, were detectable in genetically vulnerable individuals 
regardless of whether they ever suffered a frank psychotic illness.  The primary aspect of 
the schizotypal organisation was held to be an “integrative pleasure deficiency”, leading 
to a lack of the “motivational strength” of the “machinery of psychodynamic integration.”  
As a result, schizotypal individuals are required to (unconsciously) adopt several 
compensatory mechanisms to prevent disintegration; these are the conservation of their 
limited resource of pleasure, marked dependence on others and the substitution of 





The work of Paul Meehl in 1962 represents one of the first attempts to produce an 
integrative model of psychosis via the concept of schizotypy (Meehl 1962).  Meehl 
proposed that the inherited deficit in schizophrenia was one of neural integration, which 
he labelled schizotaxia, and that this was most likely due to aberrant synaptic control.  All 
schizotaxic individuals were then postulated to develop a personality structure which, 
following Rado, Meehl called schizotypal.  The degree of schizotypal traits and whether 
an individual developed clinical schizophrenia was dependent upon environmental 
influences acting upon the individual.  The primary schizotypal feature was held to be 
“cognitive slippage” – essentially a mild form of thought disorder.  Other features which 
may or may not be present depending upon the environment and social learning 
experienced by an individual were: interpersonal aversiveness (“social fear, distrust, 
expectation of rejection, and conviction of his own unlovability”); anhedonia (“a marked, 
widespread, and refractory defect in pleasure capacity”); and ambivalence.  Meehl also 
commented that autistic and dereistic thinking were secondary to the other features – 
“Crudely put, if a person cannot think straight, gets little pleasure, and is afraid of 
everyone, he will of course learn to be autistic and dereistic.”   
 
Thus, within the clinical tradition, as described by Kendler (1985), the key components of 
the schizophrenia spectrum were considered to be magical or fantastical thinking, mild 
thought disorder evidenced by an idiosyncratic communication style, attenuated 






DSM-II concepts of the schizophrenia spectrum 
Although there were many different names for schizophrenia spectrum disorders in use at 
the time, DSM-II largely took its lead from Bleuler’s nomenclature through the inclusion 
of three relevant disorders – simple schizophrenia, latent schizophrenia and schizoid 
personality (American Psychiatric Association 1952).  Paranoid personality disorder was 
also included in DSM-II but it should be noted that, although there are clear symptomatic 
overlaps with paranoid schizophrenia, paranoid personality disorder has historically been 
considered as more similar to delusional disorders or paraphrenia than to schizophrenia 
(Akhtar 1990).   
 
The characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia in DSM-II were felt to be alterations of 
concept formation (which may lead to psychologically self-protective delusions and 
hallucinations); ambivalent, constricted and inappropriate emotional responsiveness and 
loss of empathy; and regressive bizarre behaviour.  Simple schizophrenia was used for 
cases with a slow and insidious onset of withdrawal, apathy and indifference leading to 
progressive functional deterioration, but without marked positive psychotic symptoms.  
Latent schizophrenia was applied to individuals who clearly presented with the 
characteristic features of schizophrenia but who had no history of positive psychotic 
symptoms.  Pseudo-neurotic and borderline schizophrenia were included here.  Schizoid 
personality disorder was characterized by shyness, over-sensitivity, seclusiveness, 
avoidance of close or competitive relationships, and often eccentricity.  Autistic thinking, 




and affected people were thought to react to disturbing events with detachment, however 
they did not lose the capacity to recognize reality.     
 
Danish Adoption Study of Schizophrenia 
The Danish Adoption Register contains the details of all legal, non-familial adoptions in 
Denmark between 1924 and 1947 – 14,425 in total.  The register was established in the 
early 1960s with the primary purpose being to examine the genetic and environmental 
influences on the development of schizophrenia (Petersen and Sorensen 2011). The initial 
study focused on the smaller Copenhagen sample of 5483 (Petersen and Sorensen 2011).  
The prevalence of schizophrenia in biological relatives of adopted people with 
schizophrenia was 5.6% and the prevalence of the “borderline state” was 14.8% (Kety, 
Rosenthal et al. 1968).  The borderline state was specified as including “pseudoneurotic 
schizophrenia, border-line, ambulatory schizophrenia, questionable simple schizophrenia, 
“psychotic character” [and] severe schizoid individual”.  The characteristics of the 
borderline state were: 
 
“i) Thinking: strange or atypical mentation: thought shows tendency to ignore 
reality, logic and experience (to an excessive degree) resulting in poor adaptation to life 
experience (despite the presence of a normal IQ); fuzzy, murky, vague speech.  
ii) Experience: brief episodes of cognitive distortion (the patient can, and does, snap 
back but during the episode the idea has more the character of a delusion than an ego-
alien obsessive thought); feelings of depersonalization, of strangeness or unfamiliarity 




iii) Affective: anhedonia - never experiences intense pleasure - never happy; no deep or 
intense involvement with anyone or anybody.  
iv) Interpersonal behaviour: may appear poised, but lacking in depth (“as if” 
personality); sexual adjustment: chaotic fluctuation, mixture of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality.  
v) Psychopathology: multiple neurotic manifestations which shift frequently (obsessive 
concerns, phobias, conversion, psychosomatic symptoms, etc.): severe widespread 
anxiety.” 
(Kety, Rosenthal et al. 1968) 
 
As Kendler points out, many of these criteria were derived from amalgamations of 
concepts taken from the clinical tradition with Hoch’s pseudoneurotic schizophrenia 
given particular prominence; in contrast, the majority of features from the familial 
tradition are not mentioned (Kendler 1985).   
 
DSM-III to the present day 
The development of DSM-III represented a dramatic shift in the classification of 
disorders which were considered to be possibly related to schizophrenia, with the 
removal of some long-established diagnostic categories, the reformulation of others and 
the development of new disorders (American Psychiatric Association 1980).  Most 
strikingly, a new condition called schizotypal personality disorder was created which 
included many individuals previously classified under simple schizophrenia, latent 




personality disorder was retained but with a much more limited scope and the 
classification of paranoid personality disorder remained unchanged.  This classificatory 
system has remained broadly unchanged since then, despite draft proposals for DSM-5 
making the case for significant alterations (see below).   
 
Figure 1.4: Changes in schizophrenia spectrum related diagnostic categories between 
DSM-II and DSM-III 
 
The criteria for schizotypal personality disorder were derived from a reanalysis of data 
from the Danish Adoption Study by Robert Spitzer, who was leading the development of 
DSM-III, and colleagues (Spitzer, Endicott et al. 1979).  Spitzer and colleagues began by 
consulting with the authors of the Danish Adoption Study to develop a 24 item list of the 
characteristics they had used to diagnose borderline states.  They then applied this list to 
36 cases from the Danish Adoption Study with diagnoses of borderline states.  These 
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cases included both individuals with relatives who had schizophrenia and others who 
were relatives of controls.  However, they found that many clinical features of these cases 
were not captured by the 24 items and that many of the items were not seen in any of the 
cases.  They therefore re-examined the cases, noting important clinical features and 
collapsed these into 17 items.  When re-applied to the cases they found that using eight of 
the items allowed them to separate borderline states from non-schizophrenia spectrum 
individuals with a sensitivity of 86% and a specificity of 95%.  These eight items were 
somewhat validated through a large survey of clinicians working with individuals 
diagnosed with borderline states and were chosen to form the basis of schizotypal 
personality disorder in DSM-III, although not without controversy at the time (Spitzer, 
Endicott et al. 1979).  Since then they have been largely validated through detailed 
studies of relatives of people with schizophrenia (Kendler and Gruenberg 1984; Kendler, 
McGuire et al. 1993; Kendler, Gruenberg et al. 1994; Maier, Lichtermann et al. 1994; 
Chang, Chen et al. 2002; Tienari, Wynne et al. 2003).  Possibly as a result, the diagnostic 
category of schizotypal personality disorder, has remained largely unchanged since its 
adoption, with the only alteration for DSM-IV being the addition of a ninth item covering 








Figure 1.5: DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for schizotypal personality disorder 
 
Much of the focus during the development of DSM-III personality disorders was upon 
the clarification of the two major usages of the term ‘borderline’ at that time (borderline 
schizophrenia, or borderline states as it was called in the Danish American Adoption 
Study, and borderline personality disorder).  This work allowing for the categorisation 
and creation of operationalised criteria for schizotypal personality disorder and borderline 
personality disorder (Spitzer, Endicott et al. 1979).  However, other decisions potentially 
relevant to the study of the schizophrenia spectrum included the diminishment of the 
previously broadly defined category of schizoid personality disorder and the retention of 
paranoid personality disorder.  Compared to the derivation of schizotypal personality 
disorder, there is little information in the literature regarding the rationale for and 
validation of these decisions.  Similarly, there are substantial changes to both schizoid 
and paranoid personality disorder between DSM-III and DSM-IV with little available 
rationale.  For paranoid personality disorder, more emphasis is placed on mistrust in 
A. A pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits marked by acute discomfort with, and 
reduced capacity for, close relationships as well as by cognitive or perceptual distortions and 
eccentricities of behaviour, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as 
indicated by five (or more) of the following:  
 
     1. ideas of reference (excluding delusions of reference)  
     2. odd beliefs or magical thinking that influences behaviour and is inconsistent with subcultural 
         norms  
     3. unusual perceptual experiences, including bodily illusions  
     4. odd thinking and speech (eg. vague, circumstantial, metaphorical, overelaborate or stereotyped)  
     5. suspiciousness or paranoid ideation  
     6. inappropriate or constricted affect  
     7. behaviour or appearance that is odd, eccentric, or peculiar  
     8. lack of close friends or confidants other than first-degree relatives  
     9. excessive social anxiety that does not diminish with familiarity and tends to be associated with  
         paranoid fears rather than negative judgments about self  
 
B. Does not occur exclusively during the course of schizophrenia, a mood disorder with psychotic 
features, another psychotic disorder, or a pervasive developmental disorder and is not due to the 




DSM-IV (See Figure 1.6) whereas DSM-III also contained sections regarding 
hypersensitivity and restricted affectivity.  Compared to DSM-III, DSM IV schizoid 
personality disorder contains additional items related to the deliberate avoidance of others 
(items 1-4 in Figure 1.7).    
 












Figure 1.7: DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for schizoid personality disorder 
 
A. A pervasive mistrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as 
malevolent, beginning in early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by four (or 
more of the following:  
 
     1. suspects, without sufficient basis, that others are exploiting, harming or deceiving him or her  
     2. is preoccupied with unjustified doubts about the loyalty of associates  
     3. is reluctant to confide in others because of unwarranted fear that the information will be used    
         maliciously against him or her  
     4. reads hidden, demeaning or threatening meanings into benign remarks/events  
     5. persistently bears grudges, i.e. is unforgiving of insults, injuries or slights  
     6. perceives attacks on his or her character or reputation that are not apparent to others and is quick  
         to react angrily or to counterattack  
     7. has recurrent suspicions, without justification, regarding fidelity of spouse or partner  
 
B. Does not occur exclusively during the course of schizophrenia, a mood disorder with psychotic 
features, or another psychotic disorder and is not due to the direct physiological effects of a general 
medical condition 
 
A. A pervasive pattern of detachment from social relationships and a restricted range of expression of 
emotions in interpersonal settings, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as 
indicated by four (or more) of the following:  
     1. neither desires nor enjoys close relationships, including being part of a family  
     2. almost always chooses solitary activities     
     3. has little, if any, interest in having sexual experiences with another person  
     4. takes pleasure in few, if any, activities  
     5. lacks close friends or confidants other than first degree relatives  
     6. appears indifferent to the praise or criticism of others  
     7. emotional coldness, detachment or flattened affectivity  
 
B. Does not occur exclusively during the course of schizophrenia, a mood disorder with psychotic 
features, another psychotic disorder, or a pervasive developmental disorder and is not due to the direct 




Importantly, although paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders are 
commonly seen as related to each other (e.g. all three are commonly referred to as Cluster 
A or the ‘odd’ personality disorders) and there are clear overlaps in their 
symptomatology, the status of schizoid personality disorder and paranoid personality 
disorder in relation to the schizophrenia spectrum remains unclear.  As discussed above 
the postulated relationship between schizotypal personality disorder and schizophrenia 
has been clearly validated by family studies; this is not the case for schizoid and paranoid 
personality disorder where the literature is more conflicting (Kendler and Gruenberg 
1984; Kendler, McGuire et al. 1993; Kendler, Gruenberg et al. 1994; Maier, Lichtermann 
et al. 1994; Chang, Chen et al. 2002; Tienari, Wynne et al. 2003).  
 
The future of the schizophrenia spectrum 
In December 2012 the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Health Disorders, DSM-5, was signed off by the trustees of the American Psychiatric 
Association.  The initial draft, produced in 2010, proposed a radical shake-up of the 
personality disorder section, with five of the ten categories being dropped and the 
introduction of an additional new six item dimensional scale.  Two of the five categories 
put forward for exclusion were schizoid personality disorder and paranoid personality 
disorder.  However, these ideas have been rejected, being placed instead in the ‘require 
more research’ section and the original ten categories have been maintained with no 
dimensional scale to be used.  The exact criteria for each disorder remain unknown but a 
June 2011 draft of the proposed criteria for schizotypal personality disorder are shown in 




in criterion B (‘pathological personality traits’) much of criterion A (‘impairments in 
personality functioning’) is new.  Of particular relevance to the current study is the 
inclusion of an impairment in empathic function, a characteristic more classically 



















Figure 1.8: Proposed DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for schizotypal personality disorder
The essential features of a personality disorder are impairments in personality (self and interpersonal) 
functioning and the presence of pathological personality traits. To diagnose schizotypal personality 
disorder, the following criteria must be met:  
 
A. Significant impairments in personality functioning manifest by:  
     1. Impairments in self functioning:  
a. Identity: Confused boundaries between self and others; distorted self-concept; emotional 
expression often not congruent with context or internal experience.  
b. Self-direction: Unrealistic or incoherent goals; no clear set of internal standards.  
     2. Impairments in interpersonal functioning:  
a. Empathy: Pronounced difficulty understanding impact of own behaviors on others; frequent 
misinterpretations of others’ motivations and behaviors.  
b. Intimacy: Marked impairments in developing close relationships, associated with mistrust 
and anxiety.  
 
B. Pathological personality traits in the following domains:  
     1. Psychoticism, characterized by:  
a. Eccentricity: Odd, unusual, or bizarre behavior or appearance; saying unusual or 
inappropriate things.  
b. Cognitive and perceptual dysregulation: Odd or unusual thought processes; vague, 
circumstantial, metaphorical, over-elaborate, or stereotyped thought or speech; odd sensations 
in various sensory modalities.  
c. Unusual beliefs and experiences: Thought content and views of reality that are viewed by 
others as bizarre or idiosyncratic; unusual experiences of reality.  
     2. Detachment, characterized by:  
a. Restricted affectivity: Little reaction to emotionally arousing situations; constricted 
emotional experience and expression; indifference or coldness.  
b. Withdrawal: Preference for being alone to being with others; reticence in social situations; 
avoidance of social contacts and activity; lack of initiation of social contact.  
     3. Negative Affectivity, characterized by:  
a. Suspiciousness: Expectations of – and heightened sensitivity to – signs of interpersonal ill-
intent or harm; doubts about loyalty and fidelity of others; feelings of persecution.  
 
C. The impairments in personality functioning and the individual’s personality trait expression are 
relatively stable across time and consistent across situations.  
 
D. The impairments in personality functioning and the individual’s personality trait expression are not 
better understood as normative for the individual’s developmental stage or socio-cultural environment.  
 
E. The impairments in personality functioning and the individual’s personality trait expression are not 
solely due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, medication) or a 





1.3: AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
 
1.3.1: Conceptual development of autism spectrum disorders 
 
The introduction of autism as a term 
As described in the previous section, the term autism was initially coined by Eugen 
Bleuler to describe what he felt was a characteristic feature of people with schizophrenia.  
The term itself is derived from the Greek ‘autos’ meaning ‘self’, combined with the 
suffix ‘ismos’ meaning action or state, thus it is appropriate that Bleuler used it to 
describe people who have “cut themselves off as much as possible from any contact with 
the external world” and who show “detachment from reality, together with the relative 
and absolute predominance of the inner life” (Bleuler 1950).  Although his definition 
referred to patients’ internal lives, Bleuler described a wide variety of observable 
behavioural presentations which arose out of autism: difficulty in forming relationships 
with others, withdrawal into the self, indifference, rigidity, inappropriateness, aberrant 
logic, unusual priorities, inappropriateness and a tendency towards delusional ideas 
(Parnas, Bovet et al. 2002).  Bleuler’s autism was developed in a different direction by 
his student and colleague, Eugene Minkowski, who regarded it as the manifest features of 
the core cause (‘trouble génératuer’) of schizophrenia – a lack of the ‘vital contact with 
reality’ (Urfer 2001).   This lack of vital contact is evidenced in patients by unusual 
behaviours which show no regard for the usual societal demands or expectations: one 
example he gives is of a patient surprised at being arrested for trying to hand deliver a 
letter to the American ambassador protesting at the sentence of two anarchists to death; 




(Urfer 2001); a third is of a boy who constantly questions his family seemingly without 
purpose other than to interrogate (Minkowski, Targowla et al. 2001).  Interestingly the 
latter case, Paul, has several distinct qualities which one would associate with the modern 
day concept of the autism spectrum, although Minkowski clearly regarded him having 
schizophrenia.   
 
The introduction of autism as a condition 
Although there exist historical and clinical descriptions of individuals who would likely 
have fit modern diagnostic criteria for an autism spectrum disorder (Frith 2003) there was 
no clear attempt to delineate the condition as a distinct disorder until a paper by Grunya 
Sukhareva in 1926 entitled “Die Schizoid Psychopathien im Kindesalter” (Schizoid 
Psychopathy in Childhood) (Wolff 2004).  Here she described six boys aged between 2 
and 14 years old with a common constellation of symptoms which would now be 
subsumed under autism spectrum disorders (particularly Asperger Syndrome):  
 
“odd type of thinking….autistic attitude….flatness and superficiality of emotion…. 
sticking to tasks which had been started….psychic inflexibility with difficulty adapting to 
novelty….impulsive, odd behaviour…stereotypic neologisms….suggestibility…motor 
impairments.”   
 
By labelling them as having schizoid personality disorder Sukhareva acknowledged that 




but she emphasised that the condition which they presented with “differs profoundly from 
schizophrenia in terms of its pathogenesis.”   
 
Although Sukhareva has been described as the “beloved teacher” of child psychiatrists in 
the Soviet Union (Rollins 1972) and this paper is now generally accepted as being one of 
the first attempts to delineate autism spectrum disorders as distinct diagnostic entities, 
this case series remained essentially unknown in the Western world until it was translated 
by Sula Wolff in 1996, long after others had been awarded primacy.  It is interesting to 
reflect on the vagaries of chance, language, institution, orientation and affiliation that 
determine whether such descriptions become seminal papers or pass into the archives as 
interesting historical footnotes.   
 
The first widely publicised use of the term autism to describe a distinct condition was in 
1943 by Leo Kanner, the Director of Child Psychiatry at The Johns Hopkins Hospital in 
Baltimore.  Kanner’s seminal case series concerned 11 children with a condition he 
defined as an “autistic disturbance of affective contact” (Kanner 1943).  According to 
Kanner, the pathognomonic characteristic of this condition was the “inability to relate to 
themselves in the ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of life” or an 
“extreme autistic aloneness.”  Three of the eleven children were mute, while the other 
eight showed disturbances in the use of language to communicate meaning, including 
pronounced delayed echolalia.  Other key characteristics were “monotonously 
repetitious” behaviour, an “anxiously obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness”, 




potential.  Although Kanner recognised the similarities of the condition he described to 
schizophrenia (“extreme autism, stereotypy and echolalia”), he discriminated it on the 
immediately postnatal onset of his disorder, the childrens’ rigid need for sameness and 
the gradual improvement shown by many of the children, as opposed to the progressive 
dementia of schizophrenia.  In addition to emphasising the uniqueness of the condition, 
Kanner also clearly states his belief that, although the parents are mostly “limited in 
genuine interest in people”, the difficulties that the children presented with were innate 
and could not be exclusively explained by aberrant parental relations.   
 
Hans Asperger was a German psychiatrist who in 1944, apparently unknown to Kanner, 
published descriptions of 4 cases of a condition he termed “der autistichen psychopathie” 
(autistic psychopathy – psychopathy being equivalent to the modern term personality 
disorder) (Asperger 1991).  He regarded the fundamental difficulty in these children, and 
the 200 others he claimed to have seen, as being a limitation of their social relationships.  
Perhaps the most vivid summary he gives of the social difficulties is: 
 
“Autistic children are egocentric in the extreme.  They follow only their own wishes, 
interests and spontaneous impulses, without considering restrictions or prescriptions 
imposed from outside….They do not show deliberate acts of cheek but have a genuine 
defect in their understanding of another person……For personal distance too they have 
no sense of feeling….they unconcernedly lean on others….run their fingers over them as 
if they were a piece of furniture…impose themselves without shyness on anybody.  They 




All this goes, of course, without any regard for differences in age, social rank or common 
courtesies.” (Asperger 1991) 
 
In addition, children were said to appear unfeeling towards their parents and to regularly 
carry out “autistic acts of malice” as a result of not being aware they are hurting others, 
either physically or mentally.    Their ability to learn through social imitation was limited, 
instead they were forced to use “elaborate rules and laws” to learn.   
 
Asperger also describes the children’s unusual speech: the rhythm and tone of speech are 
disturbed, unusual novel expressions and neologisms are employed, and, although the 
children show “highly sophisticated linguistic skills” there was often a lack of true 
communicative function to their language.  Non-verbal communication was also felt to be 
impaired; children were said to display only fleeting gaze for both people and objects and 
they had a paucity of facial expression and gestures.   
 
In addition to the social and communication difficulties Asperger described the presence 
of stereotypic behaviour, overabsorption in preoccupations and a tendency to collect 
items.  He also identified hypersensitivity to sensation, in both a positive and a negative 
fashion.    
 
Asperger ascribes great importance to what he calls “autistic intelligence” which is 
evidenced by originality and unconventional thinking and language; interestingly this is 




up to assimilate and learn an adult’s knowledge”.  Similarly he also emphasises the 
potential for good outcome, particular in the intellectually unimpaired, which at least in 
part results from “their unswerving determination and penetrating intellectual powers 
[and] their narrowness and single mindedness”. 
 
Like Kanner, Asperger felt that the condition he described was inborn - “an explanation 
[for autism] in terms of exogenous causes must seem absurd”  - but he gives the starting 
age as prior to two years old as opposed to at birth.   
 
Although Asperger’s synthesis of the clinical characteristics of autistic psychopathy is 
less precise (and certainly less concise) than Kanner’s, there is an impressive 
perceptiveness in his work.  As Frith (1991) points out in her translation notes the 
paragraphs quoted above regarding social limitations are a very accurate description of 
poor mentalising, particularly when he refers to “a genuine defect in their understanding 
of another person”.  He also considers that the condition may be an “extreme variant of 
male intelligence”, an idea since popularised by Simon Baron-Cohen and colleagues 
(Baron-Cohen 2002).  He predates the idea of the autism spectrum when he comments 
that “the characteristic manifestations of autism…are not at all rare in children, 
especially in their milder forms” and indeed the broader autism phenotype when he 
discusses the “related incipient traits in parents or relatives”.  Finally he also notes 
similarities with other personality types, including Kretschmer’s schizothyme, and 





Evolution of the concept of autism: 1940s – 1950s 
In the 20 years following Asperger’s and Kanner’s original descriptions there were a 
number of important occurrences relevant to the conceptualisation of autistic 
psychopathy.  The first is that Asperger’s writings went largely unnoticed by the 
psychiatric community.  It has never really been clear why this was the case, although it 
is often attributed simply to language – Asperger published solely in German, whereas 
Kanner’s descriptions dominated the English literature.  Some have argued that Kanner 
was likely to be aware of Asperger’s work but sought to suppress it, presumably for 
reasons of academic interest (Feinstein 2010).  Certainly Kanner made no reference in 
any of his papers to Asperger’s work, which seems unusual given that he is said to have 
been thorough in other aspects of his literature reviews and could speak German fluently 
(Chown 2012).  However, it should be remembered that these were the days of the 
Second World War and transatlantic communication was difficult.  Besides similar 
accusations could be levelled at Asperger in regard to his lack of reference to 
Sukhareva’s paper, written in German 18 years before he published his account.   
 
Although Kanner stated in his original paper that he regarded autism as a condition which 
was inborn he did comment on the aloof, academic and distant nature of the parents of 
the children he described.  In the modern day we would regard this as a manifestation of 
the broader autism phenotype: a constellation of mild autistic-like traits seen in 
individuals who are genetically related to those with ASD, and indeed it appears that 
Asperger thought this was indeed the case.  However, at the time that they were writing 




difficulties in interaction was anathema to a generation of psychiatrists raised in the 
psychodynamic tradition.  Consistent with the zeitgeist, autism rapidly became regarded 
to be the consequence of cold parenting (Kanner 1949), a theory which persisted for 
many years.   
 
Most relevant for the current discourse is that in the years following its first description 
autism came to be regarded as a form of very early onset childhood schizophrenia.  In his 
1943 paper Kanner mentions that some of the symptoms are similar to those of 
schizophrenia – “extreme autism, obsessiveness, stereotypy and echolalia” – but asserts 
their difference, primarily on the basis of age of onset and prognosis.  As discussed 
earlier the concept of schizophrenia, particularly in the USA, was broadened considerably 
in the 1940s – 1960s by clinical descriptions of individuals felt to exhibit aspects of 
Bleuler’s fundamental symptoms but who did not display classical positive symptoms.  
When one considers how the DSM-II diagnosis of schizophrenia was based upon aberrant 
concept formation, unusual emotional responsiveness, loss of empathy and bizarre 
behaviour it becomes rather easy to see how psychiatrists at this time viewed autism as a 
very early onset of schizophrenia which interferes with or causes a regression in 
development (Bender 1947).  Kanner himself considered this issue in an address to the 
American Psychiatric Association where he reverses his previous position by concluding, 
“Early infantile autism may therefore be looked upon as the earliest possible 





Finally, and related to the above, is that autism quickly went from being considered as a 
rare disorder to being a relatively common diagnosis.  Children with known organic brain 
insults and many with intellectual disability and isolated signs of autism came to be 
regarded as autistic.  Kanner himself later complained that in the 1950s,  
 
“It became a habit to dilute the original concept of infantile autism by diagnosing it in 
many disparate conditions which show one or more isolated symptoms found as a part 
feature of the overall syndrome… Almost overnight the country seems to be populated by 
a multitude of autistic children, and somehow this trend became noticeable overseas as 
well.  Mentally defective children who displayed bizarre behaviour were promptly 
labelled autistic” (Kanner 1973) 
 
Evolution of the concept of autism: 1960s – 1970s 
During the 1960s a number of authors began to return to Kanner’s original theory that 
infantile autism and childhood onset schizophrenia were in fact separate conditions, with 
the latter showing continuity with adult schizophrenia (Rimland 1964; Rutter 1965).   
However, this was not confirmed until a group of landmark studies were published by 
Kolvin and colleagues in 1971 which essentially showed discrimination between the 
groups on the basis of their phenomenology, family history, parental personality, 
neurological function and intellectual ability.   
 
In the first paper, they determined two groups of children with childhood psychoses: the 




self-isolation and either catastrophic reactions to change or gross stereotypies; the second 
(late onset psychosis - LOP) began at between 5 and 15 years old and was characterised 
by Schneiderian first rank symptoms and disturbances to affect, motility and volition 
(Kolvin 1971).   
 
Kolvin’s second paper compared the phenomenology of the IP and LOP (Kolvin, 
Ounsted et al. 1971).  They found that children with LOP were more likely to show an 
insidious onset and be “premorbidly odd” with social problems the most commonly noted 
– “shyness, diffidence, withdrawal, timidity and sensitivity.”  The IP group were however, 
much more likely to show delayed achievement of milestones.  They were also rated as 
being more impaired in their development of social relationships and their use of 
language.  Abnormal preoccupations and resistance to change were found more 
frequently in the IP group, although both groups were equally affected with respect to 
ritualistic and perseverative behaviour.  Thought disorder and hallucinations were both 
identified more commonly found in the LOP group.  Features which were felt to have 
very high or high discriminatory power were gaze avoidance, abnormal preoccupations, 
disinterest in people, poor supervised play, stereotypies, echolalia, overactivity (all more 
common in IP) and hallucinations, disorder of content of thought, blunting of affect and 
incongruity of affect (all more common in LOP).  The problem of ascertainment bias 
must be considered (and is mentioned by the authors); a group defined by Schneiderian 
first rank symptoms seems very likely to have greater levels of hallucinations than one 
which is not.  However, it seems unlikely that this would account for all of the significant 




individuals are clinically indistinguishable when the age of onset is not considered, 
particularly for those without florid positive symptoms.   
 
The third paper considered the social background and family history of affected 
individuals (Kolvin, Ounsted et al. 1971).  Social background of the parents differed 
between the groups with IP children tending to be from social class I and II and LOP 
children coming from social class IV and V.  Social isolation was found to be non-
significantly more common in the mothers of the children with LOP.  Perhaps most 
importantly, an increase in the rate of adult schizophrenia was shown in the parents of the 
LOP group, but not the IP group, with no difference between the parents being seen in the 
rates of depression or neuroses.    
 
In the fourth paper of the series Kolvin et al (1971) considered the personality types of 
the parents and found that introversion, oversensitivity and suspiciousness were more 
common in the parents of the LOP group than the IP group.   
 
The fifth paper addressed a variety of associations within each group, summarised under 
the term cerebral dysfunction (Kolvin, Ounsted et al. 1971).  They included obstetric 
events (ante-, peri- and post-natal complications), EEG recordings and neurological 
examination.  Obstetric problems were more common in the IP group than the LOP group 
as was a low voltage EEG record.  Overall 54% of IP cases and 31% of LOP cases 
showed some evidence of ‘cerebral dysfunction’ as defined by abnormalities in any of the 





The final paper in the series identified that the IP group had a lower IQ than the LOP 
group (Kolvin, Humphrey et al. 1971).   
 
This series of papers and others led to autism and schizophrenia being regarded as 
distinct disorders.  Along with a general narrowing in the concept of autism which 
occurred around this time (Kanner 1973) this led to autism again being regarded as a rare 
condition and it remained so until the late 1970s and early 1980s   
 
Evolution of the concept of autism: late 1970s - present 
Folstein and Rutter’s twin study in 1977 (Folstein and Rutter 1977) was one of the first 
studies to propose the theory that “autism is genetically linked with a broader range of 
cognitive disorders” (Feinstein 2010).  However, it was the epidemiological study of 
Wing and Gould (1979) that really led to the birth of the spectrum concept of autism.  
They examined a selected group of children known to local statutory services as either 
disabled or behaviourally disturbed and divided them into ‘socially impaired’ and 
‘sociable [but] severely mentally retarded.’  Of most relevance to the spectrum concept of 
autism, they then divided the socially impaired group using one of two methods: the type 
of their social impairment (aloof, passive or odd) or a history of typical autism.  They 
found that the first of these methods gave the greatest separation on other clinical 
variables they measured and that the distribution of these variables suggested that “they 





This idea that autism should not be regarded as a discrete condition was further 
popularised by Wings re-defining of Asperger Syndrome in 1981 (Wing 1981).  The 
condition, Asperger Syndrome, which Wing describes, is derived from a combination of 
Asperger’s own work and Wing’s experience with 34 clinical cases.  The clinical 
characteristics are mainly as Asperger described, except Wing adds to his accounts by 
describing a lack of imaginative play as well as some additional features which may be 
seen in the early years of life.  She also disagrees with Asperger on two points.  Firstly, 
she felt that her cases showed more abnormalities of language than described by 
Asperger (including language delay in around half of her cases).  Secondly, she 
questioned the autistic intelligence that he emphasised: 
 
“Asperger described people with his syndrome as capable of originality and creativity in 
their chosen field. It would be more true to say that their thought processes are confined 
to a narrow, pedantic, literal, but logical, chain of reasoning. The unusual quality of 
their approach arises from the tendency to select, as the starting point for the logical 
chain, some aspect of a subject that would be unlikely to occur to a normal person who 
has absorbed the attitudes current in his culture. Usually the result is inappropriate, but 
once in a while it gives new insight into a problem.”  
 
Wing went on to discuss the differential diagnosis and classification of Asperger 
Syndrome.  She reviewed Wolff’s category of schizoid personality disorder of childhood 
(see Section 1.4) and, despite acknowledging that although people with Asperger 




arbitrarily states that this is not a useful categorisation because “this heading has no 
useful practical implications” and “there is not firm evidence of a special link between 
this syndrome and schizophrenia.”  Instead, she proposed that it forms part of a group of 
conditions, all characterised by a triad of impairments in social interaction, 
communication and imaginative activities.  She highlighted that the relative severity of 
each aspect of this triad could differ in different people and that it could occur across 
individuals of different intellectual abilities.  Asperger syndrome, she felt, would best be 
used to describe individuals who showed some autistic traits but “who talk grammatically 
and who are not socially aloof.”  This conceptualisation of autism, not as a discrete 
disorder, but as part of a range of conditions laid the way for the modern ideas of the 
autism spectrum.   
 
DSM-III 
Prior to the development of DSM-III there was no mention of autism as a specific 
disorder.  In DSM-I and DSM-II the closest diagnoses were “schizophrenic reaction, 
childhood type” and “schizophrenia, childhood type” respectively, both of which were 
described as presenting mainly with autism (as a symptom) (American Psychiatric 
Association 1952; American Psychiatric Association 1968).  In DSM-III infantile autism 
was included under a new category, pervasive developmental disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association 1980).   
 
The criteria for infantile autism in DSM-III were largely based upon Rutter’s criteria, 








Figure 1.9: Criteria for the diagnosis of autism as proposed by Rutter (1978) 
 
As well as infantile autism (which interestingly was divided into the full syndrome and 
the residual state; the latter represented people who had once met criteria for the full 
syndrome but no longer did, although still had some oddities of communication and 
social awkwardness) this category also included the diagnosis of “childhood onset 
pervasive developmental disorder” which had a later age of onset (30 months to 12 years) 
and included individuals with autistic features who do not show the full syndrome of 
infantile autism.  A further diagnosis of “atypical childhood onset pervasive 
developmental disorder” was also included to capture individuals with aberrant 
development of social skills and language but who do not meet criteria for either of the 
other conditions.   
 
DSM-III was published prior to Wing (1981), hence it is unsurprising that Asperger 
Syndrome is not specifically mentioned.  However, the inclusion of childhood onset 
pervasive developmental disorder and its atypical form clearly indicate an 




1. an onset before the age of 30 months 
2. impaired social development that has a number of special characteristics and is out of keeping with 
the child's intellectual level 
3. delayed and deviant language development that also has certain defined features and is out of keeping 
with the child's intellectual level 






DSM-IV again utilises the umbrella category of pervasive developmental disorders, 
although now with five main subcategories: autistic disorder, Asperger disorder, non-
specific pervasive developmental disorder (PDD-NOS), Rett’s disorder and childhood 
disintegrative disorder (CDD) (American Psychiatric Association 2000).  The first three 
conditions are all generally regarded as part of the autism spectrum whereas the 
classification of Rett’s disorder and CDD remain unclear.  The diagnostic criteria for 
autistic disorder and Asperger disorder are given in Figures 1.10 and 1.11 respectively.  
PDD-NOS is used when an individual shows a significant impairment in social 
interaction and either language or stereotyped behaviour but the criteria for other 
pervasive developmental disorders are not met.   
 
The other two pervasive developmental disorders, Rett’s disorder and CDD, are 
particularly characterised by the loss of previously acquired skills.  Rett’s disorder is a 
genetic disorder, caused by a mutation in the gene MECP2 on the X chromosome, 
although similar behavioural characteristics have also been seen in individuals with 
mutations in related genes.  It is reported almost exclusively in females (affected males 
will usually die in utero).  It is characterised by a period of typical development followed 
by a regression in several domains including social, motor and language skills.  The 
diagnosis of Rett’s disorder is now usually based upon a specific genetic test, as opposed 
to its behavioural characteristics, and it is largely regarded as a specific disorder which 
can cause autistic traits, as opposed to an autism spectrum disorder per se.  Childhood 




typical development, of at least 2 but sometimes up to 10 years, followed by a rapid and 
severe loss of skills (over a period of months) in multiple domains, including social, 
motor, language, play and continence.  Most children will develop a behavioural picture 
















Figure 1.10: DSM IV-TR diagnostic criteria for autistic disorder 
 
 
A) A total of six (or more) items from 1, 2, and 3 with at least two from 1, and one each from 2 and 3:  
1) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the  
following:  
a) marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours, such as eye-to- 
eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction  
b) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level  
c) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with  
other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest)  
d) lack of social or emotional reciprocity  
2) qualitative impairments in communication, as manifested by at least one of the  
following:  
a) delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not accompanied by 
an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of communication such as 
gesture or mime)  
b) in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to initiate or  
sustain a conversation with others  
c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language  
d) lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play appropriate 
to developmental level  
3) restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities as  
manifested by at least one of the following:  
a) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns 
of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus  
b) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals  
c) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or 
twisting or complex whole-body movements)  
d) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects  
 
B) Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior to age 3 years: 
social interaction; language as used in social communication; or symbolic or imaginative play. 
  





Figure 1.11: DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s disorder 
 
The future for the autism spectrum: DSM-5 
Amid much controversy (McPartland, Reichow et al. 2012; Swedo, Baird et al. 2012) the 
soon to be published DSM-5 will contain a quite different categorisation system for 
autism spectrum disorders.  The category of pervasive developmental disorders will be 
discarded and replaced with “autism spectrum disorders”.  There will be no specific sub-
diagnoses included under this category: i.e. autistic disorder, Asperger disorder and PDD-
NOS will all be subsumed under the single diagnosis, autism spectrum disorder.  
Clinicians will then be encouraged to add separate diagnostic specifiers to capture the 
severity, onset, cognitive abilities, known aetiologic factors and any associated 
conditions.   
A) Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:  
1) marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours, such as eye-to-eye gaze,   
facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction  
2) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level  
3) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with other 
people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest to other people)  
4) lack of social or emotional reciprocity  
 
B) Restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities, as manifested 
by at least one of the following:  
1) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest  
that is abnormal either in intensity or focus  
2) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals  
3) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or twisting, or  
complex whole-body movements)  
4) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects  
 
C) The disturbance causes clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important 
areas of functioning.  
D) There is no clinically significant general delay in language (e.g., single words used by age 2 years, 
communicative phrases used by age 3 years).  
E) There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development or in the development of age-
appropriate self-help skills, adaptive behavior (other than in social interaction), and curiosity 
about the environment in childhood.  





As well a change in classification the criteria required to be met for a diagnosis of an 
autism spectrum disorder differ from those previously employed for pervasive 
developmental disorders.  The social and communication domains will be combined to 
form one new domain along with restricted repetitive behaviour and interests (Figure 










Figure 1.12: Proposed DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder 
 
DSM-5 will also introduce a new diagnosis of social communication disorder.  Although 
classified under communication disorders, not autism spectrum disorders, it is a clearly 





A) Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across contexts, not accounted for  
by general developmental delays, and manifest by all 3 of the following: 
1. Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity 
2. Deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviours used for social interaction 
3. Deficits in developing and maintaining relationships 
 
B) Restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, or activities as manifested by at least two of the 
following: 
1. Stereotyped or repetitive speech, motor movements, or use of objects 
2. Excessive adherence to routines, ritualized patterns of verbal or nonverbal behaviour, or  
excessive resistance to change 
3. Highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus 
4. Hyper-or hypo-reactivity to sensory input or unusual interest in sensory aspects of  
environment; 
 
C) Symptoms must be present in early childhood (but may not become fully manifest until social 
demands exceed limited capacities 
 

















Figure 1.13: Proposed DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for social communication disorder 
 
 
1.4: OVERLAPS OF ASD AND SSD IN THEIR CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Autism spectrum and schizophrenia spectrum disorders have an intertwined history, 
arising first out of a common terminology and then from the idea that they were both 
forms of the same condition.  Although the work of Kolvin and others in the late 1960s 
and 1970s drew a distinction between autism and schizophrenia, the distinction between 
the broader spectrum conditions remains less clear.   
 
In the early descriptions of relatives of people with schizophrenia, traits which would 
now be regarded as similar to those found in autism spectrum disorders are mentioned 
 
A) Persistent difficulties in the social use of verbal and nonverbal communication as manifest by  
deficits in the following:  
1) Using communication for social purposes, such as greeting and sharing information, in a  
manner that is appropriate for the social context;  
2) Changing communication to match context or the needs of the listener, such as speaking  
differently in a classroom than on a playground, communicating differently to a child than to  
an adult, and avoiding use of overly formal language;  
3) Following rules for conversation and storytelling, such as taking turns in conversation,  
rephrasing when misunderstood, and knowing how to use verbal and nonverbal signals to  
regulate interaction;  
4) Understanding what is not explicitly stated (e.g. inferencing) and nonliteral or ambiguous  
meanings of language, for example, idioms, jokes, metaphors and multiple meanings that  
depend on the context for interpretation.  
 
B) Deficits result in functional limitations in effective communication, social participation, social  
relationships, academic achievement, or occupational performance.  
 
C) Onset in the early developmental period (but deficits may not become fully manifest until social  
communication demands exceed limited capacities).  
 
D) Deficits are not better explained by low abilities in the domains of word structure and grammar, or  
by intellectual disability, global developmental delay, Autism Spectrum Disorder, or another  




with reasonable frequency and by several different authors, e.g. unsociability, 
stubbornness, logical, over-pedantic, literal-mindedness with a preference for office work 
and fixed rules (Kraepelin 1919; Kretschmer 1925; Kallmann 1938; Bleuler 1950).  
Similarly, the descriptions by Hoch and Rado of people with pseudoneurotic 
schizophrenia and schizotypal conditions respectively also contain features which are 
reminiscent of autistic spectrum traits, albeit mixed with many other features and 
described in the, at times slightly pejorative although rather descriptive, language of 
1950s psychodynamic thinking:  
 
“..one often finds rigidity in thinking, stereotypy of thought and perseveration of thought. 
In such circumstances, the thought process and goal are adamantly pursued despite clear 
and necessary indications to abandon them.  Interruptions, necessary delays and 
appropriate shifts are not tolerated…..specific stereotyped sequences of associations may 
be pursued repeatedly and endlessly or to the point of exhaustion. In many instances, 
evaluation of the logicality of the on-going thought process and the thought goal is 
disturbed by doubting and indecisiveness with the result that action is often 
blocked…..The patient attempts to function according to stereotyped labels and fixed 
formulas with the conviction that all problems can be solved by the intellect. There is an 
emphasis on absolute values, "black and white" standards, while discounting obvious 
breaches, ridiculous paradoxes and impossible dilemmas.” (Hoch and Cattell 1959) 
 
“Schizotypes lack the feel for the simple pleasures, the affectionate give-and-take of daily 




service, as if trying to pick up something at a distance with lazy tongs.  For the 
spontaneous pleasurable response he lacks he substitutes mechanical limitations.  If 
highly sophisticated, he may ridicule the conventional forms of affectionate behaviour, 
dissecting and examining them as though they were the technological performance of a 
machine”  (Rado 1953)  
 
Kanner too recognised the clinical overlap between infantile autism and schizophrenia 
(Kanner 1949), while Asperger indicated the need for studies to determine the 
relationship between his personality disorder and Kretschmer’s schizothymia (Asperger 
1991).  When re-describing Asperger syndrome, Lorna Wing explicitly stated that “there 
is no question that Asperger syndrome can be regarded as a form of schizoid personality” 
(Wing 1981), a comment made with regard to the work of Sula Wolff who over the 
course of 30 years described almost 150 children with a condition she called schizoid 
personality disorder of childhood (see below).  However, Wing felt this was unhelpful as 
the terms schizoid and personality disorder were too broadly defined to be useful and 
implied a link to schizophrenia which was unproven.   
 
Wolff first reported a case series of children with schizoid personality disorder of 
childhood in an oral address in 1964 (Wolff 1964), although the first published account 
was in 1979 (Wolff and Barlow 1979).  Unaware of Asperger’s cases in 1964, Wolff 
chose the term schizoid for the children she encountered as the symptoms with which 
they presented closely matched those of adults with the diagnosis of schizoid personality 




children were “identical in all aspects with those described by Asperger” but chose to 
continue with the term schizoid (Wolff and Barlow 1979).  It is important to note that at 
the time she was initially writing schizoid was used in the broader, pre DSM-III, sense 
and she later commented that in modern diagnostic terms they children could be 
described as showing schizotypal personality disorder or “Cluster A personality disorder” 
of childhood (Wolff and McGuire 1995) (Cluster A includes the modern personality 
disorders schizoid, schizotypal and paranoid).  The operationally defined characteristics 
of schizoid personality disorder of childhood were: solitariness, impaired empathy and 
emotional detachment, increased sensitivity, rigidity of mental set and an unusual style of 
communication (Wolff and Chick 1980). 
 
Recognising the similarities of their condition with Kanner’s autism, Wolff and Barlow 
(1979) compared a group of children with schizoid personality disorder of childhood, a 
group with autism and a group of control children.  They found that the children with 
autism showed greater perseveration than the schizoid group, whereas the schizoid group 
used fewer emotional terms to describe pictures of their mother, although the latter was 
not statistically significant.  On other tests the schizoid children generally scored 
intermediate between the children with autism and the controls.   
 
Shortly following the first published description of schizoid personality disorder of 
childhood, Wing published her paper which redefined Asperger syndrome as a form of 
autism (Wing 1981) and schizoid personality disorder of childhood gradually became 




occasions (Wolff 1991; Wolff and McGuire 1995) that the children that Asperger 
described, like those she diagnosed with schizoid personality disorder, were less severely 
impaired than those with Asperger syndrome as defined by Wing (1981)and others 
(Tantam 1988; Gillberg 1989) who were more clearly autistic in nature.  She also pointed 
out that, in contrast to children with Wing’s Asperger syndrome, those who she 
diagnosed as schizoid had active but unusual fantasy lives, a high chance (75%) of 
meeting criteria for DSM-III schizotypal personality disorder as adults (Wolff, 
Townshend et al. 1991) and a 5-10 times increased risk of schizophrenia compared to the 
general population (Wolff 1992). 
 
Overall, Wolff felt that the children she described had a milder variant of Wing’s 
Asperger syndrome, but that the links with schizophrenia should be recognised; she 
therefore proposed that the disorder should be named schizoid/Asperger syndrome (Wolff 
1995).  She also suggested that the development of a schizoid personality may represent a 
genetic vulnerability state to both autism and schizophrenia but that additional different 
genetic and environmental factors act to cause the more serious disorders (Wolff and 
McGuire 1995).  Although the diagnostic label of schizoid/Asperger syndrome was not 
adopted and Asperger syndrome is now firmly rooted in the autism spectrum, the 
recognition of less severely affected individuals as falling within the diagnosis of 
Asperger syndrome and Wolff’s proposal of a partial overlap with the schizophrenia 
spectrum are currently very much in vogue (King and Lord 2011; Stone and Iguchi 





Although long recognised, the modern concepts of autism spectrum disorders and for 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders began to be formalised in DSM-III.  It is important to 
note that the two categories arose out of largely separate processes; the criteria for 
schizotypal personality disorder were validated in adults and were derived from the 
Danish Adoption Study with one of the primary objectives being its distinction from 
borderline personality disorder (Spitzer, Endicott et al. 1979); the criteria for infantile 
autism were validated in children and derived from Rutter’s 1978 criteria which, although 
he considers the possible overlap with schizophrenia, do not take into account the broader 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Rutter 1978).   
 
DSM-III does list schizotypal personality disorder as a possible differential diagnosis for 
childhood onset pervasive developmental disorder, with the latter stated to show more 
severe disturbance in social relations as well as aberrant motor movement, self-mutilation 
and inappropriate affect.  However, the concepts of both the autism and schizophrenia 
spectrums have developed further since this time and this has not had the effect of clearly 
delineating them.  Autism as a diagnosis has expanded to cover milder forms of social 
impairment with less disturbed behaviour, making the differences from schizotypal 
personality disorder described above less pertinent.  The formalisation of autism as a 
spectrum in DSM5 seems likely only to continue this process, with the addition of social 
communication disorder (albeit not as part of the autism spectrum) a potential further 
complicating factor.  The inclusion of empathy deficits as a specific part of the criteria for 
schizotypal personality disorder is likely to have a similar effect of increasing the overlap 






Autism and schizophrenia have largely arisen out of different conceptual frameworks.  
Despite this, there has always been noticeable overlaps in their phenomenology, 
particularly in the case of the spectrum disorders, ASD and SPD.  This has increased in 
recent years as the conceptions of these disorders has evolved, particularly in the case of 
ASD, which now encompasses a much greater range of disability than in the past.  It has 
therefore become unclear whether we can distinguish these conditions from each other, 
indeed are we even correct to classify them separately?  There is a need for a study to 
consider the relationship between ASD and SPD, not only in regard to their clinical 
features, but also including biological measures which may provide more objective 
information about their relationship.  As a first step towards this, the next chapter will 
review the existing literature to identify the potential shared and discriminating features 















Review of existing literature relevant to the potential shared and discriminating 















Other than Wolff’s work, interest in the relationship between autism and schizophrenia 
waned considerably following Kolvin’s series of papers.  However, a number of recent 
authors have again started to question this relationship, suggesting that the two disorders 
may be more closely related than previously thought (Nylander, Lugnegård et al. 2008; 
Rapoport, Chavez et al. 2009; Padgett, Miltsiou et al. 2010; King and Lord 2011; Stone 
and Iguchi 2011).  Two prominent over-arching theories of the relationship between 
autism and schizophrenia have been put forward, both based around predominantly 
genetic hypotheses.   
 
In 2008, Crespi and Badcock (2008) proposed that autism and schizophrenia represented 
diametrically opposite conditions mediated by alterations in genomic imprinting, an 
epigenetic phenomena occurring in about 1% of human genes leading to either the 
maternal or paternal allele being differentially expressed.  They suggest that people with 
autism have biases towards paternally expressed genes while those with schizophrenia 
have a bias towards maternally expressed genes.  Their hypothesis rests upon 
evolutionary conflict theory and its relationship to genomic imprinting.  Essentially this 
theory states that in a society where multiple males may father offspring from one 
female, paternally expressed genes are associated with gaining evolutionary fitness at the 
expense of the mother (e.g. through overgrowth), whereas maternally expressed genes are 
associated with traits which are beneficial to the mother (such as reduced growth) thereby 
allowing her to survive and produce more offspring (Haig 2000).  In support of their 




schizophrenia are opposed across a broad range of features: e.g. increased brain size in 
autism / reduced brain size in schizophrenia; hypomentalising in autism / 
hypermentalising in schizophrenia; reduced imagination in autism / increased 
imagination and delusions in schizophrenia; reduced language skills in autism / auditory 
hallucinations in schizophrenia; increased local processing in autism / increased global 
processing in schizophrenia (Crespi and Badcock 2008) .  However, a number of 
criticisms of their hypothesis are possible: the conflict theory of genomic imprinting is in 
itself controversial (Keverne and Curley 2008); which character traits are maternally 
beneficial and which are paternally beneficial is far from clear; no mechanism for why 
the imbalance might occur is advanced by their theory; and their use of evidence is 
somewhat selective (Keller 2008). 
 
Others, noting overlaps in some of the genes implicated in the disorders and in their 
clinical features, have proposed that instead of being diametrically opposed disorders, 
autism and schizophrenia actually represent different points on a broad spectrum of 
neurodevelopmental disorders (Carroll and Owen 2009; Craddock and Owen 2010; 
Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics, Smoller et al. 2013).  This would 
predict that the disorders should show at least some overlap in their features and that 
these should show common pathophysiological mechanisms, although one could 
speculate that the nature of gene-gene interactions would complicate this picture 





As the preceding chapter has outlined, the relationship between autism and schizophrenia 
is especially unclear when one considers the spectrum disorders, ASD and SPD, which 
contain many overlapping features in their historical descriptions, current definitions and 
proposed future developments to their classification.  Research examining this area is 
therefore timely and indeed necessary.  In order for any such project to shed light on the 
similarities and differences between these conditions, it will be important to consider 
both clinical measures and more objective measures of brain function, such as those 
derived from neuropsychology and neuroimaging.  The existing literature in these fields 
which pertains to ASD and SPD is therefore reviewed below.   
 
 
2.2: CLINICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
As alluded to in Chapter 1, even a fairly cursory review of the current DSM-IV and 
proposed DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and schizotypal 
personality disorder (SPD) reveal potential overlaps between the disorders.  Both may be 
associated with idiosyncratic communication, social withdrawal, a lack of social 
understanding and unusual affect.  Even the restricted, repetitive behaviours which seem 
to more characteristic of ASD, can be found in the diagnostic criteria for SPD in the form 
of the stereotyped speech mentioned in DSM-5 and potentially also the eccentric 
behaviour criterion.  These potential clinical overlaps are further confounded when one 
considers the psychiatric comorbidities which are known to be associated with both 
conditions.  Anxiety in particular is known to be associated with both ASD and 




2006), as are obsessive-compulsive phenomena (Poyurovsky and Koran 2005; Leyfer, 
Folstein et al. 2006) – this especially renders the presence of repetitive behaviour to 
distinguish the spectrums less useful.   
 
Perhaps the clearest distinguishing feature between autism and schizophrenia is the 
differential age of onset (typically in infancy for autism and in late teenage years / early 
adulthood for schizophrenia).  Indeed age of onset was how Kolvin originally delineated 
his groups in his detailed comparison of the disorders (Kolvin 1971).  However, it is now 
recognised that, although the impairments in ASD begin in infancy, they may not become 
apparent until later in life when social demands exceed abilities (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013).  In addition, although schizophrenia has a clear onset which is usually 
following childhood, the course of schizotypal personality disorder is unknown.  In 
particular, we do not know at present whether SPD is present from a very early age or 
whether there is a decline in function in late adolescence.   Certainly, studies of people at 
risk of schizophrenia for genetic reasons have shown that, although some individuals are 
premorbidly relatively unimpaired, others show high levels of schizotypal traits as 
adolescents (Johnstone, Ebmeier et al. 2005).  Indeed, even studies of infant relatives of 
people with schizophrenia have found higher levels of disturbance to social functioning 
than controls (Asarnow 1988). 
 
A number of other studies have considered the relationship between the autism and 
schizophrenia spectrums from a clinical perspective and these are reviewed below.  A 




divided (with some overlap) into: direct comparisons of autism and schizophrenia; 
studies which have examined the rates of psychotic disorders in people with ASD and 
vice versa; studies which have considered the rates of schizotypal traits in populations 
with ASD and vice versa; and studies which have examined the relationship between 
autistic and schizotypal traits in non-clinical samples.  To the author’s knowledge there 
has been no previous study directly comparing the clinical features of ASD with SPD 
 
2.2.1: Comparisons of ASD and schizophrenia 
Kolvin’s series of papers discriminating autism from childhood schizophrenia have been 
reviewed in Chapter 1.  Although many features were identified that differed between the 
groups there were also significant overlaps in the clinical picture.  Some of the features 
which were to discriminate poorly or not at all between the groups included: speech 
delay, pronominal reversal, thought disorder, poor mixing with peers, resistance to 
change, ritualistic behaviour, unpredictable response to sounds, perplexity, mannerisms, 
ambitendency, ambivalence and jerkiness of movement (Kolvin, Ounsted et al. 1971).   
 
Konstantareas et al (2001) found no difference in the rates of negative symptoms between 
individuals with autism and those with schizophrenia.  Positive symptoms were more 
common in the schizophrenia group, although they also identified the presence of at least 
one positive symptom in 35% of their autism group.   
 
Rumsey et al (1986) compared the type and degree of thought disorder in adults with 




in the autism group, whereas the schizophrenia group showed more positive thought 
disorder (derailment, illogicality and loss of goal).  The groups did not differ on their 
levels of affective flattening.   Similarly, Dykens et al (1991) found higher levels of 
poverty of speech in people with autism compared to those with schizophrenia, but less 
illogicality.   
 
More recently Spek et al (2010) compared 21 individuals with autism to 21 individuals 
with schizophrenia using self-reported measures of autistic and schizotypal traits (the 
autism spectrum quotient (AQ - (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al. 2001)) and the 
schizotypal personality questionnaire (SPQ - (Raine 1991)).  They found that individuals 
with autism rated themselves as more impaired on the AQ with regard to social skill, 
attention switching and communication, with no difference between the groups in 
attention to detail or imagination.  On the SPQ, the schizophrenia group rated themselves 
as more impaired with respect to positive schizotypy, there was a trend towards greater 
negative schizotypy in the ASD group and no difference between the groups with respect 
to disorganisation.  In terms of discrimination, only social skill (on the AQ) and positive 
schizotypy (on the SPQ) usefully discriminated the groups.  They also found slightly 
different relationships between the subscales in each group, such that negative schizotypy 
correlated negatively with attention to detail in the schizophrenia group, whereas in the 
autism group it correlated positively with difficulty switching attention – this they 
interpret as potentially meaning that negative symptoms in the two groups reflect 





In summary, studies which have directly compared ASD and schizophrenia show clinical 
overlaps between the groups, particularly with regard to negative and disorganised 
symptoms.  Positive symptoms are more common in schizophrenia, but also occur 
reasonably frequently in ASD, although the lack of typically developing control groups in 
the studies reviewed means that it is unclear whether this is to a greater degree than the 
general population.      
 
2.2.2: Prevalence of psychotic disorders in ASD 
The majority of studies which have considered comorbid psychiatric disorders in ASD 
have examined children; this has implications when one is considering the relationship 
with psychosis as most people will not become unwell until late adolescence / early 
adulthood.  Regardless, some studies have reported increased rates of psychotic 
symptoms and psychotic disorders in children with ASD, whereas others have not.  De-
Bruin et al (de Bruin, Ferdinand et al. 2007) examined 6-12 year old children with PDD-
NOS and found high levels of psychiatric comorbidity.  Although none of the children 
met criteria for schizophrenia, hallucinations and delusions were found in 5% and 3% 
respectively.  Similarly, psychotic symptoms (although not diagnoses) were found in 
12% of children and adolescents (mean age 12) with ASD by Caamano et al (2013) 
compared to none of the controls.  In keeping with this, Joshi et al (2010) found that 20% 
of the individuals with ASD referred to a paediatric psychopharmacological centre met 





In contrast to the above, Gjevik et al (2011) found that only 1.5% of their sample (n=71, 
aged 6-18 years old) met criteria for a psychotic illness.  Similarly, in a large database 
study of 4343 children with ASD, 0.5% of parents reported their children having received 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Rosenberg, Kaufmann et al. 2011).  Leyfer et al (2006) and 
Mattila et al (2010) found no cases of schizophrenia in their samples of children and 
adolescents with autism (109 and 50 individuals respectively).   
 
In addition to chance, differences between the studies mentioned above may reflect 
differences in how they were recruited – e.g. the 20% figure of Joshi et al (2010) likely 
reflects that their children had been referred specifically for evaluation of their suitability 
for psychotropic medication.  It should also be noted that ascertainment bias may well 
have inflated the figures as none were population studies, i.e. all individuals had to at 
least opt-in and were usually clinical referrals.   
 
Fewer studies have specifically investigated the rates of psychotic disorders in adults with 
autism.  Konstantareas and Hewitt (2001) found that 50% of their sample of 14 
individuals with autism also met diagnostic criteria for a schizophrenia, disorganised type 
with negative symptoms.  Hofvander et al (2009) studied 122 adults with ASD who were 
referred to specialist centres for diagnostic assessments and found that 12% met criteria 
for a psychotic illness.  In addition they found rates of paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal 
personality disorders of 19%, 21% and 13% respectively.    Previously, members of the 
same group had reported rates in a smaller sample of 26%, 32% and 23% respectively 





Overall the evidence regarding the rates of psychotic disorders in ASD is unclear.  
Ascertainment bias and the tendency to study children who are below the usual age of 
onset of schizophrenia make it difficult to draw any firm conclusions as to whether there 
is actually an increased rate of schizophrenia or other psychotic diagnoses in ASD.   
 
2.2.3: Schizotypal / psychotic traits in ASD 
Craig et al (2004) found that a group of people with Asperger Syndrome scored more 
highly than controls, but less than people with schizophrenia, on the Paranoia Scale 
(Fenigstein and Vanable 1992), a measure of paranoid ideation.  Both groups also 
showed deficits in their ability to mentalise (see Chapter 2.3.5) but the schizophrenia 
group also displayed a tendency to make external attributions for negative events 
(essentially to blame others for negative events) which the authors suggest shows 
differences in the mechanisms of paranoia in the groups.  Similarly, Blackshaw et al 
(2001) also found higher rates of paranoia in people with Asperger syndrome compared 
to controls but no difference in causal attributions (in contrast to previous findings in 
schizophrenia).  Pinkham et al (2012) compared paranoid symptoms between 101 
individuals divided into four groups (ASD, schizophrenia with paranoia, schizophrenia 
without paranoia and controls).  They found no difference in the overall level of paranoia 
between the ASD and schizophrenia with paranoia groups, both of whom scored more 
highly than the controls of the schizophrenia without paranoia groups.  However, they 
then went on to use discriminant correspondence analysis to identify factors which best 




variance), cynicism (16% of the variance) and insightful acknowledgement (13% of the 
variance).   They found that individuals with schizophrenia and paranoia separated from 
individuals with Asperger syndrome on the basis of their scores on the cynicism factor, 
but not the others and, consistent with Craig et al (2004) and Blackshaw et al (2001), 
interpret this as evidence that the nature of the paranoia differs between the groups.   
 
Consistent with the comparative studies of Dykens et al (1991) and Rumsey et al (1986), 
Solomon et al (2008) found increased loosening of associations, illogical thinking and 
poverty of content in a group of adolescents with ASD  relative to controls.  The level of 
thought disorder in the ASD group was related to anxiety and reduced executive control.  
Similarly, Van der Gaag (2005) found high rates of illogical thinking and loosened 
associations in individuals with autism compared to controls and these were related to 
lower verbal IQ.   
 
Barneveld et al (2011) found that adolescents with ASD, showed higher levels of 
positive, negative and disorganised schizotypal traits (as measured by the SPQ) than 
controls.  The levels of negative, positive and disorganised schizotypy were said to be 
equivalent to those seen in first episode schizophrenia.  They also found correlations 
between negative schizotypy and greater impairment on the AQ domains of social skills, 
attention switching, communication and imagination; positive schizotypy and impaired 
attention switching; and disorganised schizotypy and attention switching and 





In a large population of 147 children with ASD, Gadow (2012) found that individuals 
with ASD showed higher levels of schizoid personality traits than non-ASD child 
psychiatry outpatients.  Levels of disorganised behaviour and negative symptoms were 
also higher in the ASD group but only in those with comorbid ADHD (who scored more 
highly than controls with and without ADHD).  In a further paper Gadow describes the 
relationship between autistic and schizotypal symptoms in each group divided by ADHD 
status and found that, in general, disorganised thinking and negative symptoms correlated 
with autistic traits, although there were condition specific and informant specific effects 
(Gadow 2013).   
 
In summary, there is strong evidence that individuals with ASD show higher levels of 
schizotypal traits than controls. Although this is most pronounced for negative and 
disorganised features, there also exist increased rates of positive schizotypal traits in 
ASD; indeed, in one study these were even to the same level as that seen in 
schizophrenia.  There is some evidence, albeit fairly weak, that positive symptoms may 
relate to different underlying psychological mechanisms in people with ASD than in 
schizophrenia.      
 
2.2.4: Autistic traits in schizophrenia and schizotypal personality disorder 
Sheitman et al (2004) examined 21 individuals with chronic, treatment resistant 
schizophrenia and correlated their scores on the Autism Behaviour Checklist (Krug, 




Fiszbein et al. 1987).  They found that autistic traits correlated positively with severity of 
negative symptoms and general symptoms, but not with positive symptoms.   
 
As described above, Spek et al (2010) found associations between negative symptoms 
and slightly different subscales of the AQ depending on whether individuals had a 
diagnosis of autism or schizophrenia.  In this study, individuals with schizophrenia 
showed similar levels of impairment between people with autism and those with 
schizophrenia in terms of attention to detail or imagination as measured by the AQ.  
Although the autism group scored more highly than the schizophrenia group on the other 
subscales (social skill, attention switching and communication) the scores on these for the 
schizophrenia group were higher than those generally reported for typically developing 
individuals (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al. 2001).    
 
To the author’s knowledge there has only been one study of autistic traits in a population 
with diagnosed schizotypal personality disorder (Esterberg, Trotman et al. 2008).  This 
group examined 35 adolescents with SPD using the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI –
R – (Rutter, Le Couteur et al. 2003)) and compared them to 38 adolescents with other 
personality disorders and to 48 controls.  They found that the SPD group had the highest 
levels of social impairment and unusual interests and behaviours in childhood and 
currently, but no differences were seen in communication impairments.  Within the SPD 
group, autistic traits and negative symptoms correlated significantly but this was not the 
case in the other groups, although the authors do not report if this group x symptom 




significantly in any of the groups when considered separately.  This study also identified 
that higher levels of autistic traits did not predict transition to psychosis over 3 years in 
people with SPD, which the authors interpret as meaning that autistic traits are not simply 
representative of greater schizotypy.  An alternative explanation would be that autistic 
traits actually represent higher negative schizotypy which is not in itself a predictor of 
later psychosis.   
 
Overall therefore there is some evidence for increased autistic traits in SPD and 
schizophrenia compared to controls, although only a limited number of studies have 
explicitly examined this area.   
 
2.2.5: Studies of non-clinical samples 
Several authors have taken the approach of looking at the association between 
schizotypal and autistic traits in non-clinical samples, primarily psychology students.  All 
have essentially reported similar results: positive correlations across a range of 
schizotypal and autistic traits, especially, but importantly not limited to, those domains 
which capture social impairments (Hurst, Nelson-Gray et al. 2007; Claridge and 
McDonald 2009; Russell-Smith, Maybery et al. 2011; Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen et al. 
2012). 
 
2.2.6: Summary of clinical studies 
Overlaps between autistic and schizotypal / psychotic traits are found in almost every 




symptoms / social impairments, with disorganised symptoms and thought disorder also 
commonly found in both groups.  In addition, positive symptoms are also related to the 
levels of autistic traits in people with ASD and both also occur more frequently in 
individuals with ASD than in controls, although at lower levels than is found in 
schizophrenia.  There is a gap in the present literature which concerns a direct 
comparison of individuals with ASD to those with SPD.  Inferences from the above 
would suggest that such a study would at least show significant overlaps between the 
groups in negative symptoms and social impairments, and quite possibly in regard to the 
other features of the disorder; indeed it may not be possible to distinguish the conditions 
at all.    
 
Two possible explanations present themselves for the overlap between schizotypal and 
autistic traits.  Firstly it is possible that they are different phenomena, arising from 
separate mechanisms, which are simply difficult to distinguish clinically.  Alternatively, 
they may represent a shared pathophysiological process.  The findings from Spek et al 
(2010) and Pinkham et al (2012) are slightly suggestive that the former is correct for 
negative symptoms and positive symptoms respectively, although they are not 
conclusive.    
 
 
2.3: BRAIN FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Neuropsychological studies of schizophrenia have a long history with a wide range of 




episodic memory, executive function (including working memory, set-shifting, inhibition, 
planning), sustained attention, social cognition, motor speed, verbal fluency, perceptual 
processing and general intellectual ability (Fioravanti, Carlone et al. 2005; Couture, Penn 
et al. 2006; Dickinson, Ramsey et al. 2007).  The widespread nature of the cognitive 
impairments in schizophrenia means that no single cognitive process is generally held to 
account for all of the symptoms of the condition although it has been proposed that 
specific cognitive deficits are associated with particular symptom domains (Frith 1992).  
Studies in relatives of people with schizophrenia and in those with schizotypal 
personality disorder tend to show deficits in many of the same cognitive processes as are 
in seen in schizophrenia, albeit less pronounced, and with sparing of motor abilities. 
(Siever and Davis 2004; Dickinson, Ramsey et al. 2007).   
 
The neuropsychological theories of ASD can be summarised under three major domains: 
executive dysfunction, weak central coherence and impaired social cognition (Sanders, 
Johnson et al. 2008).   Similar to schizophrenia, recent thinking in the ASD field has 
moved away from the idea that any single one of these cognitive theories can account for 
all of the symptoms of autism (Happé and Frith 2006; Happé, Ronald et al. 2006).  
However, each of these domains has also been examined in schizophrenia and to a lesser 
extent in schizotypal groups; they therefore represent a useful way in which to consider 






2.3.1: Neuropsychological studies of executive dysfunction  
Executive function is an umbrella term used to describe a set of brain functions that are 
involved in the regulation and control of other cognitive processes to accomplish a 
particular goal (Elliott 2003).  There is no general agreement on what exactly constitutes 
executive function, although planning, attention, working memory, inhibition, set-
switching and generativity (the generation of novel ideas and concepts) are often included 
(Hill 2004; Alvarez and Emory 2006).  Almost invariably these functions are held to 
involve the prefrontal lobe although this is probably overly simplistic; although the 
prefrontal lobe plays a key role, intact connectivity with other cortical and subcortical 
regions is required for successful executive function (Alvarez and Emory 2006; 
Kenworthy, Yerys et al. 2008).  
 
Executive function in ASD 
Interest in executive dysfunction in ASD arises originally from the clinical observations 
of repetitive and stereotyped behaviours which characterise the disorder (Happé and Frith 
1996; Hill 2004).  No exact or specific pattern of executive difficulties characterising 
ASD has been found, a fact which has been attributed to the difficulties measuring 
executive function in general and those more specific to ASD.  General problems include 
the long and varied developmental trajectory of executive functions, the lack of 
agreement of what executive function actually is and difficulties in measuring an 
inherently complex construct (e.g. should we consider it a unitary concept or divide it 
into component parts).  Problems more specific to ASD include confounding due to task 




face to face test (computer studies tend to show fewer deficits than those administered by 
humans), high levels of psychiatric comorbidity and the complicating effects of general 
intellectual level (Kenworthy, Yerys et al. 2008).  As might therefore be expected, studies 
have identified impairments in people with ASD across all the domains of executive 
function listed above (Kenworthy, Yerys et al. 2008), although there is some evidence 
that there is sparing of sustained attention (Goldstein, Johnson et al. 2001), verbal 
working memory (Koshino, Carpenter et al. 2005; Williams, Goldstein et al. 2005; 
Williams, Goldstein et al. 2006) and possibly also inhibition (Hill 2004).   
 
Executive function in the schizophrenia spectrum 
Investigating executive function in schizophrenia is beset by the same problems as 
outlined above, with the addition of the confounding factors of medication, state versus 
trait effects and illness progression.  Studies of schizotypal personality disorder do not 
usually have these additional problems as individuals do not show discrete episodes of 
illness and do not usually take medication; whether they show progression of cognitive 
deficits is unknown.  There are however many fewer studies of SPD than schizophrenia 
meaning that less definite conclusions can be drawn.  Nevertheless, similar to the 
findings in ASD, neuropsychological studies of SPD have found impairments across 
multiple domains of executive function including working memory (verbal and 
visuospatial), sustained attention, set-shifting and planning (Siever and Davis 2004), 
although again findings are not consistent (Matsui, Yuuki et al. 2007).  Studies of 
individuals rated as high on schizotypy on self-report measures have also identified 




Executive impairments in schizophrenia (and possibly therefore also in SPD) appear to be 
particularly associated with negative and disorganised symptoms, as opposed to positive 
ones (Dibben, Rice et al. 2009). 
 
Interestingly, the generation of novel ideas may be a potential outlier in respect to the 
otherwise broad deficits in executive function found in schizotypal individuals.  There is 
a consistent association found between creativity and schizotypal traits in the general 
population (Nelson and Rawlings 2010) and this has been proposed to account for the 
evolutionary persistence of schizophrenia (Burch, Pavelis et al. 2006; Nettle and Clegg 
2006).  However in schizophrenia, studies have shown impairments in verbal fluency 
(Dickinson, Ramsey et al. 2007) and ideational fluency (Abraham, Windmann et al. 
2007) compared to controls.  One study of verbal fluency has been conducted in people 
with SPD and deficits were noted (Dickey, Morocz et al. 2010), suggesting that SPD, like 
schizophrenia, may represent too severe a phenotype to confer any advantage in this 
regard.   
 
Studies comparing executive function between the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
Unfortunately there are no studies which have directly compared executive function in 
individuals with ASD to those with SPD.  Perhaps the closest is a study by Bolte et al 
(2006) which compared central coherence and executive function in the parents of people 
with autism to the parents of people with schizophrenia.  In terms of executive function, 
they tested set shifting using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and planning 




difference between the groups.   Unfortunately they did not measure autistic or 
schizotypal traits in the relatives therefore how impaired these groups were is unknown, 
but it seems reasonable to assume that not all met criteria for a broader spectrum disorder.  
Barneveld et al (Barneveld, de Sonneville et al. 2013) found that increasing impairment 
in response inhibition was associated with increasing levels of positive, negative and 
disorganised schizotypal traits in an autistic population, but was unrelated to autistic 
traits.  Somewhat similarly, Solomon et al (2008) found that response inhibition 
correlated with formal thought disorder in adolescents with ASD.   
 
A limited number of studies have compared aspects of executive function between autism 
and schizophrenia.  Schneider et al (1987) compared children with autism to a matched 
group with schizophrenia and found that those with schizophrenia made more 
perseverative responses on the WCST (indicative of set-shifting difficulties, although not 
limited to this (Kenworthy, Yerys et al. 2008)) compared to controls, with the autism 
group scoring midway between the two and not significantly different from either alone.  
Bolte et al (2002) examined the profile on Wechsler IQ scales between a group of 20 
adults with autism and a matched group with schizophrenia. Using a multivariate 
statistical analysis they found that the autism group outperformed the schizophrenia 
group on the Similarities subscale (said to measure the ability to generate and think in 
abstract categories) whereas the schizophrenic group outperformed the autism group on 
the Comprehension subscale (said to measure the ability to assess the underlying 
significance of daily living situations).  Goldstein et al (2002) used cluster analysis of 




along with perseverative errors on the WCST, time scores from the Trail Making Test 
and the Halstead Category test (a test of abstraction) to define 4 clusters among 
individuals with schizophrenia which they labelled moderately impaired, high 
functioning, severely impaired and severe psychomotor.  They then compared these 
clusters to 31 adults with autism and found that they outperformed all of the 
schizophrenia groups, except the high functioning cluster, on many of the 
neuropsychological measures, but that their profile closely resembled the high 
functioning cluster.  It should be noted that other than the high functioning cluster the 
autism group outperformed the schizophrenia groups by at least 10 IQ points, making it 
impossible to rule out a global cognitive deficit as driving these results.   
 
Summary of neuropsychological studies of executive function 
To summarise, studies in schizophrenia spectrum disorders and autism spectrum 
disorders have shown widespread deficits across multiple domains of executive 
functions.  The few comparative studies have considered schizophrenia and autism and 
have found little in the way of definitive differences.  There has not been any direct 
comparison of SPD and ASD, although the literature suggests that some differences may 
be apparent with respect to sustained attention, verbal working memory and possibly 
inhibition, which may be less affected in ASD, and generativity, which may be less 





2.3.2: Functional magnetic resonance imaging of executive dysfunction  
The neuropsychological studies reviewed above provide one method of examining 
executive dysfunction in autism and schizophrenia; another possible method of 
investigation is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  fMRI may be 
particularly informative when considering two clinically or neuropsychologically similar 
conditions, as it provides a measure of the underlying brain activity associated with task 
performance.   
 
fMRI of executive function in the schizophrenia spectrum 
Hypofrontality has long been noted in schizophrenia (Ingvar and Franzen 1974), with 
reduced dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activation seen in a wide range of 
executive tasks (Minzenberg, Laird et al. 2009).  However, recent meta-analyses of 
executive tasks have also identified areas of increased activation in people with 
schizophrenia compared to controls in other prefrontal regions such as the left superior 
frontal gyrus (BA 6 and 9) and left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 46), right medial frontal 
gyrus (BA 10) and the left anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 32), as well as in posterior brain 
regions (temporal and parietal regions, the insula and amygdala) suggesting the problem 
is not as simple as hypofrontality alone (Minzenberg, Laird et al. 2009).  The most 
utilised executive task in schizophrenia is the n-back memory task, which has been 
studied in numerous different studies.  Hypofrontality has been consistently shown with 
the n-back task although, as with executive tasks more generally, areas of increased 
activation in the prefrontal lobe have also been reported in individuals with schizophrenia 





There are many fewer studies using fMRI in people with schizotypal personality disorder 
than there are of schizophrenia and of these only one has considered executive function.  
Koenigsberg et al (2005) examined spatial working memory in six individuals with SPD 
and 5 controls and found that, compared to controls, the SPD subjects showed reduced 
activation in the left ventral prefrontal cortex (BA 44, 45, 47), superior frontal gyrus 
(BA10), posterior inferior frontal gyrus (BA44) and intraparietal cortex, while the reverse 
was true (at trend level significance) for the right middle frontal gyrus (BA46) and right 
prestriate cortex.  It should be noted that this was a region of interest study, which 
considered approximately 80 regions derived from other studies, but did not correct for 
multiple comparisons, making the significance of the findings somewhat difficult to 
interpret.   
 
fMRI of executive dysfunction in ASD 
Imaging studies in ASD have investigated a number of different domains of executive 
function including inhibition, sustained attention, switching attention, planning, fluency 
and working memory (Philip, Dauvermann et al. 2012).  The paradigms employed within 
each domain vary between studies, with many including emotional stimuli or adding 
additional elements to test cognitive control mechanisms, making comparison between 
studies difficult.  A recent meta-analysis of all executive tasks showed a degree of both 
hyper- and hypo-frontality with increased activation in the anterior left middle frontal 
gyrus (BA11) compared to controls, while reduced activation was seen in the right 




lobule, right posterior cingulate gyrus, left insula and left lentiform nucleus) (Philip, 
Dauvermann et al. 2012).   
 
The n-back task of working memory has been employed in two studies of people with 
ASD.  Koshino et al (2005) used a verbal n-back task found highly lateralised differences 
with reduced activation in the ASD group in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
inferior frontal gyrus, precentral sulcus and inferior parietal lobe, and increased activation 
in the right inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobe and bilateral temporal regions.  
The same group conducted a further n-back study using face identity and found only 
reduced activity in the ASD group in the left inferior prefrontal and right posterior 
temporal cortex (Koshino, Kana et al. 2008).   A number of other studies have reported 
hypofrontality during working memory in ASD.  Luna et al (2002) used a visuospatial 
working memory paradigm and reported reduced activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex and posterior cingulate bilaterally.  Silk et al (Silk, Rinehart et al. 2006) employed 
a task of mental rotation, which activates both visuo-spatial and working memory 
regions, in a small number of autistic individuals (seven) compared to controls.  They 
found reduced activity in the ASD group in prefrontal and striatal regions, but not parietal 
(visuospatial) regions.   
 
fMRI studies comparing the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
As far is the author is aware, no studies to date have compared executive function in 





Summary of fMRI studies of executive function 
In summary, therefore fMRI studies of executive function in ASD, schizophrenia and to a 
much lesser extent SPD show reduced activation of the prefrontal and striatal regions, 
suggesting that executive dysfunction arises from broadly similar mechanisms between 
the groups.  There is some evidence that all three conditions also show increases in other 
prefrontal regions and posterior brain regions during executive tasks, but these appear to 
be more extensive in schizophrenia than in ASD.  These increases are commonly 
interpreted as reflecting compensatory activity in both conditions, (Minzenberg, Laird et 
al. 2009; Philip, Dauvermann et al. 2012) ; whether the nature of this compensation is 
efficient and whether it is the same between conditions is unclear.  Compensation through 
the use of visuospatial systems is often suggested to be important in ASD; such claims 
are not made for schizophrenia although the extensive activations in non-frontal regions 
during executive tasks in people with schizophrenia do raise this as a possibility.  Only 
one, very small, study has examined brain activity using fMRI during an executive 
function task in individuals with SPD and no studies to date have compared ASD with 
either schizophrenia or SPD directly.    
 
2.3.3: Neuropsychological Studies of weak central coherence  
 
Weak central coherence in ASD 
Weak central coherence is a term which was invented by Uta Frith to describe the 
tendency of autistic individuals to be unaffected by context (Frith 1989).  The evidence 
for weak central coherence in ASD comes from a number of studies conducted by Frith 




children with autism showed little improvement in recalling meaningful sentences over 
random strings of words, suggesting that they showed “a lack of sensitivity to the 
inherent pattern of the input” (Hermelin and O'Connor 1970; Hermelin and Frith 1971).  
Following this Shah and Frith (1983) showed that children with autism showed superior 
performance at the embedded figures test, a task which requires the participant to search 
for a simple figure which is hidden in a more complex figure.  They suggested that this 
superior performance resulted from a combination of enhanced skill at comprehending 
the elements within the pattern and being “unhindered …by the dominance of the overall 
meaning.”  Further evidence for the weak central coherence theory came when Shah and 
Frith (1993) later went on to address the enhanced performance of individuals with 
autism on the block design subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales.  The standard part 
of this task involves putting blocks together to make a design which is provided in a 
picture.  Shah and Frith manipulated the task in three ways: they investigated the effect of 
providing the design in a segmented form (i.e. divided up into its constituent blocks); 
they also investigated the effect of rotating the designs; finally they investigated the 
effect of using more complex designs containing diagonal lines relative the design’s 
orientation.  The idea was that if the superior performance on the block design task 
resulted from superior visuospatial ability then individuals with autism would be less 
affected by rotating the design or by the inclusion of diagonal lines, whereas if the key 
factor was weak central coherence then they would show less facilitation with the 
segmented form than would be seen in a control population (because they were not 
distracted by the gestalt in the unsegmented form).  They found that the latter was true, 




design, whereas both groups found the task more difficult when the designs were rotated 
or diagonals were included.   
 
The weak central coherence theory has been investigated by many groups since it was 
first described, using a variety of tasks in several domains.  The most popular directly 
relevant tasks have been visuospatial tasks (e.g. EFT, block design, Navon hierarchical 
figures), visual illusions, homograph reading and auditory tasks (tone discrimination, 
same/different melody judgements).  Replication has been most robust for impairment in 
homograph reading (which requires the use of context to inform pronunciation, e.g. “The 
road wound around the mountain”; “The wound hurt badly”) as well as the enhanced 
ability on the embedded figures task and the block design task, although some studies do 
report negative findings on these measures (Happé and Frith 2006).  Navon figures, 
which involve a large letter constructed of smaller letters (Navon 1977), have shown 
inconsistent findings, which is perhaps surprising given that the findings for other 
visuospatial tasks have been well replicated.  However, multiple factors can affect results 
on this test, which may account for the heterogeneity in the literature (Navon 2003).  
Tasks involving visual illusions have shown individuals with ASD to be less susceptible 
to them (Happé and Frith 1996), indicating that they are not distracted by the context, 
although again this has not been consistent (Ropar and Mitchell 2001).  It has been 
suggested that a lack of susceptibility to visual illusions and enhanced performance on 
the block design task may be tapping different abilities (Best, Moffat et al. 2008).  
Importantly, a number of studies have reported enhanced performance in people with 




clear sign of impairment in global processing (Mottron, Peretz et al. 2000; Mottron, 
Burack et al. 2003; Wang, Mottron et al. 2007), leading to the proposal that rather than 
weak central coherence, individuals with ASD show enhanced perceptual abilities for 
detail, leading to a preference for local processing, but without deficits in global 
processing abilities.  This is known as the enhanced perceptual functioning theory. 
 
As a result of the research findings since its first description, the theory of weak central 
coherence has been modified in several ways.  Firstly, it is no longer thought that weak 
central coherence also accounts for the social cognitive deficits in autism, they are now 
thought to co-exist rather than explain each other.  There has also been a shift away from 
regarding weak central coherence as relating to a deficit in global integration, instead a 
bias towards local over global processing is now suggested.  Finally, probably in 
response to the enhanced perceptual functioning theory, the superior local processing has 
been given more prominence with the deficit in global processing de-emphasised (Happé 
and Frith 2006).  A full discussion of these modifications is beyond the scope of the 
current thesis, but it is worth noting that the last of these has been disputed by Happe and 
Booth (2008) who suggest that both enhanced local and reduced global processing may 
be important.  This stands in contrast to the enhanced perceptual function theory.    
 
It is therefore generally accepted that individuals with ASD show superior performance 
to controls on tasks which benefit from a local processing advantage, such as the EFT or 




the global context (weak central coherence) or the ability to simply ignore global context 
when it is a distractor and focus on the local (enhanced perceptual function) is less clear.    
 
Weak central coherence in the schizophrenia spectrum 
Although the term central coherence is not used, studies of global-local processing are 
common in schizophrenia and are contradictory, with some reporting impairments in 
global relative to local processing (Ferman, Primeau et al. 1999; Johnson, Lowery et al. 
2005; Poirel, Brazo et al. 2010) while others report impairments in local relative to global 
processing (Carter, Robertson et al. 1996; Granholm, Perry et al. 1999).  All of the 
aforementioned studies using stimuli based upon the principle of Navon figures and so, as 
mentioned above, differences in specific task design could account for the 
inconsistencies.    
 
Several studies have employed tests of visuospatial disembedding in schizophrenia 
similar to the EFT.  Longevialle-Henin et al (2005) report no difference between people 
with schizophrenia and controls using a group administered form of the embedded figures 
test.  However, within the group with schizophrenia they report decreased performance in 
those who were rated as disorganised.  Similarly Loas et al (2004) found a significant 
negative relationship between EFT score and the degree of negative and disorganised 
symptomatology in their group of people with schizophrenia.  Chey et al (1997) found 
that individuals with schizophrenia performed similarly on the easier levels of a 
disembedding task compared to controls, but less well on the more complex tasks.  




paranoid schizophrenia and poor premorbid adjustment performed less well on the EFT 
than controls regardless of the chronicity of their illness; in other individuals with 
schizophrenia (and indeed people with other psychiatric disorders) a longer length of stay 
was related to worse performance on the EFT, interpreted by the authors as being the 
result of institutionalisation.  Taken together these findings suggest that in forms of 
schizophrenia characterised by more negative symptoms or chronic impairment, reduced 
performance on the EFT would be expected, suggesting a global processing bias, due to 
poorer local processing, enhanced global processing or both.   
 
In relation to studies of schizotypy, children of mothers with psychosis have been found 
to perform less well on the EFT than those of well mothers, despite having a similar 
verbal IQ (Gamer, Gallant et al. 1977).   In a study of schizotypal personality disorder 
Granholm (2002) found that people with SPD were relatively better at processing Navon 
Figures shapes on a global level compared to a local level, a finding which was not seen 
in controls.  This is consistent with the same groups work in schizophrenia and suggests a 
global processing advantage in SPD compared to controls, although the lack of a global 
processing advantage in their controls is unusual and contrary to much of the literature 
(Navon 1977).  Contrary to Granholm et al, Parnas et al (2001) found reduced 
susceptibility to visual illusions in individuals considered to be prodromal for 
schizophrenia compared to controls who in turn performed better than those with chronic 
schizophrenia – a finding which indicates a local processing advantage reminiscent of 
that seen in people with ASD and interestingly suggests that schizotypal and 




However, they also found that both the premorbid and schizophrenic individuals scored 
less well than the controls on the Navon figures, but do not report whether this reflects a 
local or global processing bias.   
 
The evidence in schizophrenia and SPD is therefore mixed with no clear indication of 
whether they are associated with a relative advantage of local to global processing or the 
opposite.  There is some relatively weak evidence that findings in schizophrenia may not 
be the same as those seen in schizotypal individuals.   
 
Studies comparing the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
A number of studies have compared individuals with autism and schizophrenia using 
tasks associated with central coherence.  Bolte et al (2007) used the EFT, visual illusions, 
Navon figures and block design task to compare individuals with autism to those with 
schizophrenia.  They found that individuals with high functioning autism outperformed 
individuals with schizophrenia, but not the typical controls on the EFT.  They also found 
that both high functioning autism and schizophrenia led to reduced susceptibility to visual 
illusions compared to the controls, which is in agreement with Best et al (2008) that the 
EFT and visual illusions tests tap different cognitive domains.  No differences were seen 
using the Navon figures or in the block design task.  Bolte et al (2007) also conducted a 
number of tasks to test gestalt principles and found that participants with autism 
perceived gestalt stimuli less than either those with schizophrenia or controls, suggesting 





In a study which may be relevant to the investigation of schizotypy, Bolte et al (2006) 
compared parents of children with autism to parents of children with schizophrenia and 
parents of children with intellectual disability and found that the first group outperformed 
the other two with respect to the EFT.  In keeping with this, Russell-Smith et al (2010) 
compared students who scored highly on a measure of positive schizotypy (the O-LIFE 
unusual experience subscale) to a group with a low score on this measure and found that 
the high scoring group performed worse on the EFT.  They also compared a group who 
scored highly on the AQ to one who scored less well and found that the high scoring 
group performed better on the EFT.  Although they did not compare them directly the 
scores on the EFT in their high schizotypy group and high AQ group appear to be quite 
different.  The authors interpret their study as supportive of the idea that autism and 
schizophrenia are diametrically opposed disorders (Crespi and Badcock 2008).   
 
Summary of neuropsychological studies of weak central coherence 
To summarise, there is strong evidence that ASD is associated with a preference for local 
over global processing, although whether this relates to enhanced local processing, 
impaired global processing or a combination of the two remains unclear.  The evidence in 
schizophrenia and SPD is less clear, but there is some evidence that the opposite may be 
true.  The contradictory nature of the findings may in part relate to the choice of tests 
employed, which often fail to dissociate local and global processing abilities (Happé and 





2.3.4: fMRI of weak central coherence  
 
fMRI of weak central coherence in ASD 
A number of studies have examined the brain activation associated with the embedded 
figures task in autism.  Ring et al (1999) compared activation observed during the solving 
of the EFT against that seen during fixation on a blank screen.  They found that the ASD 
group showed less activation than the controls in the parietal regions (left precuneus, 
right superior parietal lobule and right supramarginal gyrus), the right inferior and middle 
frontal gyri and the bilateral occipital cortex.  Increased activation was seen in the ASD 
group in the right occipital cortex, fusiform gyrus and middle temporal gyrus.   The 
authors suggested that these findings indicate that the ASD group use a strategy based 
less upon working memory and more upon the use of localised visual imagery.  Manjaly 
et al (2007) and Lee et al (2007) used more sophisticated designs where they compared 
activation during embedded figures performance against that elicited by similar tasks 
using complex figures without a visual search component.  Although both studies report 
qualitative differences between the groups, no significant differences were seen.  Manjaly 
et al (2007) reported no evidence of prefrontal differences but that the ASD group 
activated more primary visual areas, suggesting enhanced local processing; Lee et al 
(2007)  reported less prefrontal activations and greater posterior brain activations, similar 
to Ring et al (1999).  Damarla et al (2010) used a design similar to Ring et al (1999) and 
report similar findings: reduced prefrontal and inferior parietal activation and increased 
right occipital and bilateral superior parietal activations in the ASD group compared to 




report reduced frontal-posterior functional connectivity.  In contrast to the above studies, 
Spencer et al (2012) used the same task design as Manjaly et al (2007) and report 
significant findings of increased prefrontal and reduced visual area activation in ASD.  
All of the above studies are interesting in that they are indicative of a role of frontal 
executive functions in solving the embedded figures task.  The reductions in prefrontal 
activations seen in individuals with ASD, may therefore represent executive dysfunction, 
compensated for by visuospatial systems.  Alternatively, they could represent a reduction 
in the influence of top-down processing (which may normally bias towards global 
strategies) leading to an increase in bottom-up processing of perceptual information or 
vice versa.  The reductions in front-posterior connectivity reported by Damarla et al 
(2010) would be consistent with this idea.    
 
Liu et al (2011) argue that the embedded figure designs described above either do not use 
a suitable control task (Ring, Baron-Cohen et al. 1999; Damarla, Keller et al. 2010) or do 
not distinguish between global interference impacting disembedding and global 
processing of a complex shape (Lee, Foss-Feig et al. 2007; Manjaly, Bruning et al. 2007; 
Spencer, Holt et al. 2012).  They therefore compared activation between two different 
tasks: the first asked individuals to count lines on either possible or impossible 3D objects 
(a local processing task with interference from automatic global processing), the second 
asked people to make a judgement of whether a 3D shape was possible or impossible in 
reality (asserted to be a global processing task).  They used a region-of-interest analysis 
and found that compared to controls the ASD group showed less activation in the 




Functional connectivity of the medial frontal cortex to posterior brain regions was also 
reduced in the ASD group in the counting versus possible-impossible task.  The authors 
interpret these results as reflecting a decreased distraction by the global form of the object 
in the counting task in individuals with ASD (evidenced by reduced activation in the 
medial prefrontal cortex), either due to local bias or enhanced perceptual functioning, but 
not due to poorer global processing (because performance on the possible-impossible task 
did not differ).   
 
In the only fMRI study of the block design test to date, Bolte et al (2008) found reduced 
activation in the visual association area, V2, in individuals with autism compared to 
controls.  Although there is a reduction in activation in a visual region, the authors 
suggest that it actually may be caused by reduced top-down processing, and hence is 
reflective of greater bottom up processing of visual stimuli in ASD.   However, as the 
authors’ acknowledge there are other possible reasons why reduced activation in V2 may 
occur in ASD, such as a reduction in effortful processing. 
 
Overall, there is some evidence that fMRI studies have found that individuals with ASD 
tend to show reduced prefrontal activations and increased activation in visuo-spatial 
regions during tasks thought to probe central coherence or local-global processing.  
However, to date the studies do not provide any compelling evidence as to whether this 
results from enhanced perceptual functioning or from weak central coherence / a lack of 





fMRI of weak central coherence in the schizophrenia spectrum 
There has been much less fMRI investigation of local-global processing in schizophrenia 
than in autism.  Silverstein et al (2010) used a paradigm which involved attending to a 
target stimulus when it either stands separately from a group of distractors (isolated 
condition) or when it is among a group of distractors with a distractor standing separately 
(embedded condition).  They do not report whether there is a significant group x 
condition interaction, however for the embedded condition they report that compared to 
controls there is reduced activation in people with schizophrenia in the amygdala, 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, anterior cingulate and parahippocampal 
gyrus (all bilateral); increased activation was reported in the left middle frontal gyrus, left 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, left superior parietal lobe, left inferior temporal gyrus and 
cerebellum.  The authors suggest that the increases in activation in the parietal lobe and 
inferior temporal gyrus is evidence of greater ‘bottom up’ processing in schizophrenia, 
i.e. suggestive of a local processing strategy.  How this might accord with the increased 
frontal activations they also report is unclear.   
 
No known fMRI studies have considered SPD or schizotypal individuals in tasks of 
central coherence or local-global processing.   
 
fMRI studies comparing the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
To the author’s knowledge no studies to date have compared weak central coherence / 





Summary of fMRI studies of weak central coherence  
Overall therefore fMRI studies are consistent with the idea that individuals with ASD 
show a relative bias towards local rather than global processing, evidenced by reductions 
in prefrontal activation.  However, it remains unclear whether this bias is the result of 
enhanced local processing leading to a reduction in global distraction, impaired global 
processing meaning that they are less able to perceive the whole, both or neither.  At 
present, there are not enough studies to allow one to comment reliably upon the fMRI 
investigation of local versus global processing biases in schizophrenia or SPD, or to 
suggest how they may differ or otherwise from ASD.  Similar to the behavioural 
literature there is a need for fMRI studies in both conditions to use stimuli which 
convincingly isolate local and global processing from each other.  Studies of functional 
and effective connectivity may be useful to further investigate the possibility that 
reductions in the influence of top-down processing may be important in driving existing 
findings (Frith 2003). 
 
2.3.5: Social cognition 
Social cognition is a broad based concept summarised by Moskowitz as “the study of 
mental processes involved in perceiving, attending to, remembering, thinking about, and 
making sense of the people in our social world” (Moskowitz 2005).  It therefore 
represents a vast field of research, covering many facets of human behaviour.  Of 
particular interest in autism and schizophrenia are those aspects of social cognition which 




have generally examined these areas in autism and schizophrenia under three related 
paradigms: emotion recognition, theory of mind and mirror neuron functioning.   
 
2.3.5.1: Neuropsychological Studies of Emotion Recognition  
 
Emotion recognition in ASD 
A multitude of studies have investigated the ability of people with autism to recognise 
basic emotions from faces.  The results have been heterogeneous, which may relate to 
population, task and measurement differences between studies, although overall there 
does appear to be a deficit in face emotion recognition in people with ASD compared to 
controls, particularly when more complex stimuli are used, including dynamic and partial 
expressions (Harms, Martin et al. 2010).  The ability to accurately determine emotion 
from other stimuli, such as voices and gestures, has been less investigated but also 
appears to be disturbed in people with ASD, suggesting that the deficits are not specific 
to faces or even the visual domain (Philip, Whalley et al. 2010).  The difficulty in 
recognising basic emotions in ASD is not limited to any particular emotion, although the 
most commonly reported deficits are in negative emotions such as anger, sadness, fear 
and disgust (Harms, Martin et al. 2010).   
 
It has been suggested that individuals with ASD use a less efficient method of processing 
emotional stimuli, specifically local feature based processing as opposed to the more 
global and automatic strategy employed by typically developing individuals.  In support 




emotions whether a face is upright or inverted, whereas typically developing individuals 
perform less well in the inverted condition (Tantam, Monaghan et al. 1989; Gross 2008).  
It is possible that for more simple stimuli this method of processing emotion is effective 
enough, or it can be compensated for by other explicit cognitive methods, to allow task 
performance to be at the level of typical individuals, whereas for more complex stimuli 
these techniques are insufficient.  However, individuals with autism show difficulties in 
processing facial emotion over and above non-emotional deficits (Philip, Whalley et al. 
2010) implying that there is a role for specific dysfunction of the modulating effects of 
emotion.   
 
Emotion recognition in the schizophrenia spectrum 
In schizophrenia, there have also been consistent reports of difficulties in recognising 
emotions from facial expressions (Marwick and Hall 2008).  Again, fewer studies have 
considered vocal or gestural emotion recognition, but deficits have been reported 
(Kucharska-Pietura, David et al. 2005; Van den Stock, de Jong et al. 2011).  Similar to 
ASD, impairments are usually, but not exclusively, identified for the recognition of 
negative emotions (Marwick and Hall 2008).  Although there is some debate about 
whether the deficits are emotion specific or reflective of more general impairment 
(Johnston, Katsikitis et al. 2001), it is increasingly accepted that the former is the case 
(Morris, Weickert et al. 2009).  In contrast to ASD, the inversion effect in schizophrenia 





Studies in schizotypal personality disorder have also examined whether the ability to 
determine basic emotions from faces is impaired, with conflicting results.  Dickey et al 
(2011) found that individuals with SPD were more impaired in recognising basic 
emotions than controls using pictures derived from the Ekman faces task.  However, 
when errors on a gender recognition task were taken into account this difference lessened 
and became non-significant suggesting that the difficulties the SPD group had in emotion 
recognition were at least in part accounted for by more general difficulties in face 
processing.  Waldeck et al (2000) used a different stimulus set which again employed 
photographs of people expressing basic emotions and found no significant difference in 
the ability to identify facial emotion between a group with SPD and typical controls.  
Mikhailova et al (1996) found that people with SPD were significantly impaired in their 
recognition of happy facial expressions and there was a tendency towards impairment in 
their recognition of sad facial expressions.  The stimuli used in this study were cartoon 
pictures of happy and sad faces, as opposed to photographs of real people.  One study has 
examined the detection of emotion from voices in people with SPD in the context of an 
fMRI experiment and found no differences between the groups (Dickey, Morocz et al. 
2010).   
 
A number of studies have also examined the emotion recognition abilities of people who 
score highly on measures of schizotypy (but not diagnosed with SPD).  In the largest of 
these studies, Germine et al (2011) examined two large groups of individuals (n = 2322 
and n = 1514) recruited via the internet using the SPQ and a test of emotion recognition.  




scored highly on the SPQ whereas gender recognition was not.  In the second group they 
replicated the association between SPQ score and emotion recognition and also found 
that SPQ score did not relate to face identity discrimination.  In contrast to these findings, 
Poreh et al (1994) in a much smaller sample of college students found that those who 
scored more highly on measures of schizotypy performed less well on measures of face 
emotion recognition and general face recognition suggesting that the difficulties relate to 
face processing rather than emotion processing per se.   
 
Abbott et al (2013) recruited individuals through internet advertising and correlated their 
scores on the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (Raine 1991) with those on a video 
based measure of emotion recognition (The Awareness of Social Inference test – TASIT).  
They found that higher levels of schizotypy were associated with reduced ability to 
recognise emotions.  In contrast, using the same stimuli and measure of schizotypal traits, 
Jahshan and Sergei (2007) found no difference between individuals who scored highly on 
the SPQ compared to low scorers.  Toomey et al (1995), using static stimuli, also 
reported no difference between college students with high schizotypy scores compared to 
those with low scores.   
 
In one of the only tests which did not involve facial emotion recognition Shean et al 
(2007) found in a sample of college students that those who scored more highly on the 
SPQ subscales ‘no close friends’ and suspiciousness’ performed less well at interpreting 
emotions from posture, whereas those who score highly on ‘unusual perceptual 





Studies comparing the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
To the author’s knowledge there are no studies which have directly compared emotion 
processing in individuals with SPD to those with ASD.  However, there are a limited 
number of studies which have compared individuals with schizophrenia to those with 
ASD and controls.  Bolte and Poustka (2003) used Ekman faces and found that people 
with autism scored less well than controls and people with schizophrenia.  They also 
compared performance on the same task in the first degree relatives of their clinical 
groups and found no significant differences.  Couture et al (2010) compared adults with 
autism and those with schizophrenia to controls on their ability to determine emotion 
from several different stimuli – movie stills with faces, movie stills without faces and 
point light displays of emotional movements.  They found that both clinical groups 
performed less well than the controls on the point light motion display tasks and the 
movie stills with faces task.  No effect of emotion was seen in the former, whereas in the 
latter there was a group x emotion interaction showing that neither clinical group was 
impaired at recognising fear, both were impaired at recognising sadness and that the 
autism group were additionally impaired at recognising anger.  They also found that, in 
the movie stills with no faces tasks, the clinical groups performed less well than the 
controls at detecting sadness, but the autism group actually outperformed controls with 
respect to recognising fear.  One study has compared autism and schizophrenia with 
respect to non-visual stimuli; van Lancker et al (1989) found that children with autism 
performed less well than controls on a task of emotion recognition from voices, whereas 






Overall, therefore there is good evidence that the recognition of basic emotional 
expressions is impaired in autism and in schizophrenia.  The evidence primarily comes 
from studies of facial expressions, although other sensory modalities have also been 
investigated and impairments have been seen in both disorders.  There is some evidence 
that emotion recognition is more impaired in autism than in schizophrenia.  Although 
people with both conditions have been found to have difficulty processing face stimuli, 
regardless of their emotional content, this does not appear to account for the deficits in 
emotion recognition abilities.  It has been suggested that people with ASD have a 
tendency to process emotional expressions using a local feature based method, rather than 
a more global inherent emotional method.  In schizophrenia, no such local method is 
suspected, suggesting that the deficits may be associated with a different underlying 
mechanism.  It is possible that the mechanism differ entirely between disorders; 
alternatively the mechanism may be the same but differ in its severity, such that no 
compensatory local strategy is required in schizophrenia because the primary deficit is 
less marked than in autism; or there may be some commonalities and some differences 
between the disorders, for example, in both conditions there may be aberrant emotional 
circuitry but with additional impairments to global processing in autism.  Studies in SPD 
and schizotypy in the general population are less clear as to whether impairments in 





2.3.5.2: fMRI studies of emotion recognition  
In typically developing individuals the recognition of basic emotions is thought to 
involve the interaction of sensory and limbic regions with the prefrontal cortex 
(Diwadkar, Wadehra et al. 2012).  Facial expressions have been some of the most studied 
communicants of emotion and it has been proposed that there exists a core area for face 
perception comprising three regions (Haxby, Hoffman et al. 2000).  In this model, the 
inferior occipital gyri are involved in early perception of facial features, the fusiform 
gyrus processes invariant features of faces which allow people to detect identity, and the 
superior temporal sulcus is involved in dynamic aspects of facial expression which allow 
one to detect emotion.  Input to the superior temporal sulcus from limbic regions is then 
implicated in the recognition of emotions, although limbic regions are also active during 
the processing of neutral facial expressions (Fusar-Poli, Placentino et al. 2009).  Specific 
emotions have been associated with specific limbic regions: for example, the insula has 
commonly been found to be activated during tasks which involve disgust and anger, 
while the amygdala is associated with the recognition of fear, happiness and sadness 
(Fusar-Poli, Placentino et al. 2009).  These regions are also known to be activated during 
the sensation of emotion, a finding which has been suggested as evidence that they form 
part of a mirror neuron network (see Chapter 2.3.5.5).   
 
Others have argued that such a clear dissociation (i.e. specific regions for invariant versus 
dynamic components of faces) is not clearly upheld by the evidence and that both the 
fusiform gyrus and the superior temporal sulcus are involved in emotion processing 





fMRI of emotional recognition in ASD 
Initial studies in ASD reported reduced activation of the fusiform gyrus during face 
processing paradigms (Pierce, Müller et al. 2001) and this has been confirmed by a meta-
analysis which reported that individuals with ASD show reduced left fusiform and right 
inferior occipital gyrus activations, as well as increased bilateral superior temporal gyrus 
activations during basic social tasks (mainly face processing tasks, some with emotional 
content) (Philip, Dauvermann et al. 2012).  However, the role of eye gaze has been 
suggested to be important with some studies reporting a positive relationship between 
fusiform gyrus activation and time spent looking at the eyes (Dalton, Nacewicz et al. 
2005) and others finding no differences in fusiform gyrus activation if individuals are 
directed to look at the eyes (Hadjikhani, Joseph et al. 2004; Hadjikhani, Joseph et al. 
2007).     
 
Amygdala dysfunction has been proposed as a potential mechanism to explain autism 
(Baron-Cohen, Ring et al. 2000) and fMRI studies of face processing have reported a 
mixture of hypo (Ashwin, Baron-Cohen et al. 2007; Pelphrey, Morris et al. 2007; Grèzes, 
Wicker et al. 2009) and hyper-activation (Dalton, Nacewicz et al. 2005).  Dalton et al 
(2005) reported that in people with ASD amygdala activation correlated with the length 
of time they spent looking at the eyes of neutral stimuli, suggesting that there was an 
anxiogenic effect of direct eye gaze which was not seen in controls.  An alternative 
explanation for increased amygdala activation was proposed by Kleinhans et al (2009) 




over time of the amygdala response to neutral faces leading to a relative, but not an 
absolute hyperactivation.   
 
fMRI of emotion recognition in the schizophrenia spectrum 
Studies in schizophrenia have also implicated dysfunction of the fusiform gyrus and 
amygdala during face processing with hypo-activation of these regions being most 
commonly reported (Phillips, Williams et al. 1999; Takahashi, Koeda et al. 2004; 
Williams, Das et al. 2004).  A recent meta-analysis confirmed these findings, with areas 
of reduced activation during facial emotion processing being reported in people with 
schizophrenia compared to controls in the fusiform gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, 
amygdala, lentiform nucleus and the superior frontal gyrus (Fusar-Poli, Placentino et al. 
2009).  Interestingly, it has been proposed that hypoactivation of the amygdala seen in 
people with schizophrenia when viewing fearful faces is in fact a function of 
hyperactivation when viewing neutral faces, i.e. activation of the amygdala in people 
with schizophrenia is not actually less than in controls but the relative increase in 
activation between the neutral and fearful faces conditions is greater in controls (Hall, 
Whalley et al. 2008).  In contrast to the finding of Kleinhans et al (2009) in autism, this 
study also reported that there was no difference in the habituation of the amygdala 
response over time between people with schizophrenia and controls.   
 
There has been only one fMRI study which has considered emotion recognition in 
individuals with SPD.  Dickey et al (2010) examined emotional prosody recognition 




activated the superior temporal gyrus regardless of whether the sentences were read in a 
neutral or emotional tone, with no significant differences found between the groups.  An 
exploratory analysis, using a liberal statistical threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons, found that individuals with SPD had large haemodynamic 
responses in frontal regions which were not seen in controls.   
 
A number of studies have considered the brain activation associated with emotion 
recognition in schizotypal traits in general population samples.  Germine et al (2011) 
examined the effect of social anhedonia, a personality trait known to be associated with 
schizophrenia (and autism), on brain activation during the viewing of emotional faces.  
They found that high levels of social anhedonia were associated with both increased and 
reduced activations in a variety of brain regions using an uncorrected threshold of 
p<0.001 uncorrected.  They then used small volume corrections for certain social brain 
regions, and report that individuals with high social anhedonia showed significantly 
reduced activation (p<0.05 corrected) in the medial frontal cortex, postcentral gyrus and 
right superior temporal gyrus, compared to those with low social anhedonia.   
 
Huang et al (2013) compared brain activation during the viewing of dynamic facial 
expressions of happiness appearing and disappearing.  They found that during the 
viewing of happiness disappearing, individuals with schizotypal traits deactivated less in 






Studies comparing the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
No studies have directly compared emotion processing in autism and schizophrenia.  
However, a recent activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis compared brain 
activation during facial emotion processing tasks between studies of people with autism 
to those with schizophrenia.  They found that an increase in activation in people with 
ASD compared to those with schizophrenia in the superior temporal gyrus and anterior 
cingulate bilaterally and the left posterior cingulate.  In the reverse contrast 
(schizophrenia > ASD) they found differences in the left inferior frontal gyrus, left 
parahippocampus, left inferior parietal lobe, right inferior occipital lobe and the 
cerebellum (Sugranyes, Kyriakopoulos et al. 2011).   
 
Summary 
Overall, the functional MRI data in both autism and schizophrenia clearly indicate 
abnormal activation during the processing of emotions, particularly from faces.   
However, there is a great deal of heterogeneity between studies, with regard to whether 
affected individuals under- or over-activate particular areas.  This is particularly the case 
in studies of autism, those of schizophrenia tend to report hypoactivation of social brain 
regions during emotional processing.  Reduced activation in the fusiform gyri is 
consistently reported in both conditions which may reflect the processing of facial stimuli 
in areas outwith those typically associated with face processing.  This is consistent with 
the idea that individuals with autism, and possibly also schizophrenia, have not developed 
regional specialisation for face processing in the same way as unaffected individuals 




activations in limbic regions have been reported in both ASD and schizophrenia during 
emotion processing, with both hypo- and hyper-activation reported in the former and 
mainly hypo-activation in the latter.  However, there are some suggestions that these 
findings may relate to other factors, such as hyper-activation during the viewing of 
neutral faces in schizophrenia and a lack of the typical habitation of the amygdala in 
ASD.  Increased activation of the superior temporal sulcus during emotion processing has 
found in people with autism and not those with schizophrenia suggesting that this is an 
area of potential difference between the groups, and this was highlighted in the meta-
analysis by Sugranyes et al (2011).  This meta-analysis also suggested that people with 
schizophrenia show greater activation than those with autism in the inferior parietal lobe 
and inferior frontal gyrus (potential mirror neuron regions – see Chapter 2.3.5.5).  It is 
not clear from the few existing studies whether individuals with SPD show consistent 
differences in activation from controls during emotion processing.   
 
2.3.5.3: Neuropsychological studies of mentalising 
Mentalising, or theory of mind, describes the ability of individuals to attribute mental 
states to others and to themselves (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Frith 2003).  Studies in 
typically developing children have shown that most develop this ability from around the 
age of two (Leslie 1987).   
 
Mentalising in ASD 
Baron-Cohen et al (1985) in a now classic paper showed that 80% of autistic children, 




children and 86% of children with Down syndrome (whose IQ was actually lower than 
the autistic children).   The false belief test they employed was the Sally-Anne test, 
illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: Sally-Anne test from (Frith 2001).  Participants who fail to answer the 
question correctly are deemed to be unable to attribute a mental state to Sally that is 
different from their own.  This is a first order false belief tests, i.e. it involves the 
construct “I think that she thinks”  
 
The work of Baron-Cohen and colleagues has been replicated many times by many 
different research groups in many different ways.  Individuals with autism have, among 
other things, been shown to be impaired in tasks which involve understanding second 




1993), detecting faux pas (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan et al. 1999), determining people’s 
mental states from pictures of their eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al. 2001) or tone 
of voice (Rutherford, Baron-Cohen et al. 2002), making social judgements from pictures 
of people (Philip, Dauvermann et al. 2012), understanding irony (Happé 1994) and many 
more functions.  However, not all individuals with autism fail on tasks which purport to 
test mentalising abilities suggesting that impaired mentalisation is not an invariant feature 
of autism, the tasks used are solvable by means other than the use of a specific 
mentalising system, or the tasks used do not capture the actual deficit.  Some have 
proposed that failure to pass false belief tasks is actually the result of executive 
dysfunction, as these tasks require the use of working memory (to hold the false 
representation in mind) and inhibition (of the tendency to answer based on what you, as 
opposed to ‘Sally’ know to be true) (Tager-Flusberg 2007).    In addition, it is now 
proposed that a delay in acquiring mentalising abilities, rather than a permanent deficit, is 
what is actually associated with autism (Happé 1995).  However, adults with Asperger 
syndrome have also been found to fail more complex tasks of mentalising abilities such 
as irony detection (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen 1999), inferring mental states from pictures 
of eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al. 2001) and making social judgments from 
pictures (Philip, Whalley et al. 2010).  They also show different anticipatory gaze 
patterns compared to controls on an implicit false belief task despite passing standard 
explicit false-belief (Senju 2012).  This difference in implicit versus explicit mentalising 
may help to explain why some individuals with autism pass traditional mentalising tasks, 
which tend to be explicit in nature, but still show clear social difficulties in real life 





Mentalising in the schizophrenia spectrum 
That idea that schizophrenia could be associated with aberrant mentalising abilities 
developed in part out of observations of the similarities between schizophrenia and 
autism (Frith and Frith 1991; Frith 1992).  Given the clinical overlap between the 
negative symptoms of schizophrenia and autistic traits, it is not surprising that the most 
severe mentalising difficulties are found in patients with negative and disorganised 
symptoms in particular (Sprong, Schothorst et al. 2007).  However, deficits in 
mentalising are also found in individuals with paranoid symptoms and it has also been 
proposed that certain types of delusion are associated with over-mentalising (i.e. the over-
ascription of mental states to others leading to the selection of an incorrect one) (Abu-
Akel and Bailey 2000; Frith 2004).  Hallucinations and passivity phenomena have also 
been ascribed to similar problems with self-monitoring (Frith 1992).  In keeping with 
this, the over-ascription of mental states to non-intentional animations has been reported 
to be associated with patients with schizophrenia and delusions of persecution 
(Blakemore, Boyer et al. 2003).  Frith (2004) has also proposed that there are explicit 
theory of mind deficits in schizophrenia but, in contrast to autism, implicit processing is 
intact.  Although arising after the current study was conceived, the application of the 
implicit mentalising task from Senju et al (2012), to schizophrenia would therefore be of 
interest.   
 
To the author’s knowledge no studies of mentalising abilities exist in individuals with a 




abilities have been reported in individuals with schizophrenia who are not actively 
psychotic, suggesting that they are at least in part trait (not just state) related (Sprong, 
Schothorst et al. 2007).  There are also a relatively large number of studies which 
consider non-clinical samples with high levels of schizotypal traits and of relatives of 
people with schizophrenia.  In general, these show reductions in performance of 
mentalising tasks compared to people with low levels of schizotypal traits or controls 
(Langdon and Coltheart 1999; Langdon and Coltheart 2004; Marjoram, Miller et al. 
2006; Fyfe, Williams et al. 2008; Gooding, Johnson et al. 2010; Barragan, Laurens et al. 
2011; Aldebot Sacks, Weisman de Mamani et al. 2012), although this is not entirely 
consistent (Jahshan and Sergi 2007; Fernyhough, Jones et al. 2008; McCleery, Divilbiss 
et al. 2012; Fett and Maat 2013).  A recent meta-analysis showed that, compared to 
controls, first degree relatives of people with schizophrenia were impaired in mentalising 
tests (Lavoie, Bédard Lacroix et al. 2013).  
 
Some groups have also reported specific patterns of difference in relation to symptoms.  
Fyfe et al (2008) studied well individuals divided by the level of schizotypal traits (using 
the Schizotypal Personality Scale) or delusional thinking (measured using the Peters et al 
Delusions Inventory) using several tasks designed to probe whether schizotypal 
individuals made more allocations of connectedness between stimuli (apophenia) or 
attributed mental states to stimuli when there was none.  The tasks used were stories 
based upon Happe’s strange stories (Happé 1994), the triangles task (Castelli, Happé et 
al. 2000) or the contingency task (Blakemore, Boyer et al. 2003).  They found that 




likely to perceive connectedness between stimuli and that delusion prone individuals 
showed evidence of over-mentalisation in the triangles task and the contingency task 
(similar to the findings of Blakemore et al (2003).)  Similarly, Gray et al (2011) found 
that higher levels of schizotypy were associated with a greater tendency to ascribe mental 
capacities to objects which would not normally be held to possess these, including trees, 
dead people, robots and animals.   
 
Pickup (2006) found that positive schizotypal symptoms, measured on the O-LIFE, were 
negatively associated with performance on a mentalising task, and that this was not 
affected by executive function or verbal IQ.  No relationship between negative or 
disorganised signs and task performance were seen, suggesting that this relationship is 
restricted to clinical populations.  Similar results have also been reported by Gooding et 
al (2010) and Barragan et al (2011).  Aldebot-Sacks et al (2012) reported associations 
between reduced mentalising abilities and positive schizotypal traits in a large sample of 
undergraduates (420 individuals), but the opposite relationship was seen with 
disorganised traits.  In the unaffected relatives of people with schizophrenia derived from 
the Edinburgh High Risk Study, Marjoram et al (2006) reported reduced performance on 
a self-monitoring and a visual joke task, but only in those who had experienced 
subclinical psychotic symptoms.    
 
Studies comparing the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
Despite the clear overlaps there are relatively few studies which have directly compared 





Craig et al (2004) examined individuals with Asperger Syndrome and compared them to 
a group with schizophrenia and persecutory delusions and a group of controls with regard 
to their performance on a variety of tests hypothesised to relate to persecutory beliefs.  
The tests included two mentalisation tasks and the Attributional Style Structured 
Interview (responses on which had previously been found to relate to paranoia).  They 
found that both the schizophrenia and the Asperger groups performed less well than 
controls on the mentalisation tasks, but only the schizophrenia group showed 
atttributional abnormalities, which they interpreted to mean that psychotic symptoms in 
Asperger syndrome arise from a different mechanism than in schizophrenia.    
 
Couture et al (2010) compared a group of individuals with schizophrenia, a group with 
high-functioning autism and a group of controls on a battery of social cognition tasks, 
including emotion recognition,  a task of making trustworthiness judgements from 
pictures and the making social judgements from pictures of eyes. They found that the 
schizophrenia and autism groups performed less well on aspects of emotion recognition 
and on rating trustworthiness.  In the latter both the autism and the schizophrenia group 
rated the untrustworthy faces more positively than the controls.  When the schizophrenia 
group was divided into those with positive symptoms and those with negative symptoms, 
the negative symptom group showed most resemblance to the autism group.  
Interestingly, the positive symptom group rated the trustworthy faces less positively than 
the negative symptom or autism group.  These findings are consistent with the idea above 




mentalising difficulty than the positive symptoms, and it is the former which is more like 
similar to that found in autism. 
 
Pilowsky et al (2000) used a deception task and a false belief task and found that children 
with autism performed less well than controls on both tasks and less well than children 
with schizophrenia on the deception task.  Children with schizophrenia performed less 
well than controls on the false belief task but not the deception task, suggesting that they 
possess similar but less severe mentalising difficulties than children with autism.   
 
Summary 
Overall therefore there is evidence that individuals with schizophrenia, SPD and autism 
all show impairments in mentalising abilities.  There is some suggestion in the literature 
that the nature of the mentalising difficulties may differ between the groups and depend 
upon the symptoms expressed, with over-mentalising occurring in schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders with positive symptoms, and under-mentalising in association with 
autism and with negative symptoms in schizophrenia spectrum disorders.   
 
2.3.5.4: fMRI studies of mentalising  
Given that attributing and understanding the mental states of others often involves the 
detection of emotion, it is unsurprising that mentalising is associated with activation in 
regions known to be associated with emotional processing, such as the insula, amygdala, 
and superior temporal sulcus.  The amygdala is involved in mediating the conditioned 




an emotion is viewed in another, but also when any stimulus is viewed that is associated 
with a learned emotional characteristic (Frith 2007).  As described earlier the superior 
temporal sulcus, particularly the posterior aspect, is thought to be involved in the 
processing of dynamic biological stimuli and through this has a role in the recognition of 
emotional expressions.  However, it has also been suggested to have a broader role to 
play in social cognition, through the evaluation of intentions conveyed through biological 
motion (Pelphrey, Shultz et al. 2011) and / or through its interaction with the different 
areas of the social brain with which is co-activated (Hein and Knight 2008). 
 
Other brain regions have also been found to be activated during mentalising tasks, 
including the medial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus and temporal 
poles (Frith 2007; Van Overwalle 2009; Mar 2011).  The medial prefrontal cortex has 
been consistently found to be activated during mentalising tasks, self-processing, action 
monitoring and outcome monitoring (Amodio and Frith 2006).  The anterior rostral 
aspect has been suggested to be particularly involved in mentalising, possibly through a 
role in constructing second order representations which underpin certain communicative 
function (i.e. being aware that the person communicating with us is aware of our mental 
state) (Frith 2007).  It has also been suggested to have a key role in the attribution of 
enduring social traits to others and their application to day to day situations (Van 
Overwalle 2009).  The temporal poles have also been suggested to be involved in this 
function through their role in taking pieces of information and weaving them into a 
whole, thereby facilitating contextual understanding and integrating general social 




other cortical regions and through these connections is thought to be involved in episodic 
memory retrieval, visuo-spatial imagery and self-processing, the latter due to its 
association with the medial prefrontal cortex (Cavanna and Trimble 2006).  The inferior 
frontal gyrus has been characterised in animals and humans as a potential mirror neuron 
region and hence involved in social understanding through a specific mechanism 
discussed below.   
 
fMRI of mentalising in ASD 
Aberrant activations in many of the regions outlined above have been reported in people 
with ASD during mentalising tasks (Di Martino, Ross et al. 2009; Philip, Dauvermann et 
al. 2012).  The meta-analysis by Philip et al (2012) reported increased activations during 
complex social cognitive tasks (of which around half were mentalising tasks) in the left 
superior temporal gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus and left pre-and post-central gyri, 
while reduced activations were found in the bilateral superior temporal gyrus and left 
inferior parietal lobule.  Using a much more restricted set of studies, focused purely on 
mentalising tasks, Sugranyes et al (2011) reported no areas of increased activation in 
people with ASD compared to typically developing controls; reduced activation was seen 
in the left medial frontal lobe, right precentral gyrus, left anterior cingulate, left 
amygdala, left middle temporal gyrus and left inferior parietal lobule.   
 
fMRI of mentalising in the schizophrenia spectrum 
Findings in schizophrenia also indicate that mentalising regions are activated differently 




in activation in the right paracentral lobule and left posterior cingulate; reduced activation 
was found in the left medial frontal lobe, right posterior cingulate, left middle temporal 
gyrus and left pulvinar.   
 
There are no studies of SPD which have examined mentalising abilities.  However, three 
studies have examined the relationship between schizotypal traits and brain activation 
during mentalising tasks using fMRI in general population samples.  Using a task of 
irony detection, Rapp et al (Rapp, Mutschler et al. 2010) found that schizotypal traits as 
measured by the SPQ correlated negatively with activation in the bilateral middle 
temporal gyrus and positively with activation in the left inferior prefrontal gyrus.  No 
effect of schizotypal traits was seen on other regions found to be differentially activated 
during reading ironic and non-ironic sentences.  Premkumar et al (2012) compared brain 
activation in individuals from the general population with high schizotypy to those with 
low schizotypy (measured by the O-LIFE) when they were viewing scenes of either 
social acceptance or rejection.  They found that high schizotypy individuals showed 
reduced activation in the anterior cingulate cortex bilaterally, right superior frontal gyrus 
and left ventral prefrontal cortex when viewing scenes of rejection compared to 
acceptance.  Modinos et al (2010) considered the effect of ‘psychosis proneness’ in a 
general population sample on brain activity when participants completed cartoon based 
first and second-order mentalising tasks.  They found that those with high psychosis 
proneness showed increased activation in prefrontal regions (anterior, dorsomedial and 





Mentalising paradigms have also been used in studies of people at risk of psychosis due 
to either genetic or symptomatic reasons, some of whom may have schizotypal traits.  
Marjoram et al (2006) found greater activation in the right inferior parietal lobule and 
bilateral middle frontal gyrus during the viewing of mentalising cartoons compared to 
physical cartoons in people with a family history of schizophrenia and no history of 
psychotic symptoms compared to those with a similar family history who had symptoms.  
No differences between the familial high risk groups and the controls were seen.  Brune 
et al (2011) used a similar cartoon based task and found that individuals with prodromal 
symptoms of psychosis showed greater activation than both controls and people with 
schizophrena in the left inferior frontal gyrus, the temporo-parietal junction and left 
superior and middle temporal gyri.  They also showed increased activation compared to 
controls in the right posterior cingulate and right precuneus.  Reduced activation 
compared to controls was seen in the medial frontal lobe and posterior cingulate gyrus.      
 
Studies of people with schizotypal traits and those at risk of schizophrenia are therefore 
heterogeneous in terms of their activation patterns during mentalising tasks.  Both 
increases and decreases in brain activation in social brain regions have been found.  
Differences between the studies in the tasks used and how they define their groups may 
account for these differences.  Unfortunately the degree to which their results can be 







Studies comparing the autism and schizophrenia spectrums 
One study has directly compared schizophrenia and autism using fMRI during a social 
cognition task.  Pinkham et al (2008) measured brain activation while participants made 
judgements of trustworthiness from faces.  They compared individuals with ASD, a 
group with schizophrenia and prominent paranoid symptoms and a group with 
schizophrenia and few paranoid symptoms.  Using an ROI analysis and an uncorrected 
statistical threshold (p<0.05), they found that individuals with ASD did not differ from 
those with paranoid symptoms, but did show less activation in the right amygdala and left 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex than the non-paranoid group of people with schizophrenia.  
The very liberal statistical threshold chose in this study means that it is very difficult to 
determine whether the results arose from chance alone.   
 
Somewhat more reliably, Sugraneyes et al (2011) also conducted an ALE meta-analysis 
comparing autism to schizophrenia during mentalising tasks.  They report that people 
with schizophrenia showed greater activation than those with ASD in the right medial 
frontal lobe, left paracentral lobule and left posterior cingulate.  Only one region (the 
right insula) was found to be more active in ASD compared to schizophrenia.  It should 
be noted that this comparison was based upon combining the data from studies of ASD 
compared to controls with those of schizophrenia compared to controls and thus may be 
biased by the use of different paradigms in different clinical groups.   
 
There are no studies to date that directly compare individuals with SPD to those with 






Overall therefore there is good evidence that individuals with schizophrenia and those 
with ASD show aberrant brain activation during mentalising tasks in brain regions which 
have been found to be involved in such tasks in controls.  Both under- and over-activation 
have been reported in both groups in regions across the social brain.  The most reliable 
evidence of potential difference between the groups comes from the meta-analysis of 
Sugraneyes et al (2011) which suggests that, although individuals with schizophrenia and 
those with ASD both tend to under-activate mentalising associated brain regions 
compared to controls, when the two groups are compared generally greater activations 
are found in individuals with schizophrenia.  There is some evidence from the existing 
literature that individuals with schizotypal traits (either in general population samples or 
in high risk groups) may show increased activation in at least some brain regions 
compared to controls, although the literature is very heterogenous and does not permit 
firm conclusions to be drawn.  Whether increases and decreases in activation reflect 
hyper- and hypo-mentalising is not clear.   
 
2.3.5.5: The mirror neuron theory 
The mirror neuron theory is derived from the, initially incidental, observation that 
neurons in the inferior premotor cortex of a macaque monkey known to fire during goal 
directed movement, such as grasping an object, also fired when it observed the 
experimenter carrying out similar movements (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga et al. 1992).  Similar 




it has been observed that these neurons fire differently at the time of the action depending 
on what the outcome of the action was (for example grasping to bring food to mouth or to 
place it in a container) (Fogassi, Ferrari et al. 2005).  It has therefore been suggested that 
the role of these so-called mirror neuron regions is to allow observers not just to judge the 
goal of an observed action but also the intention that lies behind it.  Other areas of the 
macaque parietal lobe have also been suggested to contain mirror neurons – the lateral 
intraparietal area which is thought to be involved in the mirroring of the observed other’s 
eye gaze and the ventral intraparietal area which is suggested to be involved in the 
representation of the observed other’s peri-personal space (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 
2010).  Connections to parietal regions from other cortical regions such as the superior 
temporal sulcus and middle temporal gyri are said to provide higher order sensory 
information which modulates the response of mirror neurons.   
 
Findings from the macaque have been extended to humans using electroencephalography 
(EEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and fMRI.  EEG studies have shown 
desynchronisation of the mu rhythm during both movement and the observation of 
movement, with greater suppression occurring during goal directed than non-goal 
directed movement (Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson et al. 2004).  Greater peripheral 
muscle response to TMS stimulation of the premotor cortex has been shown to be 
associated with the observation of action, suggested to reflect an increase in cortico-
spinal excitability caused by premotor mirror neuron activation (Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman 
et al. 2002).  fMRI studies have shown increased activations in the inferior frontal gyrus 




which suggested meaningful intentions, compared to actions without context, or actions 
with incongruous contexts (Kaplan and Iacoboni 2006).  Kaplan et al (2006) also found 
that the increase in inferior prefrontal activation correlated with a behavioural 
measurement of empathy.  Other studies have also shown correlations between measures 
of empathy and activation of mirror neuron regions during observation of facial 
expressions (Pfeifer, Iacoboni et al. 2008) and hearing a motor action (Gazzola, Aziz-
Zadeh et al. 2006).   
 
As a result of these and other studies it has been suggested that mirror neuron regions 
play a pivotal role in the ability to understand the actions and intentions of others at a 
level prior to conscious processing and hence are important in social cognition (Gallese, 
Keysers et al. 2004; Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti 2008; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010).  
For motor behaviour, the potential links between imitation and mirror neurons provide 
one way in which this may be the case (Iacoboni 2009), although it should be noted that 
macaques do not imitate in the same way as humans (Hickok 2009).  However, there is 
also evidence that mirror neurons in humans occur outwith the regions described in the 
macaque, suggesting that it is not just the motor system that contains neurons with 
mirroring properties.  Such neurons have also been reported to occur in humans in the 
medial temporal lobe and medial frontal cortex through single cell electrode recordings in 
humans with intractable epilepsy who both performed and observed hand grasping and 
facial expressions (Mukamel, Ekstrom et al. 2010).  fMRI studies have also shown insula 
and anterior cingulate cortex activation both when someone feels disgusted and observes 




similar results have been reported for pain (Singer, Seymour et al. 2004) ; and 
somatosensory cortex activation has been reported during the observation of touch to 
another (Keysers, Wicker et al. 2004; Blakemore, Bristow et al. 2005).  In a recent meta-
analysis, Molenberghs et al (2012) found that activations reported in fMRI studies of 
action observation and execution identified, not only the ‘core’ mirror neuron regions but 
also the insula, temporal gyri, dorsal premotor cortex and cerebellum.  When they 
specifically examined activation patterns for studies of emotional stimuli they found 
activation in the posterior inferior frontal gyrus, ventral premotor cortex, amygdala, 
insula and cingulate gyrus.  Thus they conclude that neurons with mirroring properties 
are found in a wide variety of brain regions and become active dependent upon the nature 
of the task, supporting the idea that they are involved in functions which are not purely 
motor.   
 
The mirror neuron theory in ASD 
Since the discovery of mirror neurons there has been great interest in their possible role 
in autism spectrum disorder (Perkins, Stokes et al. 2010).  A number of studies have used 
EEG and reported a lack of mu rhythm suppression in people with ASD during action 
observation compared to baseline (Oberman, Hubbard et al. 2005; Bernier, Dawson et al. 
2007; Oberman, Ramachandran et al. 2008), although none have found a significant 
group by condition interaction (Hamilton 2013).  Other studies have not found mu 
rhythm suppression during action observation in people with ASD (Raymaekers, 
Wiersema et al. 2009; Fan, Decety et al. 2010; Bernier, Aaronson et al. 2013) leading 




autism have also reported contradictory findings in studies which are designed to directly 
probe mirror neuron regions (Hamilton 2013).  Studies of non-emotional conditions in 
particular have not provided consistent evidence for mirror neuron dysfunction in ASD, 
with most studies reporting no differences between controls and people with ASD in 
mirror neuron region activity during the observation of neutral actions (Williams, Waiter 
et al. 2006; Grèzes, Wicker et al. 2009; Dinstein, Thomas et al. 2010; Marsh and 
Hamilton 2011).   
 
Studies of emotional stimuli in autism have shown more evidence of differences in mirror 
neuron activity between groups, through showing differences in activation of the inferior 
frontal gyrus and / or the inferior parietal lobule during social or emotional tasks 
(Dapretto, Davies et al. 2005; Grèzes, Wicker et al. 2009; Greimel, Nehrkorn et al. 2012).  
However, the inferior frontal gyrus has a variety of functions other than acting as a mirror 
neuron region, including language, working memory and fine movement (Liakakis, 
Nickel et al. 2011) and it is possible that the differences reported relate to one of these.  
In addition in meta-analyses of social tasks in ASD, either no difference (Di Martino, 
Ross et al. 2009) or an increase in inferior frontal gyrus activity has been reported during 
social tasks (Philip, Dauvermann et al. 2012).  Only one study has confirmed that 
differences in inferior frontal activation are associated with execution or induction of the 
emotion as well as observation (Bastiaansen, Thioux et al. 2011).  They reported no 
differences in activation between individuals with ASD and controls in the inferior 
frontal gyrus (BA44) during instructed facial movement to form a disgusted expression 




reduced activation in participants with ASD compared to controls in the inferior frontal 
gyrus during the observation of facial expressions, but only in younger participants, and 
suggest that dysfunction in mirror neurons may resolve over time in people with ASD.   
 
Thus, despite its enthusiastic embrace by many, the evidence for mirror neuron 
dysfunction in autism is not strong.  Abnormalities in the function of classical mirror 
neuron regions have been reported somewhat more consistently in studies of emotional, 
but not neutral, stimuli raising two possibilities: mirror neuron dysfunction is specific to 
emotional processing in ASD; or that there is not mirror neuron dysfunction in ASD and 
these differences reported relate to other aspects of social cognitive function which may 
interact with mirror neuron areas, such as their top-down modulation by socio-emotional 
cues (Philip, Dauvermann et al. 2012; Hamilton 2013) 
 
The mirror neuron theory in the schizophrenia spectrum 
Mirror neurons are also potentially of interest in schizophrenia, given the social cognitive 
deficits which are known to occur.  They have been considered to a much lesser degree 
than in ASD but a recent review suggested that mirror neuron dysfunction was an area of 
potential overlap between schizophrenia and ASD (King and Lord 2011).  McCormick et 
al (2012) found increased mu rhythm suppression during action observation in a group of 
people with schizophrenia who were actively psychotic compared to controls.  They did 
not find this difference in people with schizophrenia who were not actively psychotic, 
suggesting it may be a state, not trait, feature of the condition.  They suggest that mirror 




opposite direction than that which has been suggested in ASD.  However, a study using 
TMS has reported reductions in mirror neuron activity in schizophrenia (Enticott, Hoy et 
al. 2008), while another has reported positive correlations between theory of mind 
measures and mirror neuron activity in schizophrenia (Mehta, Basavaraju et al. 2012).  
Reduced inferior frontal gyrus activation has been reported in several studies of people 
with schizophrenia using social and emotional tasks although not with a specific focus on 
mirroring properties (Russell, Rubia et al. 2000; Dichter, Bellion et al. 2010; de Achával, 
Villarreal et al. 2012).  Thus the literature in schizophrenia is small and contradictory, 
and the idea that deficits in mirror neuron function may be shared between schizophrenia 
and autism is premature.  There are no studies to date which specifically explore mirror 
neuron function in individuals with schizotypal personality disorder.   
 
The study by Bastiaansen et al (2011)  examining autism, also included as a sub-analysis, 
a group of individuals with schizophrenia.  Although they do not say whether there were 
any differences in inferior frontal gyrus activation between people with schizophrenia 
and controls, they do report that there were no differences between the schizophrenia 
group and the ASD group, and that there was no evidence of a significant effect of age on 
inferior frontal activation in the people with schizophrenia.   
 
Summary 
Overall therefore is some evidence that individuals with autism or schizophrenia show 
reduced activation during social tasks in the regions of the brain thought to contain mirror 




unclear, indeed there remains significant controversy over whether mirror neurons have a 




Table 2.1 summarises the clinical, neuropsychological and functional MRI findings 
reviewed above with regard to ASD and SPD.  There is considerable overlap between the 
conditions across all of the literature reviewed.  As it stands, the reviewed literature is 
most in keeping with an overlapping model of disorder (Carroll and Owen 2009; 
Craddock and Owen 2010), with similarities and differences apparent between the 
conditions across all of the reviewed the literature.  However, no work to date has 
actually compared ASD and SPD on these dimensions within the same study.  Such a 
comparison would serve two broad purposes: to establish the degree of overlap or 
otherwise in the observed clinical features and to determine whether these features arise 
from the same or different underlying mechanisms between the conditions.  Such 
understanding would not only inform current clinical practice, it would also guide 
research into the underlying cause of these conditions and could assist in the development 





 SPD ASD Notes regarding potential mechanisms 
Clinical Features    
Positive symptoms Increased 
Slightly 
increased 
Hyper-mentalising in schizophrenia and 
hypo-mentalising in autism? 
Negative symptoms / 
social impairments 
Increased Increased 
Associated with hypo-mentalising in 
both conditions? 








    Sustained attention 
    Verbal working memory 
    Inhibition  
    Generativity 
    Set shifting 
















Hypofrontality in both conditions with 
some degree of compensation?  
Compensatory mechanisms unknown - 
influence of visuo-spatial systems 
usually highlighted in ASD but 
potentially also important in SPD 






ASD may use visuospatial regions more 
than frontal regions, unknown in SPD.  
Reduced top-down processing in both? 
Social cognition 
    Emotion recognition 
    Mentalising 










Compensatory local strategy in ASD? 
Hyper versus hypo-mentalising? 
Unknown 
Table  2.1: Summary of findings in clinical and neuropsychological studies in ASD and 































The studies reviewed in the previous chapter have clearly shown that, although there are 
obvious differences between the clinical presentation of autism and schizophrenia, there 
are also overlaps, particularly with regard to negative and disorganised symptomatology 
and social impairment. More obvious differences are apparent between the conditions 
with respect to age of onset, positive symptoms and delayed speech.  However, the 
broader spectrum forms of these conditions may not conform, or at least not be detected 
at the same ages as the core disorders.  They also show less marked impairments in these 
key symptom domains: positive symptoms are markedly attenuated in SPD relative to 
schizophrenia and delayed speech is not required for a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome, 
indeed it is a specific exclusion criterion (American Psychiatric Association 2000).   
 
The clinical relationship between ASD and SPD is therefore unclear and indeed it may 
not be possible to differentiate the two on clinical measures alone.  As a first step towards 
clarifying their relationship, a detailed study of their clinical features was conducted.  
Standardised diagnostic tools were used to establish the degree of overlap between the 
diagnoses.  Given the spectrum nature of these conditions, continuous measures of their 
core features were also conducted.  Standardised measures of associated psychiatric 
diagnoses and symptomatology were employed.  Finally, for those individuals for which 
it was possible, a standardised developmental history was acquired from a relative.   
 
It was hypothesised that it would be possible in most cases to assign individuals to either 




Levels of negative and disorganised symptoms were expected to be equal between the 
groups, but positive symptoms were hypothesised to be more severe in individuals with 
SPD.  Psychiatric disorders were expected to be high in both groups although it was 
hypothesised that individuals with ASD would show more obsessive behaviours but be 
less distressed by them than the SPD group.  In those in whom it was possible to acquire 
a developmental history, greater levels of impairment were expected to be seen in early 
development in the ASD group than the SPD group, with a lessening of these differences 
over time due to a deterioration in the SPD group, analogous to that reported for 







General inclusion and exclusion criteria 
In order to participate in the study all individuals had to be over the age of 25 by the end 
of the study period to (in order to minimise the risk of later developing schizophrenia).  
Both male and female individuals were recruited.  Individuals with an IQ of less than 70, 
a history of brain injury, a lack of speech, a history of substance dependence or a history 
of schizophreniform disorder, schizophrenia or bipolar affective disorder were excluded 





Written informed consent was collected from all individuals who agreed to take part in 
the study prior to beginning the assessment process.     
 
Participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders 
Individuals with ASD were recruited from two sources: the regional autism spectrum 
disorder consultancy service (RASDCS) or the One Stop Shop for People with High 
Functioning Autism or Asperger Syndrome in the Lothians (Number 6).   
 
RASDCS is an NHS service to which the author has provided clinical sessions for the last 
3 years.  It covers Southeast Scotland (Lothian, Borders, Fife and Forth Valley) and is 
primarily a diagnostic service for adults with suspected ASD who are of normal global 
intelligence although some individuals with a learning disability are also seen.  The 
RASDCS team is drawn from a wide range of disciplines including psychiatry, nursing, 
psychology and speech and language therapy.  All referrals to RASDCS are made by 
individuals working in secondary care, i.e. specialist psychiatric services; direct referrals 
from primary care are not accepted.  Individuals seen by the service are assessed by at 
least one and sometimes two team members who carry out a face to face interview and a 
developmental history from an informant where practicable.  As the service is a clinical 
one, as opposed to being research based, it is unusual for standardised interviews or 
assessments to be used.  All assessments are discussed at a monthly multidisciplinary 





Number 6 is a support service for adults of normal global intellectual ability who have a 
diagnosis of ASD.  It is a voluntary sector service run by Autism Initiatives, although 
much of the original funding was provided by NHS Lothian and the relevant local area 
authorities.  Strong links exist between Number 6 and NHS services, such that the 
majority of individuals who attend Number 6 received their diagnosis through RASDCS.  
Number 6 provides a wide variety of support for individuals with ASD including 
recreational activities, advice related to employment or benefits issues and groups aimed 
at psychoeducation or alleviating distress such as anxiety or anger management.   
 
At both recruitment sites the initial approach was made by a person who knew the 
individual – at RASDCS this was the team member carrying out the assessment, at 
Number 6 it was a support worker.  The individual was given a brief verbal summary of 
the study and asked if they would mind being contacted by the author to discuss it in 
more detail.  Provided they gave verbal consent they were then sent a copy of the study 
information sheet.  They were contacted within one to two weeks to discuss the study 
further and arrange a time to conduct the assessments if they wished to take part.   
 
All included individuals had a clinical diagnosis of ASD and met diagnostic thresholds 
for the social and communication sections of the Autism Diagnostic Observational 
Schedule (ADOS (Lord, Risi et al. 2000)).  An additional exclusion criterion of a 
diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder determined using the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Disorders (SCID-II (First and Gibbon 1997)) was included 





Participants with schizotypal personality disorder 
Individuals with SPD were recruited from three sources: participants from the Edinburgh 
High Risk Study of schizophrenia (EHRS), NHS Lothian clinical psychiatric services; 
and individuals referred to RASDCS who were diagnosed with SPD rather than ASD.   
 
The EHRS was a large scale prospective study carried out in the University of Edinburgh 
Division of Psychiatry between 1994 and 2004.  Individuals with a family history of 
schizophrenia were recruited in early adulthood and followed up for 10 years.  All of the 
participants in this study have now passed through the period of maximum risk for the 
development of schizophrenia therefore it can be asserted with a reasonable degree of 
confidence that those who have not become unwell to date are unlikely to do so in the 
future.  Schizotypal traits and the presence of psychotic symptoms assessed were 
assessed in the EHRS using the Structured Interview for Schizotypy (SIS (Kendler, 
Lieberman et al. 1989)) and the Present State Examination (PSE (Wing, Birley et al. 
1967)) respectively.  Efforts were made to recontact all those who had the presence of 
mild impairment in four or more domains of the SIS relevant to the DSM-IV features of 
schizotypal personality disorder, or those who had shown transient or partial psychotic 
symptoms which were not of a degree sufficient to make a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  
Contact details were still current for around half of the SPD group.  It was possible to 
access contact details for many of the remainder through the use of the Community 
Health Index (CHI) system – a national database of all individuals registered with a 




participants, contact was first made with their GP to ensure that there were no health-
related or other reasons why they should not be contacted.   
 
In addition to the participants from the EHRS a number of individuals were recruited 
from NHS Lothian clinical services.  The computerised Patient Information Management 
System (PIMS) was used to identify patients in Lothian with a clinical diagnosis of SPD 
who were in current contact with NHS services.  Contact was then made with their 
consultants to determine whether they would be suitable for inclusion in the study.   
 
Finally a number of participants were recruited from RASDCS after they were referred 
for assessment for possible ASD but it transpired that they actually met criteria for SPD.   
 
All participants in the SPD group met DSM-IV criteria for SPD, confirmed using the 
SCID-II.  An additional exclusion criterion of scoring above threshold on both the social 
and communication sections of the ADOS was employed for this group.   
 
Control participants 
Controls were recruited from partners and friends of participants as well as NHS staff and 
support workers from Number 6.  Individuals with a personal history of or a first degree 






Investigation of the clinical features of the three groups consisted of 3 strands: 
assessment of autistic traits, assessment of schizotypal traits and assessment of 
psychiatric disorder.  Each involved a combination of observer-rated and self-rated 
standardised instruments 
 
3.2.2.1: Assessment of autistic traits 
The observer-rated measure and diagnostic tool used was the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule – Generic (ADOS-G); the self-rated tools were the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al. 2001)) and the Empathy 
Quotient (EQ (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004)).   
 
Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule - Generic 
The ADOS-G is a semi-structured assessment which is widely used as a face-to-face 
research diagnostic instrument for autism spectrum disorders.  It consists of 4 modules, 
each designed for use with individuals of different age groups and verbal abilities.  
Module 4 was employed in the current study as it is designed for use with adults with 
phrase speech.   
 
Practical administration of the ADOS Module 4 involves the use of a combination of free 
conversation; set questions probing the individuals understanding of social relationships 
and emotions; and practical tasks such as demonstrating an action, telling a story from a 




relevant to the diagnosis of autism and to encourage the participant to interact with the 
examiner in as natural as possible manner given the situation.   
 
The scoring system for the ADOS is divided into 5 main domains: Communication, 
Social Interaction, Imagination, Stereotyped Behaviours and Restricted Interests, and 
Other Abnormal Behaviour.  Other than Imagination, for which only one score is 
awarded, each of these domains is a composite of different traits which may be associated 
with autism.  For example, the Communication domain consists of 10 different traits 
covering areas such as speech abnormalities, quality of conversation and use of gestures.  
Each trait is awarded a score between 0 and 3, with higher scores meaning that the 
individual is more severely affected.  Although information is collected on a large 
number of traits only certain scores from the Communication and Social Interaction 
domains contribute to the diagnostic algorithm.  These are “stereotyped or idiosyncratic 
use of words or phrases”, “conversation”, “descriptive, conventional, instrumental or 
informational gestures” and “emphatic or emotional gestures” from the communication 
section and “unusual eye contact”, “facial expressions directed at others”, “empathy / 
comments on others’ emotions”, “responsibility”, “quality of social overtures”, “quality 
of social response” and “amount of reciprocal social communication” from the Social 
Interaction section.  For the diagnostic algorithm scores of 3 are converted to 2 and a total 
for each domain generated.  A diagnosis of ASD requires a total score of at least 2 for 
communication, 4 for social interaction and a combined total of not less than 7.  A 
diagnosis of autism requires a total score of at least 3 for communication, 6 for social 





The original autism diagnostic observation schedule (ADOS) was published in 1989 and 
designed for use with children between the ages of 5 and 12 years old (Lord, Rutter et al. 
1989).  The growing use of the ADOS in clinical practice and the desire for a research 
tool suitable for other age groups led to the development of the ADOS-G (Lord, Risi et 
al. 2000).  The ADOS-G was validated in a cohort of 223 individuals in total; of these 45 
participated in the validity study of Module 4.  The gold standard diagnosis for validation 
was consensus clinical diagnosis which also involved the use of the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview – Revised (ADI – R (Le Couteur, Lord et al. 2003)).  The Module 4 validation 
study contained sixteen individuals with autism, fourteen individuals with PDD-NOS and 
fifteen controls who were either typically developing or had one of a range of diagnoses 
including intellectual disability, receptive-expressive language disorder, attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, anxiety disorder,  major depression 
and obsessive-compulsive disorder.   Sensitivity and specificity for the cut-offs described 
above for module 4 were found to be between 0.76 and 0.93 for all diagnostic 
discriminations.   
 
Autism Spectrum Quotient 
The AQ is a 50 item self-rated instrument designed to measure an individual’s autistic 
traits.  Individuals are asked to rate statements such as “I frequently get so strongly 
absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other things” or “I find it easy to work out what 
someone is thinking or feeling just by looking at their face” using a 4 point scale: 




indicate the presence of an autistic trait are given a score of 1 regardless of whether the 
respondent has indicated definitely or slightly.  The AQ yields a total score and a score in 
5 different domains: social skill, communication, set switching, attention to detail and 
imagination.  The original validation study found that 80% of people with ASD had a 
total score of 32 or over, compared to only 2% of the control group (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright et al. 2001).   
 
Empathy Quotient 
The EQ is a 60 item self-rated instrument designed to measure individual differences in 
empathy.  It was developed by the same research group who produced the AQ and 
follows a similar format.  Example statements from the EQ are “It is hard for me to see 
why some things upset people so much” and “Friends usually talk to me about their 
problems as they say that I am very understanding” and are rated using the same 4 point 
scale as the AQ.  Twenty of the questions are ‘dummy’ questions and are unrelated to 
empathy so are not scored.  Scores of 1 or 2 are awarded to indicate the presence of an 
empathic trait, thus high scores indicate greater empathy.  Around 81% of people with 
ASD score less than 30 on this scale compared with 12% of controls (Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright 2004).   
 
3.2.2.2: Assessment of schizotypal traits 
The observer rated measures were the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II 
Disorders (SCID-II), the Structured Interview for Schizotypy (SIS) and the Positive and 




absence of DSM-IV schizotypal personality disorder; the SIS was used to provide a 
quantitative measure of schizotypal traits; and the PANSS provided a measure of positive 
and negative psychotic symptoms, as well as general psychiatric symptoms.   The Rust 
Inventory of Schizotypal Cognitions (RISC (Rust 1988)) and the Peters Delusions 
Inventory (PDI (Peters, Joseph et al. 2004))were the self-rated tools employed.      
 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Disorders 
The SCID-II is a well-validated and widely used interview which consists of 119 
questions directly mapping to the traits of the 12 DSM-IV personality disorders.  
Following an affirmative answer examples are sought to clarify the extent to which the 
trait is present and establish the degree of influence it has on the respondent’s life.  Each 
trait is scored on a scale between 1 (absent) and 3 (definitely present).  A score of 3 on 
five of the nine possible traits of SPD are required to make the diagnosis.   
 
Interestingly no data are available on the validity of the DSM-IV SCID-II.  A few studies 
have investigated the validity of the previous version (DSM-III-R SCID-II), although 
interpretation is difficult due to the lack of uniformly agreed gold standard (First and 
Gibbon 1997).  Skodol et al (1988) compared the SCID-II to a gold standard clinical 
diagnosis (longitudinal expert evaluation using all data) and found that the diagnostic 
power (ratio of correct test results to total number of tests administered) of the SCID-II 
varied between 0.45 (for narcissistic personality disorder) to 0.95 (for antisocial 






Structured Interview for Schizotypy (SIS) 
The SIS is an observer rated instrument which was developed to examine schizotypal 
traits in the relatives of individuals with schizophrenia (Kendler, Lieberman et al. 1989).  
It has been evaluated in several samples of relatives of individuals with schizophrenia, 
who have scored more highly across a range of the traits it measures.  It is divided into 2 
sections: the first section takes the form of a structured interview while the second 
concerns the behaviour observed by the investigator during the interview.  Questions in 
the first section are used to generate summary scores between 1 (marked) and 7 (absent) 
for a variety of schizotypal traits including several which do not form part of the 
diagnostic criteria for SPD.  The traits scored are social isolation, introversion, 
sensitivity, social anxiety, ideas of reference, suspiciousness, restricted emotion, magical 
thinking, illusions, passivity like phenomena, derealisation /  depersonalisation, antisocial 
traits, irritability and impulsivity.  The traits rated in the second section are scored 
between 1 (marked) and 5 (absent) and are rapport, affect, organisation of 
speech/thought, odd/eccentric behaviour and suspiciousness.   
 
To assist with interpretation in the current study, each item of the SIS was scored and 
then reflected, such that higher scores represented greater pathology.  In addition, in order 
to limit the number of comparisons the scores were collapsed into symptom dimensions 
(positive, negative and disorganised).  Within the positive dimension were ideas of 
reference, reported suspiciousness, magical thinking, illusions, passivity like phenomena 




sensitivity, social anxiety, restricted emotion and poor rapport.  Disorganised symptoms 
included observed affect, organisation of speech / thought and odd / eccentric behaviour.   
 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) 
The PANSS is a widely used observer rated instrument which provides summary scores 
for the burden of positive and negative psychotic symptoms as well as containing a scale 
for general psychopathology (Kay, Fiszbein et al. 1987).  It was originally shown to be a 
reliable and valid measure of symptomatology in a group of 101 individuals with 
schizophrenia (Kay, Opler et al. 1986).  Each item is rated from 1 (absent) to 7 (extreme), 
with scores of 3 or more considered to be outwith the normal range.  There are 7 items 
contained in the positive symptom domain (delusions, conceptual disorganisation, 
hallucinations, hyperactivity, grandiosity, suspiciousness/persecution and hostility); 7 
items in the negative symptom domain (blunted affect, emotional withdrawal, poor 
rapport, passive/apathetic social withdrawal, difficulty in abstract thinking, lack of 
spontaneity and flow of conversation and stereotyped thinking); and 16 items in the 
general psychopathology scale (somatic concern, anxiety, guilt feelings, tension, 
mannerisms and posturing, depression, motor retardation, uncooperativeness, unusual 
thought content, disorientation, poor attention, lack of judgment and insight, disturbance 
of volition, poor impulse control, preoccupation and active social avoidance).   
 
Rust Inventory of Schizotypal Cognitions (RISC) 
The RISC is a self-report questionnaire which was developed to measure schizotypal 




of four possible response: strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree and definitely 
disagree.  Example statements include “I consider no person or country to be my enemy” 
and “I would not be in the least bit concerned if a person who believed in magic tried to 
put a spell on me”.  A score between 0 and 3 is allocated depending on the response with 
higher scores indicating greater levels of schizotypal traits.   
 
In the original validation study the RISC score was found to be higher in a group with 
schizophrenia than controls (47.83 vs. 35.67, p=0.001) and to correlate in a general 
population sample with the psychoticism subscale of the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (r=0.12) and the emotional instability, non-conformity, low mood and poor 
social relations subscales of the Minnesota Counselling Inventory (MCI) (r=0.45, r=0.40, 
r= 0.27 and r=0.26 respectively) (Rust 1988).  While this perhaps only represents a partial 
validation of the RISC, it has since been found to correlate with other psychosis 
proneness scales (Balogh, Merritt et al. 1991).  Moreover, it is associated with the 
presence of psychotic symptoms in a group of people at enhanced risk of developing 
schizophrenia due to a family history of the disorder (Miller, Lawrie et al. 2002) and had 
the highest positive predictive value for later schizophrenia of all the clinical and 
neuropsychological variables examined in this group (Johnstone, Ebmeier et al. 2005).    
 
Peters Delusions Inventory 
The 21 item version of the PDI was used to measure delusional traits in the study 
participants.  This scale was developed for use in the general population and consists of 




“Do you ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some way?” and “Do you ever feel as 
if people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a double meaning?”  If the 
participant responds positively then they are asked to complete a further three 5 point 
Likert scales concerning how distressing they find this thought, how much they think 
about it and how much they believe it to be true.  The inventory yields four scores: 
number of items endorsed, total distress, total preoccupation and total conviction.   
 
The original PDI (Peters, Joseph et al. 1999) was a 40 item questionnaire developed from 
the Present State Examination.  A principal components analysis was used to identify 11 
components of the original PDI and the items with the highest loadings for each 
component were chosen for inclusion in the PDI-21 (Peters, Joseph et al. 2004).  The 
reliability and validity of the PDI-21 was established in a sample of 444 individuals from 
the general population in whom the scores correlated with other measures of schizotypal 
traits: the Foulds Delusions-Symptoms-State-Inventory, the unusual experiences subscale 
of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences and the Schizotypal 
Personality Scale (r=0.61, r= 0.65 and r= 0.51 respectively).   
 
3.2.2.3: Assessment of psychiatric symptoms and disorder 
Two tools were administered to assess psychiatric disorder: the Structured Clinical 
interview for Axis I Disorders (SCID I (First and Gibbon 1997)) and the Florida 






Structured Clinical interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders: Research Version 
The SCID I is structured interview designed to confirm the presence or absence of 
psychiatric disorder.  There are 10 parts to the full SCID I which cover the full range of 
DSM-IV diagnoses.  In the current study three sections were employed: psychotic 
disorders, affective disorders and anxiety disorders.   
 
As for the SCID-II, validation of the SCID-I is difficult due to the lack of a uniformly 
agreed gold standard.  Several groups have validated earlier versions of the SCID-I 
against best estimate clinical diagnoses based upon the LEAD standard (longitudinal 
expert evaluation using all data) where it has been reported to show moderate to good 
agreement for non-organic psychoses with kappa values of between 0.72 and 0.92 
(Fennig, Craig et al. 1994) and to have higher sensitivity and specificity than a routine 
unstructured clinical interview (Basco, Bostic et al. 2000).    
 
Florida Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
The FOCI is a self-report questionnaire which was developed to provide a quick and 
reliable method to screen for obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  It is divided into two 
sections: part A and part B.  In part A the respondent indicates the presence or absence of 
20 common symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder.  These are divided into 4 
sections: obsessive imagery, obsessive ruminations, obsessive impulses and compulsive 
acts.  Should the respondent positively indicate the presence of one or more symptom 
they are then asked to complete part B to assess the overall degree to which they are 




amount of time occupied by the symptoms, the distress they cause, the degree of (lack of) 
control over them, any avoidance which occurs as a result of the symptoms and their 
interference with day to day life.  Each of these is rated on a 5 point scale between 0 
(none) and 4 (extreme).  The FOCI therefore generates two scores: one reflecting the 
number of symptoms endorsed on the checklist and the other reflecting overall severity.  
No attempt is made to assess the severity of individual symptoms. 
 
The FOCI was developed by the research group which developed the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) – a widely used clinical interview for the 
assessment of obsessive compulsive symptoms.  It was validated in a population of 113 
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder where the severity score and the symptom 
checklist score were found to be correlated with the Y-BOCS total severity score (r=0.89 
and r=0.47 respectively) (Storch, Bagner et al. 2007).   
 
3.2.3: Statistical analysis 
Participant demographic characteristics were compared using Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) and chi squared tests as appropriate.  The clinical characteristics were 
compared using ANOVAs for parametric data and Kruskal-Wallis tests with follow-up 
Mann-Whitney tests for continuous non-parametric data and chi squared or Fishers exact 
tests for categorical data.  When the latter were used, standardised residuals were 
inspected to determine where significant differences lay in the contingency table.  In 
order to investigate the effect of global intellectual ability on the results, IQ, as measured 




as a covariate to the parametric tests; for the non-parametric data partial correlations 
between IQ and the characteristic in question were conducted, with group as a covariate.  
The relationship between autistic and schizotypal traits in each of the groups was 





3.4.1: Recruitment and characteristics of the study groups 
 
Recruitment to the study is summarised in Figure 3.1.  A total of 111 individuals were 
assessed as potentially suitable for the study.  Of these, 13 people failed to meet inclusion 
criteria as, although they were related to people with schizophrenia they had insufficient 
traits of schizotypal personality disorder.  In addition, 2 individual with ASD was not 
included as they did not meet ADOS criteria.  Of the remaining 96 individuals, 2 
individuals with SPD were excluded: the first because he also met standardised criteria 
for schizophrenia and the second because he was found to have suffered a stroke.  Two 
controls were also excluded due to the presence of a brain tumour in one and a stroke in 
the other.   
 
This left a total of 92 individuals for study: 28 met the inclusion criteria for the ASD 




the ASD and SPD groups and were therefore included in a separate study group, 
(comorbid group - CM); and 33 were typically developing controls. 
 







Failure to meet inclusion criteria 
13 relatives of people with schizophrenia 
-  insufficient traits of SPD 
2 ASD who did not meet ADOS criteria 
 
Met exclusion criteria 
1 SPD met criteria for schizophrenia 
1 SPD (stroke) 
2 controls (1 stroke, 1 brain tumour) 
28 ASD 21 SPD 10 CM 33 controls 
111 individuals assessed as potentially suitable 
96 individuals considered eligible 




The characteristics of the 4 groups are shown in Table 3.1. 
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
N 28 21 10 33 
M:F 22:6 14:7 7:3 23:10 
Age 39.5 (11.6) 37.1 (9.2) 34.9 (9.9) 36.5 (9.3) 
Handedness 27:1 19:2 8:2 31:2 
Yrs. education 16.2 (1.7) 15.2 (2.0) 16.2 (2.3) 16.5 (1.9) 
Verbal IQ 108.4 (14.0) 104.7 (11.9) 98.9 (22.4) 113.2 (9.8) 
Performance IQ 114.6 (17.8) 106.7 (11.4) 107.2 (21.3) 119.1 (10.2) 
Full-scale IQ 113.1 (17.3) 106.4 (10.7) 103.5 (22.5) 118.1 (9.9) 
ADOS comm 3 (2) 1 (2) 2 (1) 0 (0) 
ADOS SI 5 (1) 2 (2) 5 (3) 0 (0) 
SPD items 2 (2) 5 (1) 5 (2) 0 (0) 
Table 3.1: Characteristics of the study groups 
M:F – male:female; ADOS comm – ADOS communication score; ADOS SI – ADOS 
social interaction score; SPD items –items endorsed on SCID-II SPD subscale  
 
No significant differences were seen between the groups with respect to gender (chi sq = 
0.99, p= 0.80), handedness (Fishers exact test = 3.07, p=0.33), age (F=0.55, p=0.65) or 
years spent in education (F=1.29, p =0.28).  IQ scores differed significantly between the 
groups (F=3.59, p=0.02; F=3.65, p=0.02; F=4.12, p=0.009 for verbal, performance and 
full-scale IQ respectively).  The control group had significantly higher IQ scores in all 
three domains than either the SPD or the CM group (all p<0.05).  The ASD, SPD and 





As would be expected, the ASD group scored more highly than the SPD group and the 
controls on the ADOS communication and social interaction subscales, while the SPD 
group scored more highly than the ASD group or the controls on the number of endorsed 
items in the SPD section of the SCID-II.  No difference was seen between the CM group 
and the ASD group on the communication subscale of the ADOS (Z=-1.13, p=0.26); 
however there was a trend towards a significant difference in the social impairment 
subscale with the CM group scoring more than the ASD group (Z=-1.9, p=0.06).  There 
was no significant difference between the CM group and the SPD group on the number of 
positively endorsed items on the SPD subscale of the SCID-II (Z=-0.42, p=0.67).   
 
3.4.2: Clinical characteristics 
 
3.4.2.1: Autistic traits 
 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) 
The ADOS domain scores for each group of participants are given in Table 3.2.        
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
ADOS comm 3 (2) 1 (2) 2 (1) 0 (0) 
ADOS SI 5 (1) 2 (2) 5 (3) 0 (0) 
ADOS Imag 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (0) 
ADOS SBRI 1 (1) 0 (1) 0.5 (1) 0 (0) 
Table 3.2: Participant ADOS scores given as median (inter-quartile range) 
ADOS comm –communication score; ADOS SI –social interaction score; ADOS Imag – 





The Kruskal Wallis test shows that significant differences exist between the groups for 
each of the domains (Chi sq = 19.1 – 74.5, p<0.0001 for all domains).  Follow-up Mann 
Whitney U tests revealed significant differences between each of the affected groups and 
the controls (all p < 0.05) as well as significant differences between the ASD and the 
SPD group on all 4 domains (Z= -2.2 – -4.2, all p < 0.04).  
 
Compared to the ASD group the CM group showed a trend towards significantly greater 
social impairment (as reported above, Z=-1.8, p=0.06) but significantly less impairment 
in imagination (Z=-2.1, p=0.04).  No difference was seen between the ASD group and the 
CM group in terms of communication or stereotyped behaviours / repetitive interests.   
 
As would be expected the CM group were significantly more impaired compared to the 
SPD group with respect to the communication and social domains (Z=-3.0, p=0.003 and 
Z=-4.4, p<0.001 respectively).  However no significant differences were seen between 
the CM and SPD groups in imagination or stereotyped behaviours / repetitive interests 
(Z=-0.7, p=0.47 and Z=-0.8, p=0.5 respectively).   
 
In order to assess whether the differences between the groups may be confounded by IQ 
differences between the groups, Spearman’s correlations were run between full-scale IQ 
and the ADOS domains within each group.  No significant correlations were seen for any 




the degree of autistic traits.  Group differences in IQ are therefore unlikely to account for 
the differences in ADOS scores that are reported.   
 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
The AQ and EQ scores for the groups are summarised in Table 3.3 and Figures 3.2 – 3.3. 
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
AQ total 
     Social skills 
     Ab. to switch 
     Att. to detail 
     Comm 

























EQ total 31.4 (13.0) 46.7 (10.8) 30.5 (8.7) 56.8 (13.9) 
Table 3.3: AQ and EQ scores given as mean (standard deviation) 
 
The total AQ score differed significantly between the groups (F=34.5, p<0.001) with 
follow up t-tests revealing significant differences between the controls and the other 3 
groups (all p < 0.001).  The SPD group scored significantly less than the ASD or CM 
groups (p<0.001 and p=0.001 respectively).  There was no significant difference between 








Figure 3.2: Mean and 95% CI for AQ scores in participant groups 
 
An exploratory analysis of the subscales of the AQ was conducted.  For the social and 
communication skills subscales the pattern of results was the same as the total score.  For 
the ability to switch subscale the pattern was also similar expect there was a trend 
towards the CM group being significantly more impaired than the ASD group (p=0.09).  
For the attention to detail subscale the pattern was also similar to that found for the total 
score expect the difference between the CM group and the SPD group was less marked 
and non-significant (p=0.25).  For the imagination subscale, the controls showed less 
impairment than the other groups (all p <0.001); however there were no significant 
differences between the ASD, SPD or CM groups (all p>0.25).      
 
When IQ was added as a covariate to the above the results did not alter significantly for 




the ability to switch subscale, the difference between the CM and ASD groups became 
significant (p=0.04) whereas for the attention to detail subscale the difference between 
the ASD and SPD group became less marked although a trend towards significance 
remained apparent (p=0.054).   
 
A similar pattern of results was seen for the total EQ score with a significant main effect 
of group (F=24.8, p<0.001) and significant differences between controls and the other 
three groups (all p<0.001), as well as between the SPD group and the ASD and CM 
groups (p<0.001 and p<0.01 respectively).  No significant difference was seen between 
the ASD and CM groups (p=0.84).   
 
 






Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI) 
ADI scores were only available on a limited number of participants (10 individuals with 
ASD, 8 with SPD and 2 from the CM group).  The CM group was therefore not 
considered further.  The results for the ASD and SPD groups are summarised in Table 3.4 
and Figure 3.4.     
 ASD SPD 
ADI past / ever 
     Social Interaction 
     Communication 










     Social Interaction 
     Communication 









Table 3.4: ADI scores for diagnostic and current behaviour algorithms 
 
When the diagnostic (past / ever) algorithm of the ADI was considered there were 
significant differences between the ASD and SPD groups in the communication and 
repetitive behaviour sub-domains (Z=-2.2, p=0.03; Z=-2.6, p=0.01 respectively) and there 
was a trend towards a significant difference in the social interaction sub-domain score 
(Z=-1.92, p=0.054).  When the current behaviour algorithm was used there was a 
significant difference between the groups in the repetitive behaviour sub-domain (Z=-2.7, 
p=0.07); however, there were no significant differences between the groups in either 







Figure 3.4: Graphs showing median and 95% CI for ADI past / ever and current scores 
 
 
3.4.2.2: Schizotypal / psychotic traits 
 
SCID – II psychosis related categories 
The ratings of each of the groups in relation to the three SCID-II schizophrenia spectrum 







 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Paranoid 
     Diagnosis 
     Traits 


















     Diagnosis 
     Traits 


















     Diagnosis 
     Traits 

















Table 3.5: Ratings on SCID-II schizophrenia spectrum related personality disorder 
categories. 
Diagnosis – number (percentage) who meet diagnostic criteria; traits – median (IQR) for 
number of traits endorsed for each category; score – median (IQR) of total score for each 
category (see methods for derivation) 
 
There was a significant difference between the groups with respect to the diagnosis of 
paranoid personality disorder (Fishers exact test = 8.9, p=0.006, no significant differences 
between O and E for any group) but not for the diagnosis of schizoid personality disorder 
(Fishers exact test = 3.7, p=0.23).   
 
For the number of endorsed traits and the total score, significant differences were seen 




p<0.001 for both traits and score).  For each of the categories examined the controls 
scored significantly less than the other three groups (Z=-2.1 to -6.6, p<0.001 to 0.03) 
 
With regard to schizotypal personality disorder the ASD group scored less than the SPD 
group (traits: Z=-6.0, p<0.001; score: Z=-5.9, p<0.001) and the CM group (traits: Z=-4.7, 
p<0.001; score: Z=-4.6, p<0.001).  This would be expected given this measure was used 
to define the groups.  There were no differences between the SPD and CM groups (traits: 
Z=-0.51, p=0.61; score: Z=-0.04, p=0.97).   
  
For paranoid personality disorder the ASD group scored less than either the SPD group or 
the CM group (traits: Z=-2.9, p=0.003; score: Z=-3.1, p=0.002 and traits: Z=-2.2, p=0.03; 
score Z=-2.6, p=0.009 respectively).  Again no significant differences were seen between 
the SPD and the CM group (traits: Z=-0.17, p=0.87; score Z=-0.75, p=0.46).   
 
For schizoid personality disorder there were no significant differences between the ASD 
group and the SPD group in terms of either the number of traits endorsed or their total 
scores (Z=-0.17, p=0.87; Z=-0.670, p=0.51 respectively).  However, the ASD group 
scored significantly less than the CM group (traits: Z=-2.1, p=0.04; score Z=-2.1, 
p=0.03).  Similarly the SPD group also scored significantly less than the CM group with 
respect to score, although not for the number of traits endorsed (traits: Z=-1.6, p=0.12; 






Structured Interview for Schizotypy (SIS) 
The scores for the SIS are shown in Table 3.6 and illustrated in Figure 3.5.   
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Positive 5.0 (4.0) 15.5 (7.0) 16.0 (9.0) 3.0 (3.0) 
Negative 9.5 (7.5) 9.0 (7.5) 12.0 (5.0) 2.0 (2.0) 
Disorganised 3.0 (3.0) 3.0 (2.5) 4.0 (2.0) 0 (0) 
Table 3.6: Schizotypal traits as measured by the SIS in each of the groups 
Results given as median (IQR)  
 
Significant differences between the groups were identified using the Kruskal-Wallis test 
for positive, negative and disorganised symptoms (chi sq=47.6, p<0.001; chi sq=43.7, 
p<0.001 and chi sq= 50.5, p<0.001 respectively).   
 
Figure 3.5: Median (and 95%CI) of reflected SIS scores for positive, negative and 





Follow-up Mann Whitney tests showed that the controls scored less than the other three 
groups in all areas of the SIS (Z=-2.8 to -6.2; p=0.005 to <0.001).  In addition, with 
regard to positive symptoms, individuals with ASD scored less than the SPD or CM 
groups (Z=-4.8, p<0.001; Z=-4.17, p<0.001 respectively) whereas the SPD group did no 
differ from the CM group (Z=-0.00, p=1.0).  In contrast there were no significant 
differences between the ASD group and the SPD or CM groups with respect to negative 
symptoms (Z=-0.9, p=0.38; Z=-1.3, p=0.19 respectively) or disorganised symptoms (Z=-
0.06, p=0.95; Z=-1.2, p=0.21 respectively).  The CM group did however show a trend 
towards significantly greater levels of negative symptoms than the SPD group (Z=-1.9, 
p=0.06) although not disorganised symptoms (Z=-1.11, p=0.26).   
 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) 
The scores for the PANSS positive and negative symptom scales are shown in Table 3.7 
and Figure 3.6.  Breakdowns for the individual symptoms within the positive and 
negative symptom categories are given in Tables 3.8 - 3.9 and Figures 3.7 – 3.8.  For 
each individual symptom measure, when the summary statistic (chi sq or Fishers exact 
test) was significant the standardised residuals were checked to look for significant 
differences between the observed (O) and expected (E) values for those who scored more 







 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Positive 10 (4) 13 (4) 14 (1) 7 (0) 
Negative 9 (4.5) 9 (3) 11.5 (8) 7 ( 0) 
Table 3.7: PANSS scores in each of the groups 
Results give as median (IQR) 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Median and 95% CI of PANSS scores in each group 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there were significant differences between the 
groups for the total number of positive and negative symptoms (chi sq = 49.3, p<0.001 
and chi sq = 41.7, p<0.001 respectively).  The controls scored less than the other three 




groups on positive symptoms (Z=-3.34, p=0.01; Z=-3.7, p<0.001 respectively) while 
there was no difference between the SPD and CM groups in this regard (Z=-1.6, p=0.1).  
With respect to negative symptoms, there was no difference between the ASD and SPD 
group (Z=-0.82, p=0.41); however the CM group scored significantly more than the SPD 
group (Z=-2.0, p=0.04) and showed a trend towards a significantly higher score than the 
ASD group (Z=-1.7, p=0.09).   
 
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Delusions 3.6 47.4 70 0 
Conceptual Disorg 35.7 36.8 26.2 0 
Hallucinations 3.6 78.9 70 0 
Hyperactivity 14.3 5.3 10 0 
Grandiosity 28.6 0 0 0 
Suspiciousness 7.1 42.1 30 0 
Hostility 3.6 0 10 0 
Table 3.8: Percentage of individuals within each group scoring more than 2 on PANSS 
positive items 
 
Significant differences in the individual positive symptom scores were seen for delusions 
(Fisher’s exact test = 29.3, p<0.001, O>E for SPD and CM, O<E for ASD and controls), 
conceptual disorganisation (chi sq = 9.3, p=0.03, O<E for controls), hallucinations (chi sq 
= 45.7, p<0.001, O>E for SPD and CM, O<E for ASD and controls), grandiosity 
(Fisher’s exact test = 11.6, p=0.001, O>E for ASD) and suspiciousness (Fisher’s exact 





Figure 3.7: Individual symptom profile score for PANSS positive symptoms 
 
For the individual negative symptom measures, significant differences were seen between 
the groups for blunted affect (chi sq = 12.6, p=0.006, O<E for controls), difficulty in 
abstract thinking (Fisher’s exact test = 8.0, p=0.04, no significant differences between 
observed and expected results) and lacking spontaneity / conversational flow (Fisher’s 
exact test = 8.0, p=0.02, O>E for CM).  There was also a trend towards a significant 
difference for stereotyped behaviour (Fisher’s exact test = 6.4, p=0.06, no significant 






 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Blunted affect 35.7 31.6 60 0 
Emotional wd. 17.9 15.8 30 0 
Poor rapport 10.7 5.3 10 0 
Passive social wd 14.3 15.8 10 0 
Diff abstract think 21.4 21.1 40 0 
Lack spontaneity 10.7 10.5 40 0 
Stereotyped 21.4 10.5 30 0 
Table 3.9: Percentage of individuals within each group scoring more than 2 on PANSS 






Figure 3.8: Individual Symptom profile score for PANSS negative symptom scale 
 
Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI) and Rust Inventory of Schizotypal Cognitions (RISC) 
Results for the PDI and the RISC are shown in Table 3.10.  Significant differences were 
seen between the groups using all measures of the PDI (chi sq = 17.3 to 22.8, p=0.001 to 
<0.001) and the total RISC score (F=6.13, p=0.001).  The controls scored less than the 
three other groups on all of the PDI measures (all p<0.02).  There were no significant 
differences between the ASD and the SPD group, although there was a trend towards an 
increased level of distress reported by the SPD group (Z=-1.8, p=0.08) whereas the ASD 
group scored less than the CM group on each of the measures (all p<0.02).  There were 




 ASD SPD CM Controls 
PDI 
     Endorsed 
     Distress 
     Preoccupied 





















RISC 25.5 (10.5) 30.9 (13.3) 39.9 (10.6) 22.9 (9.7) 
Table 3.10: PDI and RISC scores in each of the groups 
PDI scores are given as median (IQR); RISC scores are given as mean (standard 
deviation) 
 
For the RISC, follow-up t tests showed that the SPD group scored significantly more than 
the controls (p=0.01) but not the ASD group (p=0.1) who in themselves did not differ 
significantly from the controls (p=0.37).  In contrast, the comorbid group scored 
significantly more than any of the ASD, SPD or control groups (p=0.002, p=0.05 and 
p<0.001 respectively) (Figure 3.9).   
 





3.4.2.3: General psychiatric symptomatology 
 
Obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
The results for the Florida Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (FOCI) are shown in Table 
3.11.  There were significant differences between the groups with respect to the scores on 
the FOCI for both the number of symptoms endorsed and the severity of these symptoms 
(chi sq = 18.7, p<0.001; and chi sq = 25.6, p<0.001 respectively).   
 
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Endorsed 3.5 (5.5) 4.5 (9.5) 4.5 (3.0) 0.0 (2.0) 
Severity 5.0 (7.5) 5.0 (8.0) 7.0 (4.0) 0.0 (2.0) 
Table 3.11: FOCI scores in each group; given as median (IQR) 
 
The ASD, SPD and CM groups all scored significantly less than the controls on both 
measures (all p<0.003).  There were no significant differences between the ASD and SPD 
groups on endorsed symptoms or severity (Z=-1.2, p=0.23; Z=-0.18, p=0.86 
respectively).  The CM group did not differ significantly from the ASD or SPD groups 
with respect to the number of symptoms endorsed (Z=-1.06, p=0.29; Z=-0.25, p=0.80 
respectively) but did show trends towards significantly greater severity of symptoms (Z=-






Figure 3.10: Median and 95% CI for FOCI scores in each group 
 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale: general symptoms  
The median and interquartile range for the PANSS general symptom score is given in 
Table 3.12 and the percentages of each group who score more than 2 on the individual 
symptoms are shown in Table 3.13.  As was done for the PANSS positive and negative 
symptoms scales, for each individual symptom measure, when the summary statistic was 
significant the standardised residuals were checked to look for significant differences 
between the observed (O) and expected (E) values for each group.   
   
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
General 21.5 (6.0) 21.0 (5.0) 25.5 (8.0) 16.0 (1.0) 




The ASD, SPD and CM groups all scored more highly than the controls with respect to 
total symptoms (all p<0.001).  The CM group scored significantly more than the ASD 
group and there was a trend towards significance compared to the SPD group on the total 
PANSS general symptom score (Z=-2.7, p=0.005; Z=-1.7, p=0.09 respectively).   
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Somatic concern 0 15.8 0 0 
Anxiety 32.1 36.8 40 0 
Guilt 14.3 21.1 30 0 
Tension 7.1 26.3 20 6.7 
Mann / post 10.7 5.3 10 0 
Depression 32.1 36.8 80 0 
Motor retardation 10.7 5.3 10 0 
Uncooperativeness 0 0 0 0 
Unusual thoughts 21.4 36.8 60 0 
Disorientation 0 0 0 0 
Poor attention 3.6 0 0 0 
Lack judge / insight 3.6 10.5 10 0 
Disturbed volition 21.4 16.7 10 0 
Impulsive 7.1 0 10 0 
Preoccupation 32.1 21.1 30 0 
Active avoidance 28.6 42.1 80 0 
Table 3.13: Percentage of individuals in each group scoring 3 or more on individual 





Significant differences between the groups for individual symptoms were seen for 
anxiety (Fishers exact test = 9.0, p=0.02, O<E for controls), depression (chi sq = 17.4, 
p=0.001, O<E for controls, O>E for CM), unusual thought content (Fishers exact test = 
13.0, p=0.003, O<E for controls, O>E for CM), and active social avoidance (chi sq = 
18.2, p<0.001, O<E for controls, O>E for CM); trends towards significant differences 
were seen for somatic worry (Fishers exact test = 5.4, p=0.052, O>E for SPD), guilt 
(Fishers exact test = 6.8, p=0.053, no significant differences between O and E for any 
group) and preoccupation (Fishers exact test = 7.1, p=0.06, no significant differences 
between O and E for any group). 
 
Psychiatric diagnoses 
The retrospectively reported lifetime prevalence of SCID I anxiety, depressive and 
psychotic disorders are shown in Table 3.14.  Simple phobias are not included in the 
analysis and social phobias are considered separately due to their particular status within 
the conditions under study.   
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Any disorder 60.7 66.7 100 12.1 
Social phobia 42.9 28.6 40.0 0.0 
OCD 10.7 4.8 20 0.0 
Other anx. dis.* 14.3 33.3 40 0.0 
Depression 35.7 57.1 90.0 12.1 
Brief psychosis 0.0 14.3 20.0 0.0 





There were significant differences between the groups for the lifetime prevalence of any 
psychiatric disorder (chi sq = 32.5, p<0.001, O>E for CM, O<E for controls), social 
phobia (chi sq = 17.6, p<0.001), p=0.001, O>E for ASD, O<E for controls), other anxiety 
disorders (Fishers exact test = 16.4, p<0.001, O<E for controls), depressive disorders (chi 
sq = 24.2, p<0.001, O>E for CM, O<E for controls) and brief psychotic episodes (Fishers 
exact test = 7.1, p=0.01, O>E for CM).  There was a trend towards a difference for OCD 
(Fishers exact test = 6.1, p<0.05, no significant differences between O and E for any 
group).    
 
Self-reported lifetime psychiatric diagnoses 
When individuals were asked about their past psychiatric treatment, six (21%) individuals 
with ASD, eight (36%) individuals with SPD and four (40%) CM individuals reported 
having received previous treatment for depression; three (11%) individuals with ASD, 
two (9%) individuals with SPD and no (0%) CM individuals reported previously 
receiving treatment for an anxiety disorder; and two individuals with SPD (9%) and three 
(30%) CM individuals reported receiving treatment for psychosis.   
 
Personality Disorder Clusters 
Table 3.15 shows the prevalence of Cluster B (borderline, dissocial, narcissistic and 
histrionic) and Cluster C (avoidant, dependent and obsessive-compulsive) personality 





 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Cluster B 7.1 4.8 30 0 
Cluster C 57.1 33.3 90 0 
Table 3.15: Percentage of individuals in each group who meet criteria for one or more 
Cluster B or Cluster C personality disorders 
 
There were significant differences between the groups for both cluster B and C 
personality disorders (Fishers exact test = 8.5, p=0.01, O>E for CM; chi sq = 37.5, 
p=<0.001, O>E for ASD and CM, O<E for controls).   
 
3.4.2.4: Relationships between schizotypal and autistic traits 
A summary of the correlations between the domains of the SIS and the total scores for the 
AQ and EQ in each group are given in Table 3.16 and Figures 3.11 – 3.13.   
Table 3.16: Correlation coefficients between schizotypal and autistic traits in each group.  
Results are given as rho (p); statistically significant results are highlighted in bold 
 
 
ASD SPD CM Controls 























































A statistically significant correlation was seen between the total AQ score and the 
positive domain of the SIS only in the SPD group (Figure 3.11).  No significant 
difference was seen between the groups in their AQ-positive symptom correlations when 
all the groups were considered together, however when only the SPD and ASD group 










Negative symptoms as measured by the SIS were significantly correlated with the AQ 
score in the SPD group and there was a trend towards a significant correlation in the ASD 
group (Figure 3.12).  No significant difference in the AQ-negative symptoms correlations 
was seen between the groups (p=0.59).   
 
 
Figure 3.12: Relationship between negative schizotypal traits and autistic traits in each 
group 
 
For disorganised symptoms there was a statistically significant negative correlation in the 
ASD group (i.e. more disorganised symptoms were associated with fewer autistic traits), 




significant difference between the groups in terms of the AQ-disorganised symptoms 
correlation (p=0.04).  As the spread of disorganised symptoms was very low in the 
controls this test of interaction was repeated with the controls excluded and it remained 
statistically significant (p=0.046).   
 
 








In this detailed clinical investigation it was found to be possible to ascribe a diagnosis of 
SPD or ASD to the majority of individuals using the ADOS and SCID-II suggesting that, 
in most cases, standardized diagnostic instruments can clinically distinguish between 
ASD and SPD.  However, a significant minority (17%) of individuals met criteria for 
both ASD and SPD, despite never having received this dual diagnosis.  In addition, those 
who met criteria for only ASD showed more traits of SPD than were seen in controls and 
vice versa.  Negative symptoms in particular overlapped between the ASD and SPD 
groups and indeed were indistinguishable in terms of their severity and profile.  
Psychiatric comorbidity was high in all of the clinical groups, particularly in the CM 
group, and was probably under-recognised.   
 
Overlap between the spectrums 
Although there were some significant differences between the groups, there were marked 
overlaps, particularly with regard to negative and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and 
each group showed features of the other condition to a greater degree than was found in 
controls.  Broadly speaking this was true, regardless of whether the measures were self-
rated, such as the AQ, EQ, PDI or RISC, or observer rated, such as SIS or PANSS, 
suggesting that it is a robust finding.  In addition, although the majority of individuals 
could be placed in one or the other diagnosis, it was not possible to classify 
approximately 17% of the clinical sample to either condition alone.  Taken together these 




conditions (Carroll and Owen 2009; Craddock and Owen 2010; Cross-Disorder Group of 
the Psychiatric Genomics, Smoller et al. 2013).    
 
Although the most parsimonious explanation of the data is that the conditions are related, 
it is far from certain that the overlaps in clinical features are actually the result of shared 
aetiological or pathophysiological factors – it may be that the behavioural characteristics 
are similar but the underlying pathology is not.  The greatest overlap between the groups 
is in relation to negative symptoms; in addition to a similar total score, the similarity in 
the symptom profile is striking (Figure 3.8) and suggestive that these features are arising 
from similar mechanisms between the groups.  Consistent with this idea, the relationship 
between autistic traits and negative schizotypy does not differ significantly between the 
groups.  Although positive symptoms were most severe in the SPD and CM groups, the 
ASD group also showed higher levels than were found in controls.  However, the profile 
of positive symptoms (Figure 3.7) appears to differ markedly between the groups with the 
ASD group having peaks in conceptual disorganisation and grandiosity, whereas the SPD 
and CM groups have peaks in delusions, hallucinations and suspiciousness.  In addition, 
there was some evidence that the relationship between autistic traits and positive 
symptoms differed between the groups, such that within the SPD group and the CM 
group (although the latter was not significant) increasing autistic traits were associated 
with increasing positive symptoms, whereas no relationship was seen in the ASD group.  
Disorganised schizotypy also showed different relationships with autistic traits between 
the groups, with the ASD and CM group having negative relationships, while the SPD 




negative symptoms likely arise out of similar mechanisms regardless of group (and may 
in fact be simply a different way of describing autistic traits), this is not the case for 
positive and disorganised symptoms.   
 
The finding that 17% of the clinical sample met standardised criteria for both ASD and 
SPD is in keeping with Anckarsater et al (2006) who reported that the prevalence of SPD 
in individuals with Asperger Syndrome was 23.4%.  Interestingly, in the CM group the 
relationship between autistic traits and positive symptoms was most similar to that of the 
SPD group, whereas greater similarity to the ASD group was seen for the relationship 
between autistic traits and disorganised symptoms.  This would suggest that rather than 
having a particularly severe form of one or the other condition, individuals who meet 
criteria for both disorders may have aspects of both.     
 
Notably, from a clinical perspective, the CM group are clearly a highly morbid group, 
who are more severely affected across multiple autistic, schizotypal and general 
psychiatric domains than those affected by one disorder alone; indeed in the current 
sample all of the CM individuals met SCID-I  criteria for a psychiatric disorder at some 
point in their lives.  In routine clinical practice it is unusual to make a dual diagnosis of 
ASD and SPD, indeed they are generally regarded as mutually exclusive (American 
Psychiatric Association 2000) and none of the current sample had previously received 
both diagnoses.  The current findings suggest it is important to identify both conditions 
when present, not only to highlight the increased severity of the disorders, but also the 




utilisation and possibly medication prescription are likely to differ between individuals 
with ASD and SPD, it is important to identify those who meet criteria for both in order to 
ensure that their needs are adequately met.   
 
Although it was only possible to conduct the Autism Diagnostic Interview in a limited 
number of participants the results suggest that the differences between SPD and ASD are 
more marked in early childhood and diminish with age.  The past / ever algorithm of the 
ADI showed significantly higher levels of communication impairment and repetitive 
behaviours and a trend towards significantly greater social impairment in the ASD group 
compared to the SPD group.  However, when the current behaviour algorithm was 
employed, there was no longer a difference in communication or social interaction 
impairment between the groups, with this being due to improvements in the ASD group, 
as opposed to deteriorations in the SPD group.  This is in contrast to the hypothesis that 
the SPD group would experience deterioration analogous to schizophrenia and implies, 
that for this small sample at least, the difficulties are lifelong.  The improvement seen in 
the ASD group suggests that cognitively able individuals with ASD may be able to learn 
the rules of communication and social interaction so that they are less impaired in 
adulthood.  From a clinical perspective these findings highlight the importance of 
obtaining a developmental history as part of the diagnostic process for ASD and SPD 







Psychiatric disorder in ASD and SPD 
Although not an ecological study, the very high rates of comorbid psychiatric disorder 
identified by the SCID-I in ASD and SPD deserve comment.  It is perhaps unsurprising 
that both groups show high rates of social phobia, but the rates for depression (ASD - 
36%, SPD - 57%, CM – 90%) and other anxiety disorders (ASD - 14%, SPD - 33%, CM 
– 40%) are also very high.  It is important to note that the SCID-I relies upon 
retrospective reporting of psychiatric symptoms which may bias these figures.  To the 
author’s knowledge population based studies considering psychiatric disorder in adults 
with ASD or SPD have not been published, however the current findings are consistent 
with those of Hofvander et al (2009) who reported lifetime rates of 53%, 50% and 24% 
for depression, anxiety disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder respectively in their 
sample derived from a specialist clinic.   
 
Interestingly, many individuals reported that they had not received a previous diagnosis 
or treatment for these disorders.   Although this is based upon self-report and can 
therefore only be regarded as approximate, it does suggest that potentially treatable 
conditions are underdiagnosed in these populations.  This may be one reason why, 
despite previous findings of high rates of psychiatric morbidity in adults with ASD 
(Hofvander, Delorme et al. 2009), their use of health services is no greater than that of 
the general population (Brugha, McManus et al. 2009).   
 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the ASD, SPD and CM groups all had more obsessive-




difference between the groups in how distressing they found these symptoms.  This 
highlights that people with ASD do not just present with preoccupations or enthusiasms 
but are at higher risk of distressing and disabling obsessive-compulsive symptoms than 
the general population (Leyfer, Folstein et al. 2006).  Individuals who met criteria for 
both ASD and SPD were particularly distressed by their symptoms.   
 
Implications of the findings 
From a clinical perspective it is possible in many, but not all, cases to distinguish ASD 
and SPD using standardized diagnostic instruments.  However, both groups show features 
of both conditions to a greater degree than is seen in controls.  Psychiatrists and 
associated professionals working in both general adult psychiatry services and specialist 
autism services need to be alert to this and actively consider each diagnosis in suspected 
cases as misdiagnosis carries important implications for future support and treatment.  
There also exists a group of individuals who cannot be categorised on the basis of current 
clinical presentation into either ASD or SPD, but who instead meet criteria for both 
conditions.  These individuals are not usually identified as having both conditions in 
routine clinical practice but the severe nature of their difficulties across multiple domains 
suggests that they should be identified and treated appropriately.  Clinicians should also 
be alert to the high prevalence of psychiatric disorder in all three clinical groups 
examined, particularly given that it was largely underdiagnosed and undertreated in the 
current population.  Finally, the results suggest that from a clinical perspective at least, 
there are marked overlaps between ASD and SPD.  Whether the conditions and in 




and biological causes and mechanisms is currently unknown; the findings reviewed 
above provide some support for the idea that negative symptoms may arise from the same 
mechanism but that positive and disorganised symptoms do not.  By considering more 
objective measures, which may have a closer association to brain function than observed 
behaviours, it may be possible to identify more definitive differences between the 






















The study reported in Chapter 3 clearly indicates that there is considerable clinical 
overlap between ASD and SPD.  However, the clinical measurement of behaviour is 
relatively imprecise and inherently subjective; it also represents only the external 
manifestation of psychobiological processes and therefore cannot distinguish between 
states where multiple different processes can lead to the same outcome.  It is likely that 
greater insight into the relationship between ASD and SPD will be gained by the 
examination of more objective measures of brain function, such as neuropsychological 
testing.   
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, there are a number of potential areas of neuropsychological 
difference between ASD and SPD within the broad domains of executive function, 
central coherence / local-global processing and social cognition.  Based on this review it 
was hypothesised that individuals with SPD would show impairments across sustained 
attention, inhibition and verbal working memory which are not seen in ASD; in contrast, 
tasks of generativity would reveal enhanced performance in SPD and impairments in 
ASD.  Although the existing evidence is unclear it was also hypothesised that tasks of 
central coherence would show a local processing style in ASD, whereas in SPD a global 
processing bias would be seen.  Emotion recognition was expected to be more severely 
affected in ASD, whereas explicit mentalising impairments were hypothesised to be 
common to both conditions.  Individuals with SPD were expected to show a particular 
deficit in judging trustworthiness, such that they would be biased towards making more 








The recruitment process for the study is detailed in Chapter 3.1.2.  All individuals who 
took part in the clinical assessments also completed the neuropsychological section of the 
study, barring one individual with SPD who did not return for the neuropsychological 




4.2.2.1: Executive function 
 
Sustained Attention and Inhibition 
The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) (Robertson, Manly et al. 1997) was 
employed in both its fixed and random forms (Johnson, Robertson et al. 2007).  Figure 
4.1 provides a summary of the task.  In both forms, numbers between 1 and 9 were 
presented on a laptop screen 225 times over 4 minutes and 19 seconds.  The numbers 
were in one of 5 different font sizes and no font size occurred more than twice in a row.  
Each number appeared on the screen for 250 milliseconds and was followed by a mask (a 
cross in a circle) for 900milliseconds seconds.  Participants were asked to press the space 
bar for every number (Go trials) except for the number 3 (No-go trials).  In order to 




appearance of the mask.  In the fixed form of the SART, the numbers are presented in 
repeated cycles of a fixed ascending order (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1, 2….); in the 
random form the numbers are presented in a pseudorandom order.  In both versions each 
number appears 15 times.  All participants completed the Fixed SART followed by the 
Random SART.   
 
       250ms              900ms             250ms              900ms 
 
 
                                                                                                   
Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram of the Random SART 
 
The SART differs from traditional continuous performance tasks in that it requires the 
inhibition of response to an infrequent target as opposed to requiring a response to an 
infrequent target.  Withholding of the primed response is suggested to place greater load 
on sustained attention networks, which in turn allows the task to be shorter in length 
(Robertson, Manly et al. 1997).  Clearly, in addition to sustained attention, individuals 
must also show intact response inhibition to perform the SART.  The use of two forms, 
fixed and random, allows to these aspects of performance to be dissociated.  The Random 
SART places greater load on inhibitory functions than the Fixed SART due to the random 
presentation of either Go or No-go trails, whereas the Fixed SART places relatively 
greater demand on attentional compared to inhibitory functions due to the predictable 















Performance on the SART is measured through the number of omission (failed Go-trials) 
and commission (failed No-go trials) errors.  Omission errors on both versions of the 
SART are related to lapses in sustained attention.  Commission errors on the random 
SART are related to difficulties in both sustained attention and response inhibition, 
whereas commission errors on the Fixed SART are primarily related to lapses in 
sustained attention with a much smaller load being placed upon response inhibition.   
 
Working memory 
The letter-number sequencing (LNS) tasks from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
3rd edition (WAIS-III) was employed to test working memory.  In this test, individuals 
are presented with a pseudorandom series of numbers and letters.  They are then asked to 
respond with the numbers first in numerical order, followed by the letters in alphabetical 
order.  It is considered to be a test of working memory as it requires the active 
manipulation of registered information prior to response (Prifitera, Saklofske et al. 2005).   
 
The task is divided into 7 levels with gradually increasing quantities of components 
(ranging from level 1 which has two components – one letter and one number; to level 7 
which has 8 components).  Each level contains 3 items.  For the current study, 
performance on the LNS was considered for the level reached and for the total number of 







Generativity was measured using two tests, one of verbal fluency and one of ideational 
fluency.   
 
The verbal fluency test was Benton’s Controlled Word Association task (Benton 1968) 
commonly referred to as the FAS test.  In this task individuals are first asked to produce 
as many words as possible beginning with the letter F in one minute; this procedure is 
then repeated for the letter A and the letter S.  The test is scored by awarding one point 
for each novel real word produced (perseverative or made-up responses are not scored).  
The FAS test also allows some estimation of the method by which individuals produce 
words through the calculation of a category score (the relative number of consecutive 
responses to total responses that are categorically related to each other (e.g. snake, sheep 
and shark are all animals and as such would form one category), and phoneme scores (the 
relative number of consecutive response to total responses which begin with the same 
phoneme (e.g. apple, application, apply would form a phoneme category).   
 
The ideational fluency test was the Use of Objects Task applied as in Turner et al (1999).  
In this task, participants were asked to produce as many possible uses for an object in 2½ 
minutes.  Six objects were used, three with a clear purpose (a mug, a brick and a pencil) 
and three with no clear purpose (a 50cm length of dowelling, a piece of plain blue cloth 
measuring 110cm by 40cm and a piece of clothing elastic measuring 100cm long).  For 
the purposeful objects the examiner gave two examples of potential uses – one 




you could use a pencil to make a flagpole for a toy castle); for the non-purposeful objects 
one imaginative example was given (e.g. you could use the stick to turn the TV on and 
off).  The order in which the objects were presented was counterbalanced between 
subjects.   
 
The Use of Objects task was scored by awarding one point for any reasonable use of the 
object.  In order to examine whether any of the conditions were associated with 
particularly creative ideas, a score for highly imaginative responses was also generated.  
The number of perseverative and inappropriate responses were also recorded.     
 
4.2.2.2: Central coherence 
Two tests of central coherence were employed: the block design task from the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI (Wechsler 1999)) and the Embedded Figures 
Task (EFT (Witkin 1950)).   
 
Block design 
The block design task was employed in its segmented and unsegmented forms, as was the 
case in Shah and Frith (1993).  As described in Chapter 2, this tasks requires participants 
to place cubic blocks with either a white face, a red face or a half-white/half-red face 
together as quickly as possible to form a total of 9 designs provided in picture form by 
the examiner.  Participants were allowed to view the design for each item throughout the 
item.  In the standard (unsegmented) form the design is provided as a whole figure; in the 




individuals completed the unsegmented form of the task prior to completing the 
segmented form, as to do otherwise would demonstrate to participants how they might 
approach the unsegmented form.  To minimise practice effects the segmented and 
unsegmented forms were set at 90 degrees to each other. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Examples of segmented and unsegmented block design stimuli 
 
The time take until completion for each item as recorded, with a maximum time of 120 
seconds for the easier designs and 180 seconds for the more difficult ones.  Typically one 
expects individuals to perform the segmented form more quickly than the unsegmented 
form, with this difference being less in individuals with a local processing bias / weak 
central coherence.  The key measure is therefore the facilitation provided by the 
segmented form, derived by subtracting the time to completion of the segmented form 
from that of the unsegmented form.      
 
Embedded Figures Task 
The Embedded Figures Task was employed in the standard fashion (Witkin 1971) (Figure 
4.3).  Participants were given a card with the face-up side showing a simple shape.  They 
were informed that on the other side of the card was a complex design and they had to 




simple shape within the complex design they were to outline it using a stylus.  
Participants were allowed to look at the simple shape for as long as they liked before they 
turned over to view the complex shape; they were also allowed to turn back to the simple 
shape as many times as they liked.  Twelve items were presented in total and the time 
taken until the completion of each item was recorded with a maximum of three minutes 
allowed for any single item.   
 
 
Figure 4.3: Example of simple shape and complex design from EFT 
 
4.2.2.3: Social cognition 
Two social cognition tasks were used: an emotion recognition task and a mentalising 
task.   
 
Emotion recognition 
The emotion recognition task was the presentation of the standard Ekman 60 faces 
(Ekman, Friesen et al. 1975) (Figure 4.3).  Each face was presented for a maximum of 
five seconds and participants were asked to select what emotion the face was showing 
from a list presented in a random of order of fear, anger, disgust, sadness, happiness and 




Performance for each emotion was measured separately and a combined total was also 
generated.    
     
 




The mentalising task employed was the Social Judgements Task (Hall, Harris et al. 
2004).  Participants were shown six sets of forty pictures of faces (eight practice and 
thirty two scored images) for a maximum of five seconds each.  In each set they were 
asked to allocate the faces into one of the following binary characteristics: approachable-
unapproachable, distinctive-not distinctive, young-old, trustworthy-untrustworthy, 
intelligent-not intelligent and attractive-unattractive.  The pictures were shown on a 
computer screen and the participants pressed a button on a keyboard to indicate their 
selection.  No feedback was provided as to their responses.   
 
The stimuli for this test were the same as those derived for a previous study (Hall, Harris 
et al. 2004). Briefly, five hundred pictures of non-famous faces were evaluated by six 




pictures with opposite mean valences for each judgement were selected for each set of the 
final test materials.  This meant that each test set consisted of forty pictures, 20 of one 
valence and 20 of the opposite (e.g. 20 attractive and 20 unattractive faces).  Individuals 
in the current study were thus scored according to their agreement with the previously 
derived ratings.  A total score for each judgement was recorded, as well as the direction 
of error (e.g. trustworthy faces rated as untrustworthy or vice versa).   
 
4.2.3: Statistical analysis 
Differences between the groups were examined using ANOVAs or repeated measures 
ANOVAs with follow-up t tests as appropriate when the data were parametric in 
distribution.  For non-parametric data Kruskal-Wallis tests and follow-up Mann-Whitney 
tests were employed.  Within the tables parametric data are presented as mean (standard 
deviation) whereas non-parametric data are presented as median (inter-quartile range).  
To assess the effect of IQ it was added as a covariate in an ANCOVA for parametric 
data; when one or more of the groups contained non-parametric data the effect of IQ was 
determined using partial correlations across all 4 groups, controlling for group.  The 
relationships between continuous measures were determined using Pearson’s correlation 










 ASD SPD CM Controls 
N 28 20 9 33 
M:F 22:6 14:6 6:3 23:10 
Age 39.5 (11.6) 37.3 (9.4) 35.8 (10.0) 36.5 (9.3) 
Handedness 27:1 18:2 7:2 31:2 
Yrs education 16.2 (1.7) 15.4 (2.0) 16.1 (2.4) 16.5 (1.9) 
Verbal IQ 108.4 (14.0) 104.7 (11.9) 98.6 (23.7) 113.2 (9.8) 
Performance IQ 114.6 (17.8) 106.7 (11.4) 105.3 (21.7) 119.1 (10.2) 
Full-scale IQ 113.1 (17.3) 106.4 (10.7) 102.4 (23.6) 118.1 (9.9) 
ADOS comm 3 (2) 1 (2) 2 (1) 0 (0) 
ADOS SI 5 (1) 2 (2) 5 (3) 0 (0) 
SPD items 2 (2) 5 (1) 5 (2) 0 (0) 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of participants for neuropsychological experiment 
 
No significant differences were seen between the groups with respect to gender (chi sq = 
1.4, p= 0.70), handedness (Fishers exact test = 3.28, p=0.28), age (F=0.42, p=0.74) or 
years spent in education (F=1.27, p =0.29).  IQ scores differed significantly between the 
groups (F=3.50, p=0.02; F=3.98, p=0.01; F=4.25, p=0.008 for verbal, performance and 
full-scale IQ respectively).  In particular the control group had significantly higher IQ 
scores in all three domains than either the SPD or the CM group (all p<0.05).  The ASD, 
SPD and CM groups did not differ significantly on any of the IQ measures, although 
there were trends towards significance for differences between the ASD and CM groups 





4.3.2: Executive function 
 
Sustained Attention and Inhibition 
The median and interquartile range for the number of omission and commission errors on 
the different versions of the SART are shown in Table 4.2.  There were no significant 
differences between the groups on any of the measures (all p>0.30).   
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Fixed 
     Om Err 














     Om Err 













Table 4.2: Results for Fixed and Random SART given as median (IQR).   
 
Working Memory 
The results for the letter-number sequencing task are shown in Table 4.3.   
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Level reached 4.0 (1.0) 5.0 (2.0) 4.0 (1.0) 6.0 (2.0) 
Total score 11.2 (3.2) 11.6 (3.5) 10.8 (4.3) 13.4 (2.6) 
Table 4.3: Results for letter-number sequencing task 
For level reached results are given as median (interquartile range).  For total score results 





Significant differences were found between the groups for the level reached (chi sq = 
15.7, p=0.001) and for the total score (F=3.17, p=0.03) (Figure 4.5).  In terms of the level 
reached, the controls scored more highly than the ASD and CM group (Z=-3.4, p=0.001; 
Z=-2.9, p=0.003 respectively but not the SPD group (Z=-1.6, p=0.10).  There were no 
significant differences when the ASD group was compared to either the SPD or CM 
group (Z=-1.5, p=0.14 and Z=-0.77, p=0.44); however a trend towards significance was 
apparent when the SPD and CM groups were compared (Z=-1.7, p=0.08).     
 
For the total score the controls scored significantly more highly than the ASD and CM 
groups (p=0.01 and p=0.03 respectively) and there was a trend towards significance for 
the control-SPD comparison (p=0.053).  There were no significant differences between 
the ASD, SPD and CM groups (Figure 4.5)   
 






When full-scale IQ was added as a covariate to the analysis the control-ASD comparison 
remained significant (p=0.03) while the control-SPD and the control-CM comparisons 
became non-significant (p=0.63 and p=0.50 respectively) (adjusted mean values: 
ASD=11.1, SPD=12.5, CM=11.8, Controls=12.7).   
 
Generativity  
The results of the FAS test are given in table 4.4.   
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Produced 13.8 (5.0) 13.0 (4.4) 13.4 (2.9) 16.3 (4.0) 
Category rel 0.19 (0.12) 0.18 (0.14) 0.19 (0.14) 0.21 (0.11) 
Phoneme rel 0.36 (0.16) 0.34 (0.14) 0.30 (0.12) 0.38 (0.19) 
Table 4.4: Mean (standard deviation) performances on the FAS test. 
Produced – total number of appropriate responses; category rel – total number of 
consecutive responses in same category / total appropriate responses; phoneme rel – total 
number of consecutive responses beginning with the same phoneme / total appropriate 
responses 
 
The controls produced a greater mean number of responses per letter than the three other 
groups (F=3.26, p=0.03, 0.007 and 0.08 for the ASD, SPD and CM groups respectively).  
No other significant differences were found.  When full-scale IQ was added as a 
covariate to the analysis the control-ASD comparison showed only a trend towards 
significance (p=0.07) while the control-SPD and the control-CM comparisons became 
non-significant (p=0.13 and p=0.68 respectively).   
 




 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Total approp. 7.0 (3.2) 6.4 (3.0) 7.1 (3.0) 10.0 (4.0) 
HI/approp. 0.03 (0.04) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 
Pers./total 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 
Inapprop./total 0.10 (0.15) 0.12 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.12 (0.07) 
Table 4.5: Mean scores per category for use of objects task.   
Total approp. – appropriate responses, mean (sd); HI/approp. – proportion of appropriate 
responses considered to be highly imaginative, median (inter-quartile range); Pers./total – 
proportion of all responses which were perseverative, median (inter-quartile range); 
Inapprop./total – proportion of all responses which were inappropriate, median (inter-
quartile range) 
 
A significant main effect of group was seen for the number of appropriate responses per 
category (F=6.1, p=0.001).  Controls scored more highly than each of the other three 
groups (all p<0.03).  There were no significant differences between the ASD, SPD and 
CM groups.  When IQ was added as a covariate the difference between the CM and 
control groups became non-significant whereas the other results did not change.   
 
A significant difference between the groups was seen for the proportion of highly 
imaginative responses produced (chi sq = 9.8, p=0.02).  The ASD group scored 
significantly more than the controls and the CM groups (Z=-2.6, p=0.009; Z=-2.2, p=0.03 
respectively) and there was a trend towards a significantly higher score compared to the 
SPD group (Z=-1.69, p=0.09).  No significant differences were seen between the other 





There were no significant differences between the groups with respect to the proportion 




4.3.3: Central coherence 
 
Block design 
There was no significant main effects for the ANOVAs comparing the groups on their 
performance on the unsegmented format of the block design task (F=2.02, p=0.12) 
whereas there was a trend towards a significant difference on the segmented format (F-
2.20, p=0.09).  Broadly speaking the controls performed the task more quickly than the 
SPD or CM groups regardless of format (see figure 4.5) with the ASD group falling in 
between the two.  Because performance on block design forms a significant component 
of full-scale IQ, the moderating effect of differing intellectual ability was examined by 
including verbal IQ as a covariate.  This led to all the results becoming non-significant 
(F=0.17, p=0.92).  Thus we did not see the anticipated superior performance of 
individuals with ASD on the block design task.   
 
 In order to assess whether there were differences between the groups with respect to the 
facilitation provided by the provision of segmented designs, a repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted with the within subject variables as mean time taken to solve the 




was some evidence that the ASD group showed the least facilitation, no significant group 
x task form interaction was observed (F= 1.2, p=0.33; figure 4.6) and this did not change 
with the addition of verbal IQ as a covariate.   
 
 
Figure 4.6: Performance on the segmented and unsegmented block design task 
 
Embedded Figures Test 
The Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant difference between the groups with regard 
to the mean time taken to solve the items (chi sq = 8.95, p=0.03, figure 4.7) and there was 
a trend towards significance in terms of the number of items correctly solved (chi sq = 
6.9, p=0.07).  The follow-up Mann-Whitney tests showed that the SPD group took longer 




Z=-2.22, p=0.03).  Although the comorbid group took longer than any of the groups, 
none of these differences were significant (all p>0.10).  Again the ASD group did not 
show the expected superior function relative to the controls.   
 
 
Figure 4.7: EFT performance shown as median time taken to solve item with 95% CIs 
 
Strong correlations exited between IQ and performance on the EFT (r=-0.72, p<0.001 
across all groups) suggesting that the differences reported may relate to IQ differences 
between the groups.  There was some evidence that IQ accounted for a greater degree of 
the variance of the EFT scores in the ASD, CM and control groups than the SPD group 





Similar to the findings for IQ, there was a significant association between EFT and 
working memory performance in the ASD and CM group with a trend towards 
significance in the controls (rho=-0.69, p<0.001; rho=-0.70, p=0.04; and rho=-0.32, 
p=0.07) but not in the SPD group (rho=-0.22, p=0.34) (Figure 4.8) 
 
 










4.3.4: Social cognition 
 
Face Emotion Recognition 
The scores for the Ekman 60 test are summarised in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.9. 
 
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Anger 8 (1.5) 8 (2) 8 (3) 9 (1) 
Disgust 8 (4) 8  (2.5) 8 (2) 8 (2) 
Fear 6.5 (4) 6 (3.5) 7 (4) 8 (2) 
Happiness 10 (0) 10 (0) 10 (0) 10 (0) 
Sadness 7 (3) 8 (2) 8 (2) 8 (2) 
Surprise 8.5 (3) 9 (3) 9 (1) 9 (2) 
Total 47 (8.5) 49 (9.5) 48 (10) 51 (4) 
Table 4.6: Results of the Ekman60 face emotion recognition task.  All given as median 
(inter-quartile range)  
 
Significant differences between the groups were seen for anger, fear and the total score 
(chi sq=9.6, p=0.02; chi sq = 8.4, p=0.04 and chi sq=8.70, p=0.03 respectively).  For 
anger, the ASD group scored significantly less than the controls and there was a trend 
towards a significant decrease in the CM group compared to the controls (Z=-3.14, 
p=0.002 and Z=-1.65, p=0.099 respectively).  For fear the ASD, SPD and CM groups all 
scored significantly less than the controls (Z=-2.29, p=0.02; Z=-2.2, p=0.03; Z=-1.97, 
p=0.049 respectively).  For the total score a significant reduction compared to controls 




reduction was seen for the CM group (Z=-1.74, p=0.08).  No other significant differences 
or trends towards significant differences were seen.   
 
 
Figure 4.9: Ekman 60 results shown as median with 95% CIs 
 
In order to assess whether IQ differences affected the results, partial correlations 
controlling for group membership were conducted between full scale IQ and the results 
for anger, fear and total Ekman60 scores.  Significant positive relationships were seen for 
IQ with anger and the total score (both p<0.001) whereas no significant relationship was 
seen for fear (p=0.10).  This suggests that the group differences for anger and the total 






Social judgements task 
The results of the social judgements task are shown in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.10. 
 
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
Age 31 (1.5) 31 (2) 30 (2) 31 (1) 
Approachability 24.5 (8.5) 26 (8.5) 27 (9) 29 (5) 
Attractiveness 26.5 (6.5) 26 (5) 28 (3) 29 (3) 
Distinctiveness 23 (3.5) 22.5 (6.5) 21 (5) 25.5 (3.5) 
Intelligence 26 (4) 27 (6.5) 28 (3) 28 (3) 
Trustworthiness 25.5 (4) 23.5 (7) 24 (5) 25.5 (4) 
Total 160 (18) 155 (19) 153 (22) 166 (11.5) 
Table 4.7: Results of social judgement task given as median (IQR) 
 
Significant differences between the groups were seen for judgements of attractiveness, 
distinctiveness and intelligence (chi sq = 9.9, p=0.02; chi sq= 11.9, p=0.008; chi sq= 8.0, 
p=0.046 respectively) and trends towards significant differences were seen for 
judgements of age and approachability (chi sq=7.2, p=0.07; chi sq=6.9, p=0.07 
respectively).  A significant difference between the groups was also seen for the total 
score (chi sq = 12.78, p=0.005).   
 
Follow-up Mann Whitney tests showed that the ASD, SPD and CM groups did not differ 
significantly from each other on any of the measures (all p>0.13).  The ASD group 




judgements of approachability, attractiveness, distinctiveness and intelligence (Z=-2.31, 
p=0.02; Z=-2.47, p=0.01, Z=-2.60, p=0.01; Z=-2.66, p=0.008 respectively) with a trend 
towards a significant difference for age (Z=-1.85, p=0.06).  The SPD group scored less 
than the controls on the total score (Z=-3.09, p=0.002) and on judgements of 
approachability, attractiveness, distinctiveness and intelligence (Z=-2.04, p=0.04; Z=-
2.69, p=0.007; Z=-2.30, p=0.02; Z=-1.97, p=0.046 respectively).  The CM group scored 
significantly less than the controls on judgments of age and distinctiveness (Z=-2.39, 
p=0.02; Z=-2.64, p=0.008 respectively) with a trend towards a significant difference for 
attractiveness (Z=-1.75, p=0.08) and for the total score (Z=-1.96, p=0.051).  No other 
significant differences were seen between the groups.   
 
 





To investigate whether the differences are confounded by IQ, partial correlations 
controlling for group between IQ and each measure were carried out.  IQ had a 
significant effect on judgements of age, distinctiveness and on the total score suggesting 
that these results may relate at least in part to IQ differences between the groups.   
 
For each measure the direction of error was also compared between the groups (i.e. 
whether one group was more likely to make approachable judgements from an 
unapproachable face or vice versa).  No significant differences were identified between 
the groups with respect to the direction of the errors made in each judgement (all p>0.16).   
 
Finally, whether the relationship between face emotion recognition and social judgement 
abilities differed between the groups was investigated by examining the correlations 
between the total scores for the Ekman faces test and the social judgement test.  There 
was a significant group x emotion recognition score (F=3.88, p = 0.01); the ASD group 
showed a significant relationship between Ekman faces score and social judgement score 
(r=0.56, p=0.002) whereas the other groups did not (r=0.26, p=0.27 for SPD; r=0.47, 








Figure 4.11: Correlations between total score on social judgment task and total score on 
Ekman 60 test in each of the four groups under study 
 
4.3.5: Correlation of symptom domains with neuropsychological tests 
Tests of interaction were performed to examine whether the groups differed with respect 
to the relationship between symptom domains (AQ, EQ, SIS positive, SIS negative and 
SIS disorganised) and the neuropsychological tasks which were found to be significantly 
different between the groups (FAS task; use of objects task; LNS task; EFT; social 
judgement task – approachability, intelligence, distinctiveness and attractiveness; and 





A significant interaction was found between group and performance on the ideational 
fluency task with respect to the SIS positive symptom domain (p=0.046).  Examination of 
the relationships within each group showed that the ASD, SPD and control groups all 
showed positive relationships between their scores on these measures (i.e. those with 
more positive symptoms tended to score more highly) whereas a negative relationship 
was seen in the CM group.  However, none of these relationships were significant in 
themselves with the closest being a trend towards significance in the SPD group (r=0.40, 
p=0.09).   
 
There was a significant interaction between the total score on the AQ and performance on 
the approachability subscale with a trend towards a significant interaction for the 
intelligence subscale of the social cognition task (p=0.02 and 0.07 respectively).  No 
significant interaction was found for the non-mentalising judgements.  When the groups 
were considered separately, the SPD group showed a significant negative relationship 
between AQ score and performance on the approachability task (rho=-0.47, p=0.04), the 
controls and the CM group both showed non-significant negative correlations, whereas 
the ASD group showed a non-significant positive correlation (Figure 4.12).  A similar, 





Figure 4.12: Relationships between performance on the approachability task and the total 
AQ score. 
 
4.3.6: Neuropsychological tests potentially confounded by IQ differences 
A summary of the tests, on which IQ had a significant effect, and which may have 
accounted for differences between the groups is shown in Table 4.8.  Only tests for which 








Domain Likely no effect of IQ Potentially confounded by IQ 




Central Coherence  Embedded Figures Task 













- total score 
Table 4.8: Neuropsychological tests for which significant differences between groups 
were seen which were potentially confounded by IQ 
 
4.4: DISCUSSION 
Using a battery of neuropsychological tests covering executive function, central 
coherence and social cognition, differences were identified between the controls and the 
clinical groups (ASD, SPD and CM) on several of the tests.  This was particularly evident 
for social cognition, where deficits in performance were seen for all of the clinical 
groups, and to a lesser extent executive function, where deficits were seen but were 
almost entirely accounted for by IQ (Table 4.8).  However, there were remarkably few 
differences apparent when the clinical groups were compared to each other, which is 
particularly striking given that the tests were specifically chosen with the intention of 







Each of the ASD, SPD and CM groups showed impairments on the Ekman 60 test of 
facial emotion recognition, particularly with respect to fear.  The ASD and CM groups 
also showed evidence of impairment with respect to anger and to the total score, although 
the significant effect of IQ on performance on these measures may mean that the CM-
control difference in particular is artefactual.  These findings are broadly consistent with 
the hypothesis derived from the literature review in Chapter 2 that emotion recognition 
deficits would be apparent in all groups, and may be more marked in those with ASD 
(although no significant difference between the ASD, CM and SPD groups were seen).  
 
The Ekman 60 is a comparatively simple emotion recognition task in that it consists of 
stationary stimuli with archetypal emotional expressions.  Previous studies have 
suggested that deficits are more recognisable with more complex stimuli (Harms, Martin 
et al. 2010) therefore the current findings are strongly suggestive that these groups show 
genuine and marked deficits in emotion recognition.     
 
The findings for fear are particularly striking across all three groups and may relate to a 
number of different reasons.  Firstly the recognition of fear is generally held to be more 
complex than, for example, happiness or sadness, therefore the deficits reported here may 
be an effect of task difficulty.  Secondly, it is well established that the amygdala has a 
prominent role in judgements of fear (Fusar-Poli, Placentino et al. 2009), and amygdala 
dysfunction has been suggested as to play a key role in the pathogenesis of both autism 




al. 2008).  Interestingly, there was some evidence that the ASD and CM groups were 
additionally impaired at the recognition of anger, which has been associated with the 
insula (Fusar-Poli, Placentino et al. 2009), suggesting that a potentially broader 
impairment in social brain function occurs in these conditions.   
 
The deficits in social judgements across the clinical groups were striking in their 
similarity across the groups, particularly between the ASD and SPD groups.  Impairments 
in judgements of approachability, intelligence, attractiveness and distinctiveness were 
apparent in both the ASD and SPD groups, whereas neither showed impairments the 
detection of age or trustworthiness.  Although all of these judgements are socially 
mediated, intelligence, approachability and trustworthiness likely require a greater degree 
of mentalising ability than attractiveness, distinctiveness or age.  Thus the deficits 
reported here may not be specific for mentalising decisions per se but may be more 
broadly related to the ability to make social judgements, or possibly be due to a 
combination of mentalising deficits and sociocultural factors which affect how one 
judges attractiveness and distinctiveness.      
 
The lack of a significant difference on the trustworthiness task was contrary to the 
hypothesis of worse performance by the SPD group due to the over-ascription of 
untrustworthiness.  It is possible that this may relate to selection bias as over-ascription of 
untrustworthiness has been specifically associated with the presence of paranoid features 




SPD who were willing to undergo the detailed interviews, cognitive testing and MRI 
scanning required for the current study.     
 
Interestingly a significant difference was found between the groups with regard to the 
relationship between performance on the emotion recognition task and on the social 
judgement task, such that the ASD group showed a significant positive association which 
was not seen in the other groups.  The greatest difference was seen between the ASD and 
control groups with the SPD group in between the two and the CM group performing 
similarly to the ASD group.  The positive association in the ASD group (and possibly 
also the CM group) suggests that these individuals may make social judgements based 
upon the same strategy by which they recognise emotions, whereas the control group do 
not.  If, as suggested (Tantam, Monaghan et al. 1989; Gross 2008), individuals with ASD 
use local, feature based processing to recognise emotions, it is possible that they use 
similar explicit techniques to make a social judgement, whereas controls use more 
implicit processing, with people with SPD employing a mixture of the two.        
 
There was some evidence also of a difference between the groups with respect to the 
relationship between autistic traits and performance on the approachability task.  The 
significantly negative relationship between these measures in the SPD group contrasts 
with the lack of a relationship found in the other groups and suggests that mentalising 
dysfunction is more closely associated with clinically expressed autistic traits in the SPD 






No difference in sustained attention or inhibition were seen between any of the groups.  
This is in contrast to previous studies in schizophrenia which have shown impairments in 
both domains, and to a lesser extent studies in SPD, where increased omission and 
commission errors have been reported in the Continuous Performance Test in individuals 
with SPD (Siever and Davis 2004) and general population samples with psychometrically 
defined schizotypy (Bergida and Lenzenweger 2006; Giakoumaki 2012).  Impairments 
on the Random SART have been reported in individuals with psychometrically defined 
schizotypy, although only in terms of efficiency (a measure derived from the number of 
correct response divided by the average reaction time of correct responses); no significant 
differences were seen between the schizotypal individuals and controls in terms of 
commission or omission errors (Chan, Wang et al. 2009).  It is possible therefore that the 
SART is not a sensitive enough measure of attention or response inhibition to capture the 
deficits in SPD which are more subtle than in schizophrenia.   
 
Differences between the groups were apparent for working memory, measured using the 
letter-number sequencing (LNS) task, such that the clinical groups all scored less than the 
controls.  After IQ was taken into account the difference was still apparent for the ASD 
group, but not for the SPD or the CM group who now scored midway between the ASD 
group and the controls.  No differences between the ASD, SPD and CM groups were 
apparent either with or without IQ as a covariate.  This is in contrast to the hypothesis 
that individuals with SPD would perform less well than those with ASD who were 




visuospatial networks.  However, this hypothesis was based primarily on findings of 
compensatory activity in people with ASD using functional MRI during the n-back task, 
which is a visually presented task.  In contrast, the LNS is not visually based and as such 
may not be amenable to compensation by visuospatial regions.  The current findings are 
therefore consistent with a theory of hypofrontality in ASD but not clearly so in SPD or 
CM individuals.  One possible explanation is that SPD is not associated with prefrontal 
deficits.  Alternatively, the compensatory increases in brain activity in prefrontal and 
other regions which have been reported to occur in schizophrenia (Glahn, Ragland et al. 
2005) and in SPD (Koenigsberg, Buchsbaum et al. 2005), are acting in such a way to 
minimise the deficit in the current cohort.  If this is the case this would imply that these 
compensatory mechanisms are different between ASD and SPD.   
 
No evidence was found for enhanced generativity in SPD.  Instead all three clinical 
groups performed less well than the control on the verbal fluency test.  These differences 
became non-significant following the addition of IQ as a covariate, although there was 
still some evidence suggestive of a deficit in the SPD and, to a lesser extent, the ASD 
groups.  The ASD, SPD and CM groups also showed reduced performance on the use of 
objects task compared to controls and this was robust to the addition of IQ.  The reduced 
performance on verbal and ideational fluency in ASD is consistent with previous research 
(Turner 1999) and indicative of a general deficit in the ability to produce multiple novel 
responses to a general cue.  In contrast to Turner et al (1999) the ASD group scored more 
highly than any of the other groups on the proportion of their responses considered to be 




generation as it is the relative, but not total, number of highly imaginative responses that 
is increased.  Rather it may reflect the ‘autistic intelligence’ suggested by Asperger 
(1991), which Wing felt was due to the lack of constraining sociocultural expectations 
constraints experienced by individuals with ASD (Wing 1981).   
 
The lack of a performance advantage for individuals with SPD is contrary to findings of 
increased creativity in psychometric schizotypy (Nettle and Clegg 2006; Nelson and 
Rawlings 2010).  However, it is consistent with the single study of verbal fluency in SPD 
which found reductions in performance compared to controls.  The current study suggests 
that findings from general population studies of increased creativity associated with 
schizotypal traits do not generalise to a performance advantage for those with SPD.  We 
did find evidence for non-significant positive relationships between ideational fluency 
and positive schizotypal traits within the ASD, SPD and control groups which suggests 
that the presence of such traits may be associated with increased creativity within each 
population, but that additional factors that differ between the populations may lead to the 
overall group differences reported in the current study.  Raine (1991) reported that 55% 
of individuals in the top decile of scorers on the SPQ in a general population sample met 
criteria for SPD.  Studies which have shown a creativity advantage in such samples may 
therefore be reflective of the relatively mild degree of schizotypy that they consider 








In contrast to previous studies (Shah and Frith 1983; Shah and Frith 1993) and to the 
hypotheses of the current study, no advantage was seen for the ASD group compared to 
controls in tasks of weak central coherence.  Although individuals with ASD showed the 
least facilitation from the segmented block design task, this did not come close to 
approaching significance, nor did they show overall superiority in the unsegmented block 
design task.  Similarly, there was no evidence that the ASD group outperformed controls 
on the EFT.  It is not clear why this should be; performance advantages on these tasks 
have been identified consistently in the past, indeed it has been the mechanism behind 
such advantages that is most debated, not whether they exist (Mottron, Burack et al. 
2003; Happé and Booth 2008).   
 
Although no evidence was seen for enhanced performance in the ASD group relative to 
controls there was some suggestion that individuals with SPD and CM individuals score 
less well than people with ASD on the EFT.  Caution must be applied in interpreting this 
finding as there was a strong relationship between IQ and EFT performance suggesting 
that these differences might relate to differences in global intellectual ability.  However, 
these findings are consistent with the work of Bolte et al who reported impaired 
performance in the EFT in schizophrenia compared to people with autism and controls 
and in parents of people with schizophrenia compared to parents of people with autism 
and controls (Bölte and Poustka 2006).  It is unclear whether these deficits in EFT 




the two or a relative global processing bias regardless of the absolute local or global 
processing abilities.   
 
What do the neuropsychological studies tell us about the relationship between the autism 
and schizophrenia spectrums? 
The pattern of deficits in the CM group did not convincingly allocate them to any single 
diagnostic category (severe ASD, severe SPD) or a combination of categories.  In part 
this may be due to the general lack of discrimination between ASD and SPD in the 
neuropsychological measures studied.  There was some non-significant evidence that the 
CM group showed the same deficits as the SPD group on the EFT and use of objects task, 
but also showed the same deficits as the ASD group in terms of working memory.  Thus, 
there is some suggestion that they may have the deficits of both the ASD and SPD group, 
providing some support for the combination or true comorbidity model.  However, the 
lack of statistical significance means that these findings must be interpreted with caution.  
Interestingly, unlike the clinical studies, the CM group showed no evidence of being 
more affected from a neuropsychological perspective than the ASD and SPD groups.   
 
Although several differences from controls were identified in the neuropsychological 
battery, remarkably few characteristics were found which discriminate between the ASD 
and SPD groups.  Overall therefore the neuropsychological evidence suggests that ASD 
and SPD overlap considerably in terms of the cognitive function which underlies their 
clinical presentation.  Certainly if differences between the groups are present they are 




was some evidence that working memory may be more affected in ASD than it is in SPD 
which may indicate a greater degree of prefrontal cortex impairment, or at least less 
effective compensatory mechanisms in the specific task that was used in the current 
study.  Performance on the tests of social cognition were very similar between ASD and 
SPD, although there was also some evidence that the strategies used to make social 
judgements may differentiate them.  The investigation of these domains using fMRI may 





















5.1: INTRODUCTION  
Functional MRI (fMRI) is a form of magnetic resonance imaging which is based upon 
two premises.  Firstly, the brain does not store glucose.  Instead when energy 
requirements in a specific region increase, for example due to increased neuronal activity, 
an increase in blood flow to that region is required.  Secondly, oxygenated haemoglobin 
and deoxygenated haemoglobin have different magnetic properties and changes in their 
ratio therefore lead to a change in the signal detected during magnetic resonance imaging 
(Ogawa, Lee et al. 1990).  This change in signal is called the blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) response.  Therefore, by measuring the BOLD response, usually 
while an individual conducts different neuropsychological tasks, one is able to draw 
inferences about the relative blood flow to a particular brain region and hence relative 
neuronal activity.   
 
It is important to note that the BOLD response is a proxy, rather than a direct measure of 
regional brain activity, and can be modulated by any variable that affects blood flow, not 
just neural activity.  However, the lack of ionising radiation and good spatial resolution 
mean that fMRI is a valuable and popular tool for the in vivo study of human cognitive 
processes in health and in disease.   
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, fMRI has been regularly applied to the study of both 
schizophrenia spectrum and autism spectrum disorders.  In the current study it is of 
particular interest because it may represent one way in which ASD and SPD can be better 




neuropsychological similarities reported between ASD and SPD are associated with the 
same or different patterns of BOLD response, and hence allow inferences to be drawn 
about any relationship between the conditions.   
 
Given that social deficits are one of the most strongly overlapping features between ASD 
and SPD, both from a clinical and a neuropsychological perspective, the need for their 
investigation using fMRI is clear.  Both the ASD and SPD groups showed impairments 
on the approachability component of the social judgement task, but there was some 
evidence that they may differ in terms of its associations with emotion processing and 
clinically defined autistic traits.  This indirect evidence that different brain mechanisms 
are associated with the mentalising deficit in ASD and SPD is consistent with the theories 
of hypo- and hyper-mentalising in autism and schizophrenia respectively (Abu-Akel and 
Bailey 2000; Frith 2004).  If these theories are correct, predominantly underactivation of 
social brain regions should be seen in ASD while they make judgements of 
approachability, whereas predominantly overactivation should be seen in SPD while 
making the same judgements (although the caveats described in the opening paragraphs 
above should be noted).  It was therefore hypothesised that individuals with ASD would 
show decreased activity of social brain regions than controls and that those with SPD 
would show greater activity in these regions compared to controls.     
 
Verbal working memory was also found to be impaired in both the ASD and SPD groups, 
although this was not evident for the SPD group when IQ was taken into account.  This 




back task of verbal working memory in people with ASD, despite evidence of reduced 
prefrontal activations, possibly due to the compensatory use of visuospatial regions 
(Koshino, Carpenter et al. 2005).Compensation has also been suggested to explain 
prefrontal and other hyperactivations which accompany prefrontal hypoactivation during 
the n-back task in schizophrenia (Glahn, Ragland et al. 2005) and SPD (Koenigsberg, 
Buchsbaum et al. 2005).  By directly comparing BOLD response during the n-back task 
between participants with ASD and those with SPD it may be possible to not only 
determine whether frontal activation is similar between the disorders, but also whether 
compensatory activity occurs through increased activation elsewhere in the brain and 
whether the compensatory regions are the same or differ from each other.  Based on the 
limited data available it was hypothesised that both groups would show reduced 
activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex compared to controls and that this would 
not differ between them.  It was also hypothesised that compensatory increases in 
activation would occur in visuospatial brain regions in ASD, whereas in SPD 
compensatory activations in prefrontal regions other than the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex would be seen.  However, the working memory deficits identified in Chapter 4, 
particularly in the ASD group, suggest that the compensatory activity is not sufficient to 












Participants for this study were recruited from those who had completed the 
neuropsychological component outlined in Chapter 4.  Two individuals (both from the 
ASD group) who completed the neuropsychological component did not take part in the 
imaging study due to their concerns about the scanner environment.  A further two 
individuals (one control, one ASD) were excluded due to technical problems arising 
during their scans, such that meaningful data was not recorded.  Finally, one individual 
with ASD was excluded due to the presence of a ferromagnetic earring causing 
significant artefact.  The characteristics of the remaining participants are given in Table 
5.1.     
 
5.2.2: Image acquisition 
All participants were scanned on a 1.5T GE Medical Systems Signa Scanner (GE 
Medical, USA).  For the approachability task there were two experimental sessions, each 
acquiring 96 volumes.  For the n-back task 210 volumes were acquired across one 
experimental session.  For both tasks, axial, gradient-echo planar images (EPI) were 
acquired with a repetition time (TR) of 2.5s, echo time (TE) of 40ms, matrix 64 x 64, a 
field of view (FOV) of 240mm x 240mm and a flip angle of 90 degrees.  Thirty 





In addition to the functional acquisition, a T1 structural image was also obtained using an 
MPRAGE sequence.  180 contiguous 1.2mm thick coronal slices were obtained in an 
interleaved fashion (TR 9.7ms, TE 4.0ms, matrix 192 x 192, FOV 240mm x 240mm, flip 
angle 8 degrees).   
 
5.2.3: Approachability task 
The approachability task was applied as in Hall et al (2010).  Participants were asked to 
decide whether people were approachable or not approachable, based upon pictures of 
their faces.  As the control condition, participants were shown different face pictures and 
asked to decide if they were male or female.  The face stimuli used were derived as 
described for the neuropsychological task in Chapter 4.  No stimuli from the 
neuropsychological study in Chapter 4 were repeated in the imaging study, therefore, the 
stimuli employed were novel to all participants.   
 
Stimuli were presented in blocks of approachability judgements (‘social’ condition) and 
gender judgements (‘gender’ condition).  Two runs of the task were presented, each 
lasting 240 seconds.  There were six blocks per run, three of the social conditions and 
three of the gender condition.  Each block lasted for 25 seconds and blocks were 
separated by a baseline condition where participants were instructed to fixate on a cross 
in the centre of the screen (‘Baseline’ condition).  Each block began with a 1 second 
visual reminder of the task for the block (“Approachable?” or “Gender?”).  This was 
followed by 6 faces, in a pseudorandom order, each presented for 3.5 seconds with a 0.5 




bivalent choice (“Approachable : Not approachable” or “Male : Female”) and these were 
maintained on the screen throughout the block.  They indicated their selection by pressing 
a button in the hand that corresponded to their choice.   
 
Two pairs, A and B, each containing two forms of the task were created to permit 
counterbalancing of order and stimuli (four forms in total – A1, A2, B1, B2).  Pair A 
began with the gender condition, whereas Pair B began with the social condition.  In A1 
and B1, participants were asked to make gender judgements on one set of stimuli and 
social judgements on another; this was then reversed for A2 and B2.   
 
As per the out of scanner task in Chapter 4, performance was rated against the previously 
derived ratings for each picture derived in healthy controls (Hall, Harris et al. 2004).   
 
5.2.4: N-back task 
The stimuli for the n-back task were letters from the ISO basic Latin-script alphabet.  
Prior to each block written instructions were presented for 7.5 seconds as a cue to remind 
participants which condition this block contained.  These were followed by the 
presentation of 12 stimuli, each for 1.5 seconds with a 1 second interval.  In total the task 
lasted 525 seconds.   
 
Four possible conditions were employed – 0-back, 1-back, 2-back and 3-back – with each 
block consisting entirely of only one condition.  In all conditions, participants were asked 




stimulus in which case they would press a different button.  The target stimulus varied 
between the four conditions.  In the 0-back condition, the target stimulus was the letter 
‘X’, thus the 0-back is considered a baseline condition with little working memory 
component.  In the 1-, 2- and 3- back conditions the target stimulus was the letter shown 
one, two or three letters prior to the stimulus on the screen.  Thus, these conditions are 
considered to place an increasing load on working memory.   The number of correct 
responses for each condition were recorded as a measure of behavioural accuracy.  The 
conditions were always presented in the order 0-back, 1-back, 2-back and 3-back, and 
this cycle was presented three times in total.   
 
5.2.5: Image analysis 
Image data were converted to NIfTI format and preprocessed using Statistical Parametric 
Mapping 8 software (SPM8 – www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) running in MATLAB 2011b 
(The MathWorks, Inc).  In each task the first four volumes of each run were discarded to 
avoid T1 equilibrium effects.  This was followed by realignment to the mean EPI image 
to correct for small movements of the participants within the task.  The functional images 
were then co-registered to the T1 structural image for each participant.  Next, the T1 
image was segmented and the parameters derived from this segmentation were used to 
normalise the T1 and the functional images to the standard Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) template.  The parameters from this were then used to normalise the 
functional images. Finally, the resultant functional images were then smoothed using an 





Statistical analysis was conducted using the general linear model implemented in SPM8.  
For the approachability task, the data for individual participants were modelled with two 
explicit conditions (social judgement and gender judgement) and an implicit baseline.  
Parameters representing the participant’s movement during the scan were also entered 
into the model as covariates of no interest.  Contrast images were then generated for each 
participant for two contrasts: social versus baseline and gender versus baseline.  In the 
second level analysis, a 2 x 4 flexible factorial design matrix was constructed with the 
two contrasts (social versus baseline and gender versus baseline) as within subjects 
factors and four groups (ASD, SPD, CM and control) as between-subjects factors in 
addition to the subject constants (Figure 5.1).   
 





Using this design matrix contrasts were constructed to test: the main effect of condition 
(social or gender) across all four groups; the effect of condition within each group; and 
the group x condition interaction. 
 
For the n-back task, the data for individual participants were modelled with four explicit 
conditions: 0-back, 1-back, 2-back and 3-back, and parameters representing the 
participant’s movement during the scan were also entered into the model as covariates of 
no interest.   Images were then generated for each participant for three contrasts: 1-back 
versus 0-back, 2-back versus 0-back and 3-back versus 0-back.  In the second level 
analysis, a 3 x 4 flexible factorial design was constructed with the 3 contrasts as the 
within subjects factors and the 4 groups as the between subjects factor in addition to the 
subject constants (Figure 5.2).  
  





Using this design matrix the effect of interest was the change in activation as the n-back 
condition changed from 1-back to 3-back (i.e. as working memory load increased).  As 
with the approachability task, contrasts were constructed to test: the main effect of 
condition across all four groups; the effect of condition within each group; and the group 
x condition interaction. 
 
For the statistical maps from all analyses, other than those generated by the group x 
condition interactions, the height threshold was set at the level of p=0.001 uncorrected.  
Given that the group x condition interaction is a more subtle contrast, the height threshold 
was set at p=0.005 uncorrected.  However, for all analyses results were only considered 
significant at p<0.05 after family wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons 
across the whole brain.  
 
In addition, for the approachability task, a small volume correction (SVC) was applied to 
the amygdala bilaterally.  This SVC was derived through dilating the amygdala from the 
WFU-Pick Atlas toolbox for SPM by 1 voxel in order to ensure the whole structure was 
captured.  Due to the small size of the amygdala, when SVC results are presented, the 
FWE corrected peak-level significance is given (as opposed to the cluster level 
significance).  All significance values presented are therefore FWE corrected over the 





The anatomical regions corresponding to activated clusters were identified using the 
Anatomy toolbox plug-in for SPM8 (Eickhoff, Stephan et al. 2005) supplemented by the 
MNI atlas contained in the MANGO image viewer software package 
(http://www.nitrc.org/projects/mango/).  Within the tables, the areas listed beside each 
cluster are all those contained within the cluster in the SPM output table which have a 
peak activation greater than the height threshold used.   
 
For those clusters that showed a significant group x condition interaction, the 
eigenvariates for each cluster were extracted and the difference value calculated by 
subtracting the value for the gender condition from that for the social condition.  This 
difference value was regressed against clinical variables of interest: positive, negative and 
disorganised traits as measured by the SIS and autistic traits as measured by the AQ and 
EQ.  In addition, in order to assess the effect of potential confounding factors the 
difference values were also regressed against IQ and performance.  These regression 
analyses were conducted within IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 19.0 







5.3.1: Participant characteristics 
The characteristics of the participants with valid imaging data are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
 ASD SPD CM Controls 
N 24 20 9 32 
M:F 19:5 14:6 6:3 22:10 
Age 40.5 (11.9) 37.3 (9.4) 35.8 (10.0) 36.6 (9.5) 
Handedness 23:1 18:2 7:2 30:2 
Yrs. education 16.4 (1.6) 15.4 (2.0) 16.1 (2.4) 16.4 (2.0) 
Verbal IQ 109.0 (14.1) 104.7 (11.9) 98.6 (23.7) 113.3 (9.9) 
Performance IQ 115.4 (17.5) 106.7 (11.4) 105.3 (21.7) 118.8 (10.3) 
Full-scale IQ 113.9 (17.1) 106.4 (10.7) 102.4 (23.6) 117.9 (10.0) 
ADOS comm. 3 (1.5) 1 (2) 2 (1) 0 (0) 
ADOS SI 5 (1) 2 (2) 5 (3) 0 (0) 
SPD items 2 (2) 5 (1) 5 (2) 0 (0) 
Table 5.1: Characteristics of participants who completed fMRI study 
 
No significant differences were seen between the groups with respect to gender (chi sq = 
0.94, p= 0.82), handedness (Fishers exact test = 1.10, p=0.35), age (F=0.72, p=0.55) or 
years spent in education (F=1.62, p =0.19).  IQ scores differed significantly between the 
groups (F=3.48, p=0.02; F=3.93, p=0.01; F=4.25, p=0.008 for verbal, performance and 




scores in all three domains than either the SPD or the CM group (all p<0.05).  The ASD, 
SPD and CM groups did not differ significantly on any of the IQ measures (all p>0.05), 
although there were trends towards significance for differences between the ASD and 
CM groups in verbal and full-scale IQ (p=0.06 and 0.054 respectively).  
 
5.3.2: Approachability task analysis 
 
5.3.2.1: Performance 
The scores for each group in the approachability judgement were: ASD – 27.8 (6.9); SPD 
– 27.4 (5.9); CM – 29.4 (4.8); controls 30.7 (4.7).  Comparing the groups using ANOVA 
showed no overall main effect for a difference (F=1.92, p=0.13), although the follow-up 
comparisons did show evidence that the controls differed from the ASD and SPD groups 
(p=0.06 and p=0.04 respectively).   
 
5.3.2.2: Main effect of condition 
The main effect of condition shows the activation for the social versus gender contrasts 
when all four groups are considered together.     
 
Significantly greater activation was found during the social > gender contrast bilaterally 
in the inferior frontal gyrus, superior medial prefrontal gyrus, insula, temporal poles, 
occipital regions and posterior cerebellum as well as in the left temporoparietal junction  
and right amygdala (Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3).  No significant clusters were seen for the 




Regions in cluster MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
Social > Gender 
 
      
L inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p orbitalis and p triangularis 
L temporal pole 
L insula 
 
-54 32 -2 218 0.01 3.99 
R. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p triangularis  
R. temporal pole 
R. insula 
 
51 29 -5 237 0.01 4.57 
L. & R. superior medial gyrus 
L. & R. superior frontal gyrus 
 
-9 -32 58 1121 <0.001 5.88 
L. ant. inferior temporal gyrus 
L. medial temporal pole 
 
-48 2 -35 146 0.048 5.11 
L. post. middle temporal gyrus 
 
-57 -43 1 346 0.002 4.43 
L. & R. calcarine gyrus 
L. superior occipital gyrus 
L. lingual gyrus 
L. inferior occipital gyrus 
R. cerebellum  
   - VI, VIIa Crus I & II 
 
-9 -85 1 1953 <0.001 ∞ 
L. cerebellum  
   - VIIa Crus II 
 




Gender > Social 
 
15 -4 14  
 
0.01 SVC 3.52 
     No significant clusters 
 
      
Table 5.2: Brain activations during social versus gender contrast across all groups 
Significance values reported are cluster values FWE-corrected for whole brain volume 
unless indicated using SVC when significance is reported for peak values FWE corrected 





Figure 5.3: Clusters of activation for social > gender contrast across all four groups 
Only clusters with a significance value of p<0.1 are displayed 





5.3.2.3: Brain activation within each group 
Activations within each group for the social > gender and reverse contrasts are shown in 
Tables 5.3 – 5.5 and Figures 5.4 – 5.7.   
 
Within Controls 
The controls showed significant areas of activation in the social > gender contrast in the 
right supplementary mot or area and the superior medial frontal lobe, occipital regions 
and the posterior cerebellum bilaterally.  No significant activations were seen the reverse 
contrast (Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4).   
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
Social > Gender 
 
      
L. & R. superior medial gyrus 
R. supplementary motor area 
 
9 32 58 183 0.02 4.19 
L. & R.  superior medial gyrus 
 
12 56 34 202 0.02 3.76 
L. & R. lingual gyrus 
L. & R. superior occipital gyrus 
 
12 -82 1 472 <0.001 5.86 
L. cerebellum 
   - VIIa Crus II 
 
-36 -70 -44 201 0.02 4.24 
R. cerebellum 
   - VIIa Crus II) 
 
30 -82 -44 114 0.09 3.97 
 
Gender > Social 
 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      






Figure 5.4: Activations within control group for social > gender contrast  
Only clusters with a significance value of p<0.1 are displayed 




Within ASD group 
The ASD group showed a trend towards significant activation in the left calcarine and 
lingual gyri during the social > gender contrast.  No other areas of increased activation 
were seen in either of the contrasts (Table 5.4 and Figure 5.5).   
 
Regions in cluster MNI Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
Social > Gender 
 
      
L. calcarine gyrus 
L. lingual gyrus 
 
-9 -85 4 118 0.08 5.77 
 
Gender > Social 
 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      






Figure 5.5: Activations within ASD group for social > gender contrast  
Only clusters with a significance value of p<0.1 are displayed 




Within SPD group 
The SPD group showed significantly activated clusters in the social > gender contrast in 
the bilateral medial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyri, medial temporal lobe and 
cerebellum, left temporal regions and basal ganglia (Table 5.5 and Figures 5.6 - 5.7). 
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
Social > Gender 
 
      
L. superior frontal gyrus 
L. & R. supplementary motor area 
 
-12 32 58 233 0.01 4.48 
L. & R. superior medial gyrus 
R. middle cingulate cortex 
 
-6 56 34 155 0.04 4.33 
L. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. orbitalis and p. triangularis 
 
-54 17 4 200 0.02 4.6 
R. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. triangularis 
 
51 35 25 232 0.01 5.52 
L. inferior temporal gyrus 
L. temporal pole 
 
-48 -1 -38 135 0.06 4.61 
L. middle temporal gyrus 
 
-63 -40 1 110 0.096 4.68 
L. & R. calcarine gyrus 
L. superior occipital gyrus 
L. & R. Cerebellum 
   - VI & VIIa Crus I and II 
 
-9 -85 1 2422 <0.001 5.62 
L. caudate & pallidum 
 
-15 5 -5 136 0.058 3.86 
L. hippocampus 
 
-3 -25 -26 139 0.054 4.49 
R. amygdala 
 
15 -4 -14  0.02SVC 3.38 
 
Gender > Social 
 
      
     No significant clusters 
 
      





Figure 5.6: Activations within SPD group for social > gender contrast  
Only clusters with a significance value of p<0.1 are displayed 






Figure 5.7: Location of right amygdala activation (MNI: 15 -4 -14) within SPD group for 
social > gender contrast  
 
Within CM group 
No significant regions of activation were seen in the CM group in either the social > 





5.3.2.4: Group x condition interactions 
The group x condition interaction provides an estimate of the difference between the 
groups with respect to the change in activation during the social decision compared to the 
gender decision.  It thus represents an approximation of the activity associated with the 
purely social aspects of the task, as the non-specific visual and decision making elements 
are controlled for.  As this contrast is more subtle than the previous ones, the initial 
height threshold was set as p=0.005 uncorrected.  However, all significance values 
reported are FWE corrected for multiple comparisons.  The results for the groups are 












Group x Condition Interaction: ASD versus Control 
The ASD group showed significantly less activation than the control group in the 
posterior cerebellum bilaterally when making a social judgement as compared to a gender 
judgement (Table 5.6 and Figures 5.8 – 5.9).  No areas were activated significantly more 
in the ASD group than the controls.   
 
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
ASD > Control 
 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      
 
ASD < Control 
 
      
R. cerebellum 
   - VI, VIIa Crus I and II 
 
30 -58 -44 126 0.050 4.16 
L. cerebellum 
   - VI, VIIa Crus I and II 
 
-45 -55 -41 329 0.07 3.52 
Table 5.6: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 






Figure 5.8: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 
using the social > gender contrast between the ASD and control groups. 
Blue – green clusters represent areas of less activation increase in ASD compared to 
control group 





 a  b 
Figure 5.9: Graphs showing difference values of extracted eigenvariates from (a) right 
cerebellum (30 -58 -44) and (b) left cerebellum (-45 -55 -41) clusters detailed in Table 
5.6 
 
Group x Condition Interaction: SPD versus Control 
No significant clusters were seen for the SPD versus control group x condition 
interaction. 
 
Group x Condition Interaction: CM versus Control 











Group x condition interaction: ASD versus SPD 
Significantly greater activation was found in the SPD group compared to the ASD group 
when making social compared to gender judgements in several clusters covering the 
posterior cerebellum, fusiform and inferior temporal gyri bilaterally, and the left superior 
temporal gyrus, temporoparietal junction, precuneus and amygdala, and right hemisphere 
occipital regions (Table 5.7 and Figures 5.10 – 5.12).   
 
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
ASD > SPD 
 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      
 
ASD < SPD 
 
      
L. fusiform gyrus 
L. inferior temporal gyrus 
L. superior temporal gyrus 
L. precuneus 
 
-24 -52 -31 403 0.04 3.55 
L. cerebellum 
   - anterior, VI, VIIa Crus I & II, VIIb 
R. cerebellum 
   - anterior 
 
-15 -40 -38 652 0.005 4.18 
R. cerebellum 
   - VI, VIIa Crus I & VIIIb 
R. inferior occipital gyrus 
R. middle occipital gyrus 
R. fusiform gyrus 
R. inferior temporal gyrus 
 
33 -64 -44 1554 <0.001 4.54 
L. amygdala 
 
-18 -10 -14  0.046SVC 3.00 
Table 5.7: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 






Figure 5.10: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 
using the social > gender contrast between the ASD and SPD groups. 
Blue – green clusters represent areas of less activation increase in ASD compared to SPD 
group 






Figure 5.11: Graphs showing difference values of extracted eigenvariates from (a) 
temporoparietal cluster (-24 52 -31) (b) left cerebellum cluster (-15 -40 -38) and (c) right 
cerebellum cluster (33 -64 -44) detailed in Table 5.7 
 
           
Figure 5.12: Location of increased amygdala activation (-18 10 14) and graph of 
difference values of extracted eigenvariates for social > gender contrast in SPD group 





Group x condition interaction: ASD versus CM 
The increase in activation in the social relative to the gender judgment was greater in the 
CM group compared to the ASD group in the left pre- and post-central gyri, the right 
cerebellum and cerebellar vermis (Table 5.8 and Figures 5.13 – 5.14) 
 
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
ASD > CM 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      
 
ASD < CM 
      
L. postcentral gyrus 
L. precentral gyrus 
L. superior frontal gyrus 
 
-18 -19 49 844 0.001 3.94 
R. cerebellum (VI, VIIa, VIIb) 
Cerebellar vermis (VIIIa) 
 
24 -55 -41 404 0.04 3.84 
Table 5.8: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 
using the social > gender contrast between the ASD and CM groups. 
 
a      b 
Figure 5.13: Graphs showing difference values of extracted eigenvariates from (a) 





Figure 5.14: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 
using the social > gender contrast between the ASD and CM groups. 
Blue–green clusters are areas of less activation change in ASD compared to CM group 




 Group x condition interaction: SPD versus CM 
The SPD group displayed a trend towards significantly greater activation than the CM 
group in a cluster which extended from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex around to the 
orbital frontal cortex, and included the right inferior frontal gyrus (Table 5.9 and Figures 
5.15 – 5.16).   
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
SPD > CM 
 
      
R.inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. triangularis 
R. middle frontal gyrus 
R. superior frontal gyrus 
R. superior orbital gyrus 
 
51 35 25 308 0.09 4.59 
 
SPD < CM 
 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      
Table 5.9: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 
using the social > gender contrast between the ASD and CM groups. 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Graph showing difference values of extracted eigenvariates from the frontal 





Figure 5.16: Brain regions showing differences in the relative increase in activation seen 
using the social > gender contrast between the SPD and CM groups. 
Red-yellow clusters represent areas of greater activation change in SPD compared to CM 
group 




5.3.2.5: Analysis of potential confounding factors 
In order to assess the effect of potential confounding variables, the difference between the 
extracted eigenvariates of the social and gender conditions was regressed against IQ and 
performance on the approachability task, with group as a covariate.  No significant 
relationships were seen, suggesting that the reported differences are not due to 
performance or IQ differences between the groups.   
 
5.3.2.6: Relationship between clinical traits and extracted difference values  
There was a trend towards a significant difference between the groups in the relationship 
between the extracted value for the left frontal cluster identified in the ASD < CM 
contrast (MNI -18 -19 49) and negative symptoms as measured by the SIS (p=0.08).  A 
significant positive relationship was seen between these measures in the CM group 
(r=0.69, p=0.03) while a trend towards a significant negative relationship was seen in the 
SPD group (r=-0.40, p=0.09).  No significant relationships were seen in the ASD or 
control groups (both p >0.26) (Figure 5.17a) 
 
A trend towards a significant interaction for the same cluster was also seen for 
disorganised schizotypal traits (p=0.08).  In this case however, the ASD group showed a 
trend towards a significant negative relationship (r=-0.35, p=0.09) whereas the other 
groups showed no significant relationships (all p> 0.17) (Figure 5.17b).   
 
No other significant group x activation interaction effects on clinical traits were 





a     b 
Figure 5.17: Graphs demonstrating relationship of (a) negative and (b) disorganised 
schizotypal traits with difference values of eigenvariates extracted from cluster located at 
MNI co-ordinate -18 -19 49, identified in ASD < CM contrast. 
 
 
5.3.3: N-back task analysis 
 
5.3.3.1: Performance 
The scores for each group did not differ significantly in the 0-back and 1-back conditions.  
For the 2-back there was a trend towards a significant main effect of group (F=2.57, 
p=0.06) with the controls achieving higher scores than the ASD, SPD and CM groups 
(p=0.06, 0.06 and 0.02 respectively).  For the 3-back condition, there was again a trend 
towards a significant main effect (F=2.19, p=0.097), with the SPD group performing 
significantly less well than the controls (p=0.02) and the CM showing a trend towards 
significantly reduced performance compared to the controls (p=0.097).  There were no 






Figure 5.18: Performance on the n-back working memory task as working memory load 




5.3.3.2: Main effect of condition 
The main effect of condition is a measure of the change in brain activation as working 
memory (WM) load increases across the conditions (i.e. 1-back up to 3-back) in all four 
groups considered together.  Increasing WM load was associated with increased 
activations located mainly in the dorsolateral and superior medial frontal cortex, parietal 
lobes, basal ganglia and the posterior cerebellum (Table 5.10 and Figure 5.19).  
Reductions in activation were seen in the anterior, middle and posterior cingulate, insula, 
superior temporal gyrus, pre- and post-central gyri, fusiform gyri and parahippocampus 
(Tables 5.11 and Figure 5.19).    
 




      
L. & R. middle frontal gyrus 
L. supplementary motor area 
L. & R. precentral gyrus 
L. & R. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. opercularis and p. orbitalis 
R. orbital gyrus  
R. inferior medial frontal gyrus 
L. insula 
L. & R. caudate 
 
-30 8 58 5994 <0.001 ∞ 
L. & R. inferior parietal lobule 
R. supramarginal gyrus 
R. angular gyrus 
L. & R. precuneus 
 
-33 -58 43 2772 <0.001 ∞ 
R. cerebellum 
   - VI & VIIa 
 
36 -64 -32 116 0.07 5.75 
Table 5.10: Brain regions showing increasing activation as WM load increased when all 










      
R. supramarginal gyrus 
R. superior temporal gyrus 
R. insula 
R. postcentral gyrus 
R. precentral gyrus 
R. temporal pole 
 
57 -28 19 1358 <0.001 7.51 
L. posterior cingulate 
R. precentral gyrus 
L. & R. postcentral gyrus 
L. & R. middle cingulate 
L. superior parietal lobule 
L. & R. paracentral lobule 
L. & R. fusiform gyrus 
R. anterior cerebellum 
R. parahippocampus 
 
-6 -52 22 3522 <0.001 6.97 
L. inferior medial frontal gyrus 
L anterior cingulate 
L. superior frontal gyrus 
-6 59 7 595 <0.001 6.57 
L. superior temporal gyrus 
L. insula 
 
-54 -28 10 789 <0.001 5.91 
L. angular gyrus 
L middle temporal gyrus 
 
-54 -70 25 126 0.06 4.96 









Figure 5.19: Regions showing changes in activation as WM load increases 
Red-yellow – increasing activation; blue-green – decreasing activation 






5.3.3.3: Brain activation within each group  
 
Within Controls 
Similar to the main effect of condition analysis, controls showed increases in activation in 
dorsolateral and superior medial frontal regions, parietal regions, basal ganglia and the 
cerebellum as WM load increased (Table 5.12 and Figure 5.20).    




      
L. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. opercularis & p. triangularis 
R. middle frontal gyrus 
L. & R. superior frontal gyrus 
L. & R. precentral gyrus 
L. supplementary motor area 
L. & R. insula 
L. globus pallidus 
R. caudate 
 
-45 17 19 5178 <0.001 ∞ 
L. inferior parietal lobule 
R. supramarginal gyrus 
R. precuneus 
L. superior parietal lobule 
R. angular gyrus 
 
-33 -58 43 3431 <0.001 7.75 
R. cerebellum 
   - VI, VIIa Crus I &II 
 
33 -64 -35 472 <0.001 6.26 
L. lingual gyrus 
 
-15 -97 -11 151 0.04 4.58 
R. lingual gyrus 
R. calcarine gyrus 
 
21 -91 -8 107 0.09 4.31 
Cerebellar vermis 
 
-3 -25 20 114 0.08 4.07 






Decreases in activation were also found in similar regions to the main effect of condition 
analysis: midline regions, the superior temporal lobe and insula (Table 5.13 and Figure 
5.20).   
 




      
R. supramarginal gyrus 
R. rolandic operculum 
R. insula 
R. superior temporal gyrus 
 
57 -28 19 800 <0.001 6.02 
L. superior medial frontal gyrus 
L. anterior cingulate 
L. superior frontal gyrus 
 
-6 59 7 593 <0.001 5.89 
L. superior temporal gyrus 
L. temporal pole 
L. amygdala 
 
-39 -16 -5 484 <0.001 5.66 
L. posterior cingulate 
 
-3 -52 25 200 0.02 5.49 
L. & R. postcentral gyrus 
R. paracentral lobule 
R. supplementary motor area 
 
18 -37 64 1060 <0.001 5.40 








Figure 5.20: Regions showing changes in activation within control group as WM load 
increases 
Red-yellow – increasing activation; blue-green – decreasing activation 





Within ASD group 
AS WM load increased, the ASD group showed increases in activation in dorsolateral 
and superior medial frontal regions, as well as in the parietal lobe (Table 5.14 and Figure 
5.21)  
 




      
L. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p.triangularis & p. opercularis 
L. middle frontal gyrus 
L. supplementary motor area 
L. superior medial frontal gyrus 
 
-48 26 28 1023 <0.001 5.86 
R. middle frontal gyrus 
 
30 8 55 232 <0.001 5.11 
R. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. triangularis 
R. middle frontal gyrus 
 
45 32 28 177 0.02 4.87 
L. inferior parietal lobule 
L. angular gyrus 
 
-36 -58 46 167 0.03 4.12 
R. supramarginal gyrus 
R. angular gyrus 
R. inferior parietal lobule 
 
48 -40 40 194 0.02 4.11 










Decreases in activation within the ASD group as WM load increased were seen in the 
cingulate gyrus, anterior superior medial frontal lobe, superior temporal regions, insula, 
postcentral gyrus and occipital regions (Table 5.15 and Figure 5.21).   
 




      
L. posterior cingulate 
R. paracentral lobule 
L. superior parietal lobule 
L. & R. postcentral gyrus 
L. middle cingulate 
L. calcarine gyrus 
 
-6 -52 22 2022 <0.001 5.70 
R. rolandic operculum 
R. insula 
 
57 -28 22 476 <0.001 4.90 
L. middle temporal gyrus 
L. occipital gyrus 
 
-51 -70 19 123 0.06 4.43 
L. superior temporal gyrus 
L. insula 
 
-39 -25 -2 272 0.004 4.22 
L. & R. superior medial frontal gyrus 
 
9 56 13 103 0.095 3.91 
L. anterior cingulate 
 
      












Figure 5.21: Regions in ASD group showing changes in activation as WM load increases 
Red-yellow – increasing activation; blue-green – decreasing activation 






Within SPD group 
Within the SPD group, increasing WM load was associated with increasing activity in the 
dorsolateral and superior medial frontal cortex and the parietal lobe (Table 5.16 and 
Figure 5.22). 
 




      
L. supplementary motor area 
L. middle frontal gyrus 
L. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. triangularis 
L. precentral gyrus 
 
-3 17 49 1714 <0.001 7.12 
R. middle frontal gyrus 
R. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. opercularis 
 
45 35 31 953 <0.001 6.16 
L. inferior parietal lobule 
L. superior parietal lobule 
 
-33 -46 37 742 <0.001 5.65 
R. angular gyrus 
R. supramarginal gyrus 
R. precuneus 
 
36 -64 40 747 <0.001 5.64 











Reductions in activity as WM load increased were seen in the anterior superior medial 
frontal lobe, cingulate gyrus, insula and superior temporal regions (Table 5.17 and Figure 
5.22). 
 




      
R. rolandic operculum 
R. supramarginal gyrus 
R. superior temporal gyrus 
R. Heschl’s gyrus 
R. insula 
 
54 -28 22 1263 <0.001 6.94 
L. anterior cingulate 
L & R. superior medial frontal gyrus 
L. superior frontal gyrus 
 
0 41 1 479 <0.001 6.06 
L. posterior cingulate 
L. & R. fusiform gyrus 
L. calcarine gyrus 
R. postcentral gyrus 
L. & R. middle cingulate cortex 
R. middle temporal gyrus 
R. paracentral lobule 
 
-6 -52 22 2242 <0.001 5.73 
L. superior temporal gyrus 
L. insula 
-54 -31 10 665 <0.001 5.14 











Figure 5.22: Regions in SPD group showing changes in activation as WM load increases 
Red-yellow – increasing activation; blue-green – decreasing activation 






Within CM group 
As WM load increased the CM group showed increases in activation in the dorsolateral 
and superior medial frontal regions (table 5.17 and Figure 5.23).  There were no regions 
in which significant decreases in brain activation during increasing WM load were seen. 
 




      
L. middle frontal gyrus 
L. precentral gyrus 
L inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. opercularis 
 
-36 8 61 323 0.002 5.65 
L. middle frontal gyrus 
L. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. triangularis 
 
-42 32 40 111 0.08 4.62 
R. middle frontal gyrus 
R. inferior frontal gyrus 
   - p. opercularis 
48 32 34 254 0.006 4.43 
L. superior medial gyrus 
R. supplementary motor area 
 
-6 23 43 276 0.004 4.30 
R. middle frontal gyrus 
R. superior frontal gyrus 
 
24 17 52 180 0.02 3.93 










Figure 5.23: Regions in CM group showing changes in activation as WM load increases 
Red-yellow – increasing activation; no regions of decreasing activation were seen 






5.3.3.4: Group x condition interaction: increasing WM load 
 
ASD versus Control 
Significantly less increase in activation was seen in the ASD group compared to controls 
as WM load increased in a cluster which stretched from the left superior parietal lobule 
into the cuneus and calcarine gyrus (Table 5.18 and Figures 5.24-5.25).  Note that this 
cluster may also result from greater decrease in activation in the ASD group as WM load 
increases.  No significantly greater increases in activation were seen in the ASD group.   
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
ASD > Control 
 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      
 
ASD < Control 
 
      
L. superior parietal lobule 
L. calcarine gyrus 
L. cuneus 
 
-21 -49 40 612 0.004 3.63 
Table 5.18: Brain regions showing differences in the degree of increased activation 
between the ASD and control groups as WM load increases  
 
 





Figure 5.25: Cluster of significantly less increase in activation in the ASD group 







SPD versus Control 
Significantly less increase in activation was seen in a bilateral parietal-occipital cluster in 
the SPD group compared to the control group as WM load increased (Table 5.19 and 
Figures 5.26 – 5.27).  This pattern of differences could also be caused by a significantly 
greater decrease in activation in the SPD group as WM load increases.  No other 
significant differences were seen.   
Regions  MNI of peak Extent PFWE Zpeak 
 
SPD > Control 
 
      
No significant clusters 
 
      
 
SPD < Control 
 
      
L. & R. calcarine gyrus 
L. cuneus 
L. & R. precuneus 
R. middle temporal gyrus 
R. lingual gyrus 
 
-21 -67 16 946 <0.001 4.25 
Table 5.19: Brain regions showing differences in the degree of increased activation 
between the SPD and control groups as WM load increases  
 
 





Figure 5.27: Cluster of significantly less increase in activation in the SPD group 







Other group x condition interactions 
No significant differences were seen in any of the other group x condition interactions 
(CM versus control, ASD versus SPD, ASD versus CM and SPD versus CM).   
 
 
5.3.3.5: Examination of potential confounding factors 
Partial correlations controlling for group revealed no significant relationships between 
activation in the two clusters identified as differing between the groups and either IQ or 
task performance at any level (all p>0.22). 
 
 
5.3.3.6: Relationship between clinical traits and extracted difference values 
There was a significant interaction between positive schizotypal traits, as measured by 
the SIS, and activation in the parieto-occipital cluster identified in the SPD < Control 
analysis (p=0.04).  The SPD group showed a significant negative relationship between 
activation difference in this cluster and increasing positive symptoms (r=-0.48, p=0.04): 
i.e. worse positive symptoms were associated with less of an increase in activation (or a 
greater decrease in activation) in this region.  No significant relationships were seen in 
the other groups (r=-0.30, p=-.16 for ASD; r=-0.27, p=0.49 for CM; and r=0.11, p=0.64 
for controls) although inspection of the scatterplot suggested that the greatest difference 
was between the SPD group and the CM group (Figure 5.28).  No other significant 






Figure 5.28: Relationship of positive schizotypal traits with difference values of 
eigenvariates extracted from temporo-parieto-occipital cluster (peak: MNI -21 -67 16), 

















Consistent with the hypothesis, differences were found between people with ASD and 
those with SPD in relation to the social judgment task.  Despite similar behavioural 
performance in the ASD and SPD groups, fMRI revealed clear differences between them 
when making judgements of approachability compared to judgments of gender in regions 
of the brain known to be associated with social cognition: the fusiform gyrus, precuneus, 
temporoparietal junction and amygdala.  This marked difference in social brain function 
stands in contrast to the results identified using the n-back task where there were no 
significant differences between the ASD, SPD and CM groups.     
 
Social judgment task 
For the social judgement tasks, when all participants were considered together, greater 
activations in the social condition compared to the gender condition were seen in many of 
the social brain regions reviewed in Chapter 2 suggesting that the task reliably taps social 
cognitive functions.  The regions activated included the inferior frontal gyrus, medial 
prefrontal lobe, temporoparietal junction, temporal pole, insula, amygdala and posterior 
cerebellum.  When the within group activation maps were considered, the SPD group and 
to a lesser extent the controls showed activations within many of these regions.  In 
contrast the ASD group and the CM group showed little, if any increases in activation 
when making social compared to gender judgments.   
 
This impression of greater activity in the SPD compared to the ASD group was borne out 




people with SPD compared to those with ASD in the precuneus, temporoparietal 
junction, fusiform gyrus, visual cortex (mainly ventral V3 and V4), amygdala and 
posterior cerebellum in the social > gender contrast.  These differences in social brain 
regions suggest that the mentalising deficits which occur in both groups are associated 
with different underlying mechanisms and imply that, from a social perspective at least, 
ASD and SPD are potentially quite different conditions.   
 
Although there were few significant clinical group – control differences apparent, 
inspection of the graphs of the extracted eigenvariate difference values shows that for 
many of these regions the SPD group show the greatest activity, the ASD group the least 
and the controls sitting between them.  This is broadly consistent with the hypo- and 
hyper-mentalising theories of these conditions (Abu-Akel and Bailey 2000; Frith 2004), 
although it should be noted that increased activity in a mentalising region does not 
necessarily equate to hypermentalisation per se.  For example it may mean that a region 
has to generate more activity to accomplish a typical degree, or even a reduced degree, of 
mentalising.   
 
Increased activity in the temporoparietal junction has been reported in people with 
schizophrenia compared to controls when making judgements of a non-social, but not a 
social, nature (Bara, Ciaramidaro et al. 2011) which the authors interpret as indicating 
that people with schizophrenia are inappropriately reading intentions into non-intentional 
stimuli, an idea similar to that of Blakemore et al (2003).  The findings of the current 




social judgments, as opposed to being ‘inappropriately switched-on’ at other times as has 
been reported for schizophrenia.  This in turn may represent a correlate of the mechanism 
by which individuals with SPD are spared the more severe symptomatology associated 
with schizophrenia.  A direct comparison between schizophrenia and SPD would help to 
confirm or refute this hypothesis.   
 
The decrease in activation in the posterior cerebellum seen between the ASD and SPD 
groups are also seen, but to a lesser extent, in the ASD versus CM and ASD versus 
control comparisons, indicating that function in this region is particularly affected in 
ASD.   Although classically associated with motor co-ordination, the cerebellum, 
particularly the posterior aspect, has been found to be activated during a wide variety of 
cognitive and emotional fMRI tasks (Stoodley and Schmahmann 2009; Keren-Happuch, 
Chen et al. 2012).   As well as the fMRI evidence, patients with known organic lesions of 
the cerebellum, either through stroke (Roldan Gerschcovich, Cerquetti et al. 2011) or 
spinocerebellar ataxia (Garrard, Martin et al. 2008) have been reported to show 
impairments in mentalising.  The cerebellum was one of the earliest sites identified as 
abnormal in ASD in both post-mortem (Bauman and Kemper 1985) and structural MRI 
studies (Courchesne, Yeung-Courchesne et al. 1988).  fMRI studies in ASD have also 
identified differences in cerebellar function compared to controls, including in tasks of 
social cognition (Critchley, Daly et al. 2000; Deeley, Daly et al. 2007; Herrington, Baron-





In the clusters where the ASD and SPD groups differed, the CM group tended to show 
increases in activation which were similar to the SPD group, as opposed to the decreases 
which were seen in the ASD group (Figures 5.11 – 5.12).  This could suggest that the CM 
group are in fact similar to the SPD group, as opposed to being truly comorbid for both 
ASD and SPD.  However, there were also differences found between the CM and the 
ASD in the cerebellum and the around the central sulcus, and between the CM and SPD 
group in the prefrontal cortex.  The cerebellar cluster identified is similar to that observed 
in other comparisons and reflects a consistent decrease in cerebellar activation in the 
ASD group compared to all the other groups.  However, with respect to the two frontal 
clusters the CM group are quite different from both the ASD and SPD groups, suggesting 
that these represent aberrances in brain function which are unique to this group.  This is 
supported by the symptom – difference value correlations for the central sulcus cluster 
where the CM group show quite different relationships from the other groups (Figure 
5.17).  One possible interpretation of these findings is that individuals who meet criteria 
for both ASD and SPD have neither one disorder or the other, nor do they simply have 
the features of both.  It is possible that the combination of the two disorders is additive 
such that less pronounced brain activation differences become more apparent when the 
two are combined.   Alternatively it may be that the CM group are also affected by an 
additional factor (or factors) associated with frontal lobe dysfunction.  However, the 
small number of participants in the CM group prevents any firm conclusions from being 





The current study provides little evidence to suggest that specific clinical dimensions are 
related to different underlying mechanisms in people with ASD compared to those with 
SPD.  None of the clusters which differed significantly between the ASD and SPD 
groups showed interactions between activation and group membership on the degree of 
either autistic or schizotypal traits.  There was some suggestion that negative schizotypal 
traits showed a negative association with activation in the central sulcus cluster defined 
from the ASD<CM contrast in the SPD group but not the ASD group, but the 
significance of this interaction was driven more by the difference between the SPD and 
CM group than that between the ASD and SPD groups.  It should be noted however, that 
the current design matrix was not set up to specifically explore symptom effects and it is 
possible that differences between the groups in activation-symptom relationships exist 
outwith the regions which differed significantly between the groups.   
 
N-back task 
When all the groups were considered together significant increases in activation were 
seen as WM load increased in the dorsolateral and dorsomedial frontal regions, parietal 
lobes, basal ganglia and cerebellum.  These findings are broadly in line with those of the 
meta-analysis of Owen et al (2005) which primarily identified frontoparietal regions to be 
involved in working memory.  Decreases in activation were seen throughout the cingulate 
gyrus, in the pre- and post-central gyri, insula, and temporal regions.  Again these are 
broadly consistent with previous studies of task related activations (Tomasi, Ernst et al. 




regions which are active at rest, the default mode network (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna et 
al. 2008).   
 
The within group maps showed activation of similar regions to those outlined above.  The 
ASD, SPD and especially the CM groups appeared to activate these regions less 
extensively than the controls.  Deactivations appeared broadly similar in the ASD, SPD 
and control groups; the CM group showed no significant areas of deactivation.  When the 
parametric contrast to examine increasing WM load was employed, compared to the 
controls, the ASD group showed a significantly smaller increase in activation (or a larger 
decrease in activation) in the left lateral parietal lobe stretching into the occipital lobe; 
whereas the SPD group showed a significantly smaller increase in activation (or a larger 
decrease in activation) in the posterior medial parietal and occipital regions bilaterally.  
No significant differences were seen between the CM group and the controls, or between 
any of the ASD, SPD and CM groups.   
 
The lack of a difference between the ASD and the SPD groups is in contrast to the 
original hypothesis that the groups would differ with respect to the compensatory 
mechanisms employed to carry out the n-back task successfully.  Although the ASD and 
SPD groups showed slightly different changes in activation as WM load increased 
compared to controls (see below), these did not differ significantly between the groups 
and inspection of the plots of the extracted values indicates that no difference is likely.  In 
addition, activation within these regions did not relate to performance on the task 




with ASD and those with SPD cannot be separated with regard to the brain activation 
associated with working memory, be it compensatory or deficit related.    
 
Comparing the within group activation map for the ASD and the control groups (Figures 
5.20 and 5.21) shows that both groups significantly activate the left lateral parietal lobe as 
WM load increases.  The difference between the groups in the direct contrast likely 
represents a failure to activate this region in response to increased WM load in the ASD 
group.  This is in contrast to the prediction that people with ASD would show greater 
activation of posterior brain regions to compensate for hypofrontality, indicative of a 
visual processing style.  Instead the findings of the current study suggest that individuals 
with ASD show a relative failure to recruit the parietal lobe as WM load increases in the 
presence of preserved frontal lobe function. It is possible that this relates to reductions in 
long range connectivity which have previously been described in ASD (Philip, 
Dauvermann et al. 2012).   
 
When the within group maps for the SPD and control groups are compared, it is apparent 
that both show decreases in activation in the medial parietal lobe as WM load increases.  
Thus, the difference between the groups identified in the direct contrast is likely due to 
greater deactivation of the posterior medial parietal lobe in the SPD group.  The posterior 
medial parietal lobe is well established as forming part of the default mode network 
(Buckner, Andrews-Hanna et al. 2008).  This is a network of brain regions which are 
known to be active at rest and hypothesised to relate to monitoring of the environment 




2008).  The latter in particular concerns socially mediated judgements which are known 
to involve many of the medial brain regions involved in the default mode network.  
Individuals with SPD therefore show a greater deactivation of one component of the 
default mode network, which may reflect higher baseline activity in this region.  
Consistent with this, increased connectivity of the default mode network at rest has been 
previously reported in people with schizophrenia (Broyd, Demanuele et al. 2009).  The 
current findings suggest that this too may be the case in SPD and are consistent with the 
idea that schizophrenia spectrum disorders are associated with aberrant self-monitoring 
and hypermentalisation (Frith 1992; Abu-Akel and Bailey 2000; Frith 2004).  This 
interpretation is further supported by the significant relationship seen in the SPD group 
between positive schizotypal traits and increasing deactivation of this region (Figure 
5.28).  It should however be noted that the contrast used in the current study is of changes 
in activation as working memory load increased from the 1-back condition to the 3-back 
condition.  Thus the potential over-activation at baseline in fact represents an over-
activation during the 1-back task, as opposed to in a true resting state, and a greater 
deactivation in this region under the 3-back condition.  That this finding did not relate to 
task performance suggests that this change is not simply due to failure to complete the 
task, rather it may relate to an inappropriate persistence of baseline overactivation in the 
easier working memory task, which cannot be maintained as working memory load 
increases.  The inclusion of a baseline rest component to the n-back task would have 





It is interesting to note that the relationship between the deactivation described above and 
positive schizotypal traits differs between the CM and other groups, particularly the CM 
and SPD groups. This is consistent with the findings for the symptom-activation 
relationships reported for the social judgement task and provide further preliminary 
evidence that the CM group differ from both the ASD and SPD groups.    
 
Conclusion 
Despite similar behavioural performance, significant differences in activation were seen 
in social brain regions when individuals with ASD and SPD were asked to make a social 
judgement.  Individuals with SPD over-activated such regions compared to those with 
ASD who showed reduced activation, with the controls tending to sit midway between 
the two.  These findings are consistent with the idea that SPD is associated with 
hypermentalising and ASD is associated with hypomentalising.  In contrast, no 
differences were found between the groups with respect to brain activation during a 
working memory task suggesting that the differences between the groups may be 
primarily related to social cognitive processes, as opposed to executive function.  
Individuals who meet criteria for both disorders, may have additional factors which 
account for their difficulties, over and above those associated with either of the single 





















6.1: Findings of the current study 
This is the first study to comprehensively compare ASD and SPD across a range of 
features derived from clinical, neuropsychological and functional brain imaging 
investigations.  In the clinical study it was found that it was possible to clinically 
distinguish individuals with ASD and SPD in most cases, although just under 20% of 
participants met criteria for both conditions and these individuals were more severely 
affected across multiple clinical domains than either condition alone.  Even when a single 
diagnosis could be made, there were clear overlaps of clinical features and each condition 
showed more traits of the other than were seen in controls.  The overlaps were most 
prominent for negative schizotypal traits which did not differ between the groups.  The 
degree of similarity between the disorders was even more striking in the 
neuropsychological study.  Both showed similar evidence of impairment in social 
cognitive and executive function tasks, with only minimal differences seen in local-global 
processing (and these were potentially confounded by IQ).  The fMRI study was more 
revealing of differences between the groups with respect to social cognition.  Despite 
similar behavioural performance on the social judgement task there were clear activation 
differences seen between the ASD and SPD groups in social brain regions and the 
cerebellum.  Differences also existed between the CM and the ASD and SPD groups 
suggesting that this condition represent more than the simple addition of ASD and SPD.  
When activations during a working memory task were considered there were no 
significant differences between the ASD, SPD and CM groups.  Correlations of the 




the groups did not convincingly reveal any clear differences between them with regard to 
the mechanisms by which their symptomatology might develop.   
 
6.2: What do the findings tell us about the relationship between ASD and SPD? 
As reviewed in the introduction to Chapter 2, two major theories have been advanced to 
conceptualise the relationship between the autism and schizophrenia spectrums.  The first 
is that the two conditions are diametrically opposed disorders which result from sexually 
dimorphic genomic imprinting (Crespi and Badcock 2008).  The second hypothesis is 
that autism and schizophrenia are related disorders, occupying two points on a broad 
spectrum of neurodevelopmental disorders (Carroll and Owen 2009; Craddock and Owen 
2010; Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics, Smoller et al. 2013).   
 
The findings from the neuroimaging study could be used to support either of these 
positions; the ‘double dissociation’ of brain activations shown in the social judgement 
task is consistent with the idea that the conditions are diametrically opposed, whereas the 
lack of significant differences in the fMRI of the n-back task is consistent with the idea 
that the two are related disorders.  However, the results from the clinical and 
neuropsychological components of the current investigation are more in keeping with the 
idea that ASD and SPD are related disorders which show partial overlap.  Further 
evidence for this comes from the lack of convincing evidence that different brain 
mechanisms are associated with the overlapping clinical features of the conditions.  If 
they were indeed fundamentally opposed as suggested by Crespi and Badcock (2008) one 




associations with brain function.  This was not observed within the context of the current 
study.  Finally, that a significant proportion of individuals exist who meet criteria for both 
conditions is difficult to equate with the idea that the two disorders are in opposition to 
each other.     
 
Although the overall evidence from the current study suggests that there is a partial 
overlap between the autism and schizophrenia spectrums, the clearest positive findings 
were that the two conditions show opposing mechanisms with respect to their mentalising 
impairments.  This would suggest that, in this aspect at least, the disorders are distinct.  
Although there is considered to be genetic overlap between autism and schizophrenia 
(Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics, Smoller et al. 2013), there are also 
many genes which are thought to be associated with one condition and not the other 
(Crespi, Stead et al. 2010).  The effect of the genetic factors which are not shared 
between the conditions may be such as to produce this double dissociation in social brain 
function, either independently or through their interaction with shared genetic factors.  
Alternatively, it is possible that differences between the conditions in spatiotemporal 
gene expression, epigenetic factors or gene-environment interactions may be responsible 
for the apparently opposing brain activity described.      
 
More broadly speaking, it is apparent from the historical review in Chapter 1 that the 
diagnoses of ASD and SPD have been derived from observed clinical phenomena in 
individuals affected by these conditions and / or their relatives.  There has been no 




psychiatric classification) and they have arisen largely from different traditions (for 
example, ASD has arisen from behavioural observations made in child psychiatry, 
whereas SPD focuses more upon cognitive symptoms from an adult psychiatric tradition).  
The findings from the current study suggest the possibility that mentalising style may be 
one way in which an overarching cognitive framework could be used to inform future 
classification.  This is in keeping with the Research Domain Criteria initiative by the 
National Institute of Mental Health in the USA, which proposes giving up conventional 
psychiatric diagnosis and focusing on domains of function developed from social, 
biological and cognitive science.  It would be appealing to recruit a group of individuals 
with multiple different psychiatric diagnoses relating to social dysfunction (e.g. avoidant 
personality disorder, SPD, ASD, social phobia) and examine whether individuals could 
be categorised into hypo- and hyper-mentalising.  If this were possible one could then 
consider whether these groups determined on mentalising style clustered on other clinical 
and biological features, and on response to specific treatments.   
 
6.4: What are the practical implications of the current study? 
 The study carries a number of implications for clinical practice.  Perhaps the most 
immediate is that clinicians should be alert to the possibility that individuals with one 
condition may also meet criteria for the other and that people who are thus affected show 
particularly high levels of psychiatric morbidity across multiple domains.  Indeed, the 
high levels of psychiatric disorder identified in all of the clinical groups stands in contrast 
to the relatively low self-reporting of previous mental disorder diagnoses, suggesting that 




immediately, the differences between the groups in the social brain activity associated 
with mentalising impairments suggest that treatments directed at improving social 
dysfunction need to be appropriately tailored to each group.  
 
Outwith clinical practice the relatively high co-occurrence of ASD and SPD has 
important implications for academic research studies directed at elucidating aetiological 
or pathophysiological factors of these conditions.  This is particularly important given 
those who met criteria for both disorders show differences in brain activity than were 
seen for either disorder alone.  Although many studies of ASD will exclude individuals 
who have an Axis I psychiatric disorder, to the author’s knowledge none consider the 
presence of SPD as an exclusion criterion.  Similarly, again to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no studies of SPD have examined for the presence of ASD in their sample.  
The findings of the present study suggest that without considering these as exclusion 
criteria, such samples are likely to have increased heterogeneity and subsequently 
reduced power to find true positive results.   
 
6.5: Methodological issues  
There are a number of methodological issues in the current study which deserve 
comment.  Firstly, the sample size is relatively small, particularly for the comorbid group, 
meaning that the degree of confidence in negative results in particular is limited.  A larger 
sample of participants may have identified more subtle but important differences between 
the groups.  The recruitment of individuals who have conditions associated with social 




investigation.  This is highlighted by the fact that although relatively small, the current 
study is the largest fMRI study ever conducted in SPD and one of the largest for ASD.   
 
Like most research studies, the sample recruited may not be representative of the 
generality of people with ASD and SPD.  The limitation to relatively high IQ individuals 
means that it is not possible to extend the findings to the approximately 50-70% of people 
with ASD who also have intellectual disability (Matson and Shoemaker 2009).  However, 
this was necessary in order to provide a fair comparison to people with SPD, the majority 
of whom are not known to be intellectually disabled.  In addition, the samples were 
recruited from several different sources, with the major difference being that all 
individuals with ASD had been diagnosed by a specialist diagnostic service, whereas 
those with SPD were mainly derived from a previous research sample and had not been 
in contact with clinical services.  Thus the ASD sample may represent a relatively more 
affected group with this condition than the SPD sample.  However, the median score on 
the ADOS was 7 which is the lower limit of the cut-off for ASD on this instrument, 
suggesting that the current sample of people with ASD was actually a relatively mildly 
affected one. It is also important to note that many of the participants, including the entire 
CM group, had a history of psychiatric disorder which may have affected the results.  In 
part this may relate to the fact that the ASD group were recruited from a clinical service, 
although this was not the case for the SPD group who also showed high levels of 
comorbid psychiatric disorder.  Differences between the groups in terms of psychiatric 
history may have confounded the differences reported.  However, to exclude such 




of individuals affected by these conditions.   Finally, with regard to subject selection, 
individuals who volunteer to take part in research are a self-selecting group and one 
obvious way this was reflected was in the above-average IQ of the sample.  Less 
obviously, but perhaps more importantly, individuals who were more socially withdrawn 
or with higher levels of persecutory ideation are not likely to volunteer for such studies   
 
From a methodological perspective, the most obvious weakness of the current study was 
that, outwith the fMRI analysis, multiple comparisons were not corrected for, therefore at 
least some of the findings reported in this thesis are likely to have resulted from Type II 
error, particularly those which were unexpected.  Replication of the current findings is 
therefore essential.  A second potential weakness is the lack of use of a standardised 
developmental history in making the diagnosis.  The inclusion of such a history may have 
provided information particularly pertinent to the classification of the CM group.  The 
ADI-R was used to investigate for potential developmental differences between ASD and 
SPD but was not included as a diagnostic measure for two reasons: firstly, it is difficult to 
obtain such a history for many adults with ASD therefore the current study is perhaps 
more reflective of clinical reality; secondly, although it is considered as a gold-standard 
diagnostic measure for autism the ADI-R has not been validated for consideration of the 
broader autism spectrum and therefore was not suitable for the purposes of the current 





6.6: Future directions 
In this, as with any, large dataset there are many analyses over and above the ones 
presented here which can be conducted to further understand the conditions.  
Dysconnectivity has been suggested to be important in both ASD (Müller, Shih et al. 
2011; Just, Keller et al. 2012) and SPD (Hazlett, Goldstein et al. 2012) therefore 
conducting connectivity analyses of the fMRI data may shed further light on the findings 
reported here and perhaps reveal further differences between the groups.  Similarly 
analysis of the structural MRI data which were also collected for the current study may 
provide further information about the relationship between ASD and SPD.  Whether 
specific symptom dimensions which overlap between the groups are associated with 
differing underlying mechanisms could also be investigated more precisely using a 
different statistical design which includes the symptom in question as a covariate and a 
group x symptom interaction term.  In this regard the differences in symptom correlation 
measures which were identified in Chapter 3 should be probed further by looking at more 
precise symptoms, i.e. individual positive or disorganised symptoms, as opposed to 
considering them as groups of symptoms.   
 
Future studies should examine the hypo- versus hyper-mentalising theory of the autism 
and schizophrenia spectrums in more detail.  Hypomentalising is construed as the under-
ascription of mental states to stimuli when such ascriptions would be appropriate; 
hypermentalising therefore represents the inappropriate over-ascription of mental states 
to stimuli.  The social judgement task, as analysed in the current study, considers only 




mentalising.  Clearly clinical difficulties exist in ASD and SPD which go beyond what 
would be expected if only explicit mentalising was affected; therefore consideration 
needs to be given to whether ASD and SPD also differ through opposing implicit 
mentalising styles.  In the past, groups have examined implicit mentalising through the 
use of apparently non-social stimuli, such as moving triangles and shapes.  In such tasks 
the viewer tends to ascribe social actions to the shapes if their movements are 
anthropomorphised (Castelli, Happé et al. 2000; Blakemore, Boyer et al. 2003).  If 
hypermentalisaion exists in a clinical group such tasks should overactivate social brain 
regions compared to controls, similarly hypomentalisaion may be revealed as 
underactivation.  However, the use of such tasks in individuals with ASD may be 
inappropriate as differences in implict ascription of mental states to non-social objects 
could result from concrete or literal thinking as opposed to hypo-mentalisation per se, i.e. 
an individual with ASD may not view shapes as being anything other than shapes which 
is quite different from not implicitly ascribing mental states to a stimulus.  It would 
perhaps be more useful to construct a study where a real social stimulus is used but which 
can contain varying degrees of cues designed to provoke implicit mentalising by, for 
example, varying the degree to which people are seen to be interacting.   
 
In regard to the other domains of cognitive function tested, the current study found few 
differences between the groups, which is somewhat surprising given that the tasks were 
specifically chosen as they were hypothesised to discriminate the groups.  Although this 
may reflect a genuine lack of a difference between the groups or a lack of statistical 




tease out more subtle differences between the groups.  More detailed investigation of the 
local versus global processing bias may be informative, as the current study did not 
consider tasks which fractionate the two processes.   The lack of a difference between the 
groups, even from controls, was particularly striking for the executive function tests.  
More fine grained analysis of executive function may be warranted in the future to 
determine whether there is a true lack of executive deficit.  For example, considering 
several different types of working memory, as opposed to just verbal, and using a more 
difficult continuous performance task than the SART might be beneficial.  However, 
executive dysfunction is present in many different psychiatric disorders and it may be 
unrealistic to expect that either ASD or SPD would show specific deficits not seen in the 
other.   
 
The differences between the groups in positive and disorganised symptom correlations 
with autistic traits merit further study to clarify what they represent.  The basis of 
psychiatric classification relies upon grouping constellations of symptoms into 
syndromes; this carries the implicit assumption that the symptoms within a syndrome 
have some form of shared aetiology and / or pathophysiology.  The differences between 
ASD and SPD identified in the current study imply that these symptoms do not cluster in 
the same way in the groups.  The imaging findings from the current study suggest that at 
a pathohysiological level there are differences between the groups which implies that this 
difference in clustering may relate to the fact that these symptoms are not the same.  If 
true, this would mean that the rating scales used to identify symptoms are not sensitive 




environmental disturbances associated with the development of ASD or SPD overlap 
only insomuch as those factors which are associated with negative symptoms.  It would 
be instructive to design an experiment to consider the potentially shared aetiological 
factors and their relationship with symptoms in each group.  Indeed, determining the 
relationship between identified deficits in all domains and potential aetiological factors 
would also help to establish whether shared or distinct genetic characteristics are 
associated with, for example, the mentalising impairments in the groups.   
 
Finally, the potential relevance of the current work to research into therapeutic 
interventions for ASD and SPD should be considered.  Psychological treatment 
programmes targeted at social deficits in the autism and schizophrenia spectrums should 
be targeted towards the correction of hypo- and hypermentalising respectively.  In 
addition, there is currently great interest in the development of potential medications to 
treat the social deficits of autism (Ecker, Spooren et al. 2012; Murphy and Spooren 2012; 
Farmer, Thurm et al. 2013; Tachibana, Kagitani-Shimono et al. 2013) and the negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia (Hashimoto, Malchow et al. 2013; Miyamoto, Jarskog et al. 
2013) .  Identification of whether an affected individual has a hypo- or a hyper-
mentalising style may be a useful predictor of response to such treatments. 
 
6.6: Conclusions 
It has been over one hundred years since the word autism was first used by Bleuler in the 
context of schizophrenia, and more than sixty years since it became a disorder in its own 




spectrums have occurred, such that spectrum forms of the conditions are now well 
recognised and catered for within structured classificatory systems.  However, the 
relationship between these spectrums has never been clearly established and diagnostic 
separation is difficult.  The current study revealed that substantial overlaps occur between 
the conditions, with regard to both clinical and neuropsychological measures.  However, 
a clear dissociation between the disorders was seen in terms of the brain function 
associated with deficits in understanding the mental states of others.  Thus, the autism 
and schizophrenia spectrums, while likely to be partially overlapping, show clear 
differences in relation to one of their cardinal symptoms such that ASD and SPD are 
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